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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A NASA/NHTSA agreement
to assess advanced air bag
technology
The cause of air bag injury
lies in the design of the air
bag and the variabili_ of the
crash process
1.0 NASA/NHTSA AGREEMENT
As a result of the concern for the growing number of air-bag-induced
injuries and fatalities, the administrators of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) agreed to a cooperative effort that
"leverages NHTSA's expertise in motor vehicle safety restraint
systems and biomechanics with NASA's position as one of the leaders
in advanced technology development.., to enable the state of air bag
safety technology to advance at a faster pace..." They signed a
memorandum of understanding for NASA to "evaluate air bag
performance, establish the technological potential for improved
(smart) air bag systems, and identify key expertise and technology
within the agency (NASA) that can potentially contribute significantly
to the improved effectiveness of air bags." NASA is committed to
contributing to NHTSA's effort to "(1) understand and define critical
parameters affecting air bag performance, (2) systematically assess
air bag technology state of the art and its future potential, and (3)
identify new concepts for air bag systems." The Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL) was selected by NASA to respond to the
memorandum of understanding by conducting an advanced air bag
technology assessment.
2.0 THE PROBLEM
Deploying air bags in moderate-speed crashes have killed at least 44
children and 36 adults between 1990 and October 31, 1997. This
should be considered, however, against the 2,620 people who NHTSA
estimates have been saved by air bags during that same period. To
put these numbers in perspective, there are about 90 light vehicle
occupant fatalities per day from crashes and about 22 of these fatalities
are in frontal crashes, where air bags are designed to provide effective
occupant crash protection.
This automobile safety system is injuring occupants because of the
widely variable nature of motor vehicle crashes and the performance
of current air bag systems. Crashes can happen at any speed and
vary widely in character and severity. The occupants to be protected
are typical of the population as a whole. They include men, women,
and children of all sizes and ages who may, or may not, be belted. A
restraint system, such as an air bag, must respond to this highly varied
and unpredictable need for protection.
Study approach
Today's air bag is a
"one-size-fits-all ""system
Keep-out zone
Design challenges
An inherent design feature of air bags is that they deploy rapidly
toward occupants during a crash. This leads to their tendency to
cause injuries. To deploy, air bags must burst through protective
covers and expand in a very short time. The time from initial impact
to full deployment must be on the order of 50 ms.
3.0 APPROACH AND OVERALL FINDINGS
JPL's interpretation of its mandate led to the following activities.
We analyzed the nature of the need for occupant restraint, how air
bags operate alone and with safety belts to provide restraint, and the
potential hazards introduced by that technology. This yielded a set
of critical parameters for restraint systems. We examined data on the
performance of current air bag technology. Finally, we searched for
and assessed how new technologies could reduce the hazards
introduced by air bags while providing the restraint protection that is
their primary purpose.
Today's air bags are "one-:dze-fits-all" systems. They have crash
sensors that predict the sewzrity of crashes early in the crash event.
If a crash is sufficiently severe, these sensors trigger air bag
deployment by igniting a propellant in an inflator that rapidly
generates gas to fill the air bag. This system has not been able to
provide protection without causing injuries and deaths. Furthermore,
we found an absence ofa fu _damental understanding of air bags as a
system. If any of the autorcobile manufacturers or air bag suppliers
have developed a systematic characterization of air bags, it was not
made available to the JPL team when requested.
Air bags cause injury if an occupant is in close proximity to them
when they deploy. The relr, ion of high injury risk is defined by a
keep-out zone, which varies in size with the vehicle's air bag design,
and with the size, position a ad fragility of the occupants. As long as
air bags are capable of caus:ng injury, there will be a keep-out zone.
Injury risk will continue until the keep-out zone is eliminated by
technology or design, or ur til the air bag can be disabled when an
occupant is within this zorn. Of course, if an air bag is disabled, it
will not provide protection.
To improve air bags, designers have several basic challenges.
Increased information about the crash and the occupants and a more
tailored response are needec. First is the need for crash sensors that
can more accurately estimat,; the need for occupant protection within
about twenty-thousandths of a second after the onset of a crash. These
sensors measure the dynamics of the beginning of the crash pulse
and, often using algorithms, determine the need for air bag
Depowering
Improvements by model
year 2001
Improvements by model
year 2003
deployment. Second, if air bag inflation is tailored for occupants, it
is necessary to be able to determine the size, type and belt status of
the occupant to be protected. Third, a sensor is needed to detect
when an occupant is in or is entering the keep-out zone so that the air
bag can be kept from inflating or can be inflated at a reduced rate.
Fourth, air bags must respond to the crash type and severity, and
occupant size, position and belt status. They must inflate rapidly, but
consistently in time and space when they are triggered by the crash
sensors. It would be useful if the rate of inflation could be controlled,
at least to the extent of having dual stages of inflation for more or
less severe crashes and for both belted and unbelted occupants of
different sizes. As air bags inflate, the region within which they can
inflict harm on occupants (the "keep-out zone") must be minimized
and restricted to regions where occupants are unlikely to be.
Can advanced technology make air bags safer and more protective?
The short answer is yes, but there are significant problems to
overcome.
Improvements to air bags are already being made. The magnitude of
forces from inflating air bags are being reduced in model year 1998
vehicles by depow ering, i.e., reducing the inflation rate and pressure.
This was permitted in 1997 by an amendment to the federal standard
(FMVSS 208). Depowering will reduce the risk to small-statured
drivers, out-of-position drivers and front-seat passengers. NHTSA
has also permitted disconnection of air bags (either permanently or
temporarily with a switch) for people who are unavoidably at risk
from air bag inflation.
The industry is developing a number of promising technologies to
meet the air bag design challenges. By model year 2001, improved
crash sensors, belt use sensors, and seat position sensors can be
available to provide more information about the crash and occupants.
If aggressive development is undertaken, belt spool-out sensors and
static proximity sensors could be available to provide improved
occupant position determination. Improvements in response include
automatic suppression to prevent inflation, two-stage inflators,
compartmented bags, variable venting and advanced safety belts.
With these improvements will come a reduction in the keep-out zone
and more tailored response which will reduce the risk of injury relative
to depowered air bags.
By about 2003 occupant weight and position sensors should be
available to be used with sensors and response capabilities previously
developed. These systems should be able to remove most of the risk
of injury from deploying air bags.
Unreliability effects
Advantages of safety belt use
Technology challenges
Critical parameters
However, even with the imp:'ovements that could come in 2003, there
will be a small residual haz lrd from unintended inflations resulting
from unreliability. Also, Lnbelted out-of-position occupants will
receive no protection if the tir bag is suppressed.
JPL particularly found manual restraint use (safety belts and child
safety seats) to be critical to addressing the problems of air bags.
Furthermore, if air bag designers could assume that occupants would
be belted, air bags could be designed to give superior protection with
far less hazard. The growing use of safety belts may permit such a
design strategy.
To achieve improvements -,_nair bag performance with advanced
technology, technology hurdles need to be overcome. Air bag
deployment time variability and inflator variability must be reduced.
System and component reliability must achieve high levels, and
occupant and position sensors must be developed.
4.0 THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE
The technological challenge is to provide more robust occupant
restraint systems, including air bags, i.e., systems that are safer and
more protective over a wide range of crash severities and occupant
categories. Stated simply, air bag protection must be more robust
with respect to variation of critical parameters that govern air bag
performance.
4.1 CRITICAL PARAMETERS
An advanced system must be better than current systems at obtaining
and processing information It will have to predict crash severity,
establish the size and wei ;ht of the occupants, determine their
proximity to the air bag, an zl sense whether or not they are belted.
Air bag inflation will need t¢, vary in response to crash and occupant
wtriation. The parameters th_ t determine air bag advanced technology
requirements were establish_:d by a functional analysis of a complete
crash scenario. The critical _)arameters that govern the performance
of the air bag system provi, te information about the crash and the
occupant, and the air bag re' ponse. They are:
Input Information
• Crash severity and vehicle crash pulse shape and duration
• Driver and passenger characteristics including height, weight, age,
and gender
Control of deployment time
and inflator output are
critical to air bag
performance
• Belt or child safety seat use
• Proximity of the occupant to the air bag module
Air Bag Response Characteristics
• Time to deployment decision: sensor reaction and information
processing
• Time and rate of air bag inflation, which is related to inflator
parameters
• Inflator parameters, such as inflator mass flow rate
• Air bag parameters, such as configuration, compartmentalization,
venting, materials, and fold
Reliability
• Reliability of the complete air bag system
4.2 Am BAG PERFORMANCE
The performance of an air bag system expressed in terms of occupant
injury risk is strongly affected by the inflator gas output characteristics
and the time at which inflation is initiated, i.e., deployment time. At
the beginning of a crash, an occupant begins to move forward relative
to the vehicle. The distance between the occupant and the air bag
module decreases as the occupant moves forward. If the deployment
time is late in the crash, the occupant can be close enough to the air
bag module to interact with the inflating air bag and can experience
inflation-induced injuries.
Car crash testing performed by Transport Canada is discussed in
Section 7 of this report. These tests show that late deployment of the
air bag can occur often in "soft" crashes that resemble common
vehicle-to-vehicle crashes. Their test results also show that forces
on the occupant and the risk of injury increase substantially when the
deployment timing (time to initiate air bag deployment) is later than
about 40 ms after the crash begins.
The higher forces on the occupant can be caused by inflation of the
air bag while the occupant is enveloped by the bag. This occurs as
the occupant is forced forward by vehicle deceleration. An occupant
can be in motion toward the air bag module or, in the case of Transport
No systematic investigation of
air bag performance
Key technology development
nee_
Canada tests with belted occupants, restrained by three-point belts.
The increasing bag pressure during inflation acts to expel the occupant
from the bag and, because the bag is flexible, force the head upward
and extend the neck during inflation. The level of bag pressure and
the rate of increase of bag 9ressure is dependent on the inflator gas
output. Consequently, inflator gas output and deployment time are
among the most critical parameters that affect air bag performance
as expressed in terms of occupant injury risk during a vehicle crash.
In the course of this study, we determined that the interactions among
the more important parameters that govern air bag performance had
not been systematically investigated and understood. To meet a goal
of protecting the public from air-bag-induced injury during vehicle
crashes, air bag pert%rmance must be characterized and understood
(1) for occupants ofdifferer_t sizes who sit at different distances from
the air bag module, (2) for vehicle crashes of differing severity ranging
from low-speed vehicle-to-vehicle crashes to high-speed rigid barrier
crashes, (3) for different ambient temperatures, because temperature
has a large effect on inflator gas output characteristics, and (4) for
belted and unbelted occupants. The air bag systems presently in the
U.S. vehicle fleet have bee a optimized for the 50th-percentile male
without a safety belt in a 48- km/h (30-mph) rigid frontal barrier crash
at ambient temperature.
The performance of present air bag systems can be severely degraded
by changes in any of the four parameters mentioned above. The
introduction of advanced technology must dramatically increase the
robustness of air bag sy, tem performance with respect to the
variability of critical pararleters encountered during public use of
automobiles.
4.3 TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT NEEDS
The expected improvements in safety and protectiveness of air bags,
as described above, must be tempered by the understanding that there
are key technology advanc(',s to be made.
(1) Air bag deploymem time variability must be reduced by
improvements in th _ vehicle crush/crash sensor system
(2) Inflator variability n ust be reduced so that dual-stage inflators
can be applied effectively
(3) System and component reliability must receive diligent
attention to achieve the high levels required under field
conditions
(4) Occupant sensors must be developed that can distinguish
between small, medium, and large adults, children and infant
seats with high accuracy
(5) Position sensors to measure occupant proximity to the air bag
module with the required response time and accuracy must
be demonstrated
All of the above are the subject of current development; but
development, test, and integration of the advanced technologies needs
to be accelerated to enable its incorporation into production vehicles.
5.0 ADVANCED Am BAG TECHNOLOGY
Advanced technology
development environment is
influenced by NHTSA, the
OEMs and suppliers
JPL survey of advanced
technology
5.1 ASSESSMENT OF AIR BAG TECHNOLOGY
Advanced occupant restraint technology is being developed in an
environment that is primarily influenced by NHTSA, the automobile
manufacturers (original equipment manufacturers or OEMs), and
restraint system and component suppliers. NHTSA has said that it
intends to amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS
208), which governs air bag performance, in a way that is likely to
require advanced air bag technology. This has set in motion a flurry
of advanced development activity by both OEMs and suppliers.
The OEMs specify design parameters for the restraint systems they
will use that must meet the requirements of FMVSS 208. The
suppliers are the primary providers of systems and technology. The
interaction between the requirements of FMVSS 208, the parameters
set by OEMs, and the systems developed and offered by suppliers
will determine which advanced technologies will be put into
production and how soon. Business considerations will play a part
in the implementation of these new technologies.
JPL found no set of generally accepted requirements for advanced
air bag systems. The OEMs establish requirements with the suppliers,
but neither group provided requirements for the critical parameters.
Therefore, JPL developed candidate requirements for some of the
critical parameters to enable an evaluation of the technologies' state
of readiness.
JPL has surveyed and characterized advanced restraint system
technology by visits with OEMs and suppliers (which are listed in
Appendix A) and by conducting an extensive survey through the use
of a questionnaire (Appendix B).
Technologies that may be
available by model year 2001
Suppliers are developing advanced sensors to improve crash severity
determination, to detect occupants and determine their proximity to
the air bag module, and to monitor safety belt use. They are
developing staged inflators; to provide more appropriate air bag
inflation rates for crashes of varying severity to provide more
protection in severe crashes They are also developing advanced air
bag concepts that will reduce injuries caused by deploying air bags.
Some suppliers are developing advanced safety belt systems. Our
findings are summarized in Table 1. This table lists the technology
evaluated, briefly describes the technology and its capabilities, and
indicates the model year it could be available for production by the
supplier. The OEMs and suppliers work together to bring technology
advances into vehicles, but the OEMs will decide when a new
technology is to be introducL_d. We estimate that an additional 1 to 3
years beyond the time shown in Table 1 could be required to introduce
the technologies into vehicles.
5.2 PROJECTED ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AVAILABILITIES
Technologies are being developed that may be available for model
years 2001 and 2003. JPL projected the technology availabilities
based on limited contact; with a limited number of vehicle
manufacturers and suppliers. The state of the art of advanced air bag
technology is in a high state of flux. The projected technologies, as
well as other technologies, may advance more or less rapidly than is
indicated below and in Sectlons 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Model year 2001. T ae technologies that are being developed
and that may be available for model year 2001 provide both improved
information and improved r _sponse.
Information
Crash sensor/control systems with improved algorithms will better
discriminate when air ba:_, deployment is necessary for occupant
crash protection, will pn,vide better threshold control, and will
determine the appropriat_ inflation level for two-stage inflators.
Belt use status sensors c_ n detect when an occupant is belted so
that the air bag deployme it threshold can be raised when belts are
in use. (These are curren!ly in use in some cars.)
Seat position sensors pro ¢ide an approximate surrogate measure
of occupant size and pro':imity to the air bag module. They can
be used in combination v,ith belt status sensors to determine the
appropriate inflator outpt t.
Table 1. Summary of Advanced Technology Characteristics
Technology
Item
Sensors
Pre-Crash
Sensing
Crash Severity
Sensors
Sensing
Diagnostic
Modules/Crash
Algorithms
Belt Use
Sensors
Belt spool-out
sensors
Seat Position
Sensors
Technology
Description and
Function
These sensors provide
remote sensing
(electromagnetic) for
early crash severity
determination.
These sensors are
electromechanical
switches and analog
accelerometers for
determination of crash
severity.
Improved algorithms
are aimed at reducing
discrimination times
and unintended airbag
deployments. Evolu-
tionary design includes
improved hardware
compatible with an
increased number of
sensor inputs and
restraint firing loops.
These sensors
determine whether or
not a safety belt is
being used.
These sensors aid in
determining occupant
size.
These sensors could be
used to estimate driver
size and proximity to
the air bag and
passenger proximity.
Potential of Technology to Improve the
Robustness and Performance of Safety
Restraint System
The potential here is limited. The ability
to determine obstacle inertia has not been
determined. The implications of system
unreliability are not defined, but they are
potentially serious
Critical capabilities already have been
demonstrated. A move toward analog
accelerometers (single point sensors) is
underway. This reduces cost/complexity.
There is unclear potential for significant
improvement. Details of current system
performance are unavailable to JPL due
to confidentiality concerns by companies.
Hall-type sensors have been developed.
These sensors with seat position sensors
could provide approximate information
of occupant size and proximity, but JPL
knows of no plan by industry for their
use.
These sensors would be a surrogate for
occupant presence and proximity sensors,
but would only provide approximate
information.
Technology Maturity
Readiness Date*
These sensors could be
available for MY2001.
These sensors are
available now.
Development here is
ongoing.
These sensors could be
available for
introduction into
vehicles by MY2000.
These sensors could be
available by MY2001
These sensors could be
available for MY2000.
* Technology readiness dates are those dates when production subsystems could be ready. Implementation into vehicles depends
upon the OEMs' decision to include them and their technology deployment schedules, which could add one to three years to the
model year readiness dates provided here.
Table 1. Summary of Advanced Technology Characteristics (Continued)
Technology
Item
Sensors (cont.)
Occupant
Classification
Sensors
Occupant
Proximity
Motion
Sensors
Computational
Systems/
Algorithms
Inflators
Non-Azide
Propellants
Hybrid
Inflators
Heated Gas
Inflators
Technology
Description and
Function
These sensors measure
weight and presence for
classification of at-risk
occupants.
These sensors involve
remote sensing systems
to provide range
information between
occupants and in-cabin
hazards.
Such systems record all
sensor signals to
determine/actuate
restraint system
response.
These materials replace
sodium azide propel-
lants to improve gas
generant properties (i.e.,
they are smokeless and
odorless, and have
fewer particulates and
lower temperatures).
These inflators use
high-pressure stored gas
in conjunction with a
pyrotechnic charge.
These inflators use a
combustible mixture of
dry air and hydrogen
gas under high pressure.
Potential of Technolol_y to Improve the
Robustness and Performance of Safety
Restraint System
Weight sensors have fundamental
inaccuracies and systemic errors. They
have limited utility. Presence sensors
show ability for occupznt classifications.
System reliability requirements are
unclear. Child seat tag_ will provide the
required performance. Required retrofit
of existing child seats is an impediment.
These sensors are usefitl for static OOP
detection. The consequences of system
unreliability are not well defined. Ultra-
sonic/IR systems hold the greatest
promise. Utility of dynamic proximity
information is not well understood at
present.
These might replace upgraded crash
sensor diagnostic modules, as systems
requirements expand. Hardware
currently is available. Utility of
currently envisioned advanced algorithms
has not been demonstr;_ted.
These propellants have lower temperature
gas with no particulate;. This will
permit use of lighter-weight air bag
fabrics, which improve performance.
Simpler inflator design s are possible.
These inflators have m _re desirable gas
generant properties (i.e, fewer particu-
lates). There is lower tariability in
performance.
The gas generant is cle an and environ-
mentally friendly. These inflators permit
use of lighter-weight a r bag fabrics to
improve performance.
Technology Maturity
Readiness Date
MY2000 could see
availability of weight
sensors and presence
sensors. Tags are
available now.
These sensors could be
available by
MY2000/2001.
These systems could be
in use by MY2000.
Some non-azide
propellants are now
used; however, they
have higher gas
temperatures. Low
vulnerability (LOVA)
propellants should be
ready for MY2000.
More use is expected by
MY1999. Units with
LOVA propellants could
be ready by MY2000.
These units are expected
to be ready by MY1999.
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Table 1. Summary of Advanced Technology Characteristics (Continued)
Technology
Item
!Inflators
(cont.)
Multistage
Inflators
Inflators with
Tailorable
Mass Flow
Rate
Air Bags
New Fabrics
and Coatings
New Woven
Fabrics and
Bag
Construction
New Bag
Shapes and
Compart-
mented Bags
New Air Bag
Venting
Systems
Technology Description
and Function
These systems use two
separate inflators
packaged as a single unit,
or two separate
pyrotechnic charges with
a single inflator.
These systems provide
control of inflator output
in near real-time.
Fabrics and coatings that
are more flexible, lighter
in weight and have lower
permeability are now
available.
These materials use
controlled fabric porosity
and improved weaving
techniques to reduce or
eliminate bag seams.
These alternatives involve
air bags with multiple
compartments, which
inflate sequentially. Bags
expand radially during
deployment.
These systems provide
multilevel venting
systems with discrete
holes and continuously
variable venting designs.
Continuously variable
venting designs would be
controlled in near real-
time based on available
sensor information.
Potential of Technology to Improve the
Robustness and Performance of Safety
Restraint System
These inflators permit stages of air bag
deployment depending on crash severity
and occupant characteristics. Inflator
performance variability could
overshadow the potential advantages.
With appropriate sensor information, this
technology would permit control of air
bag deployment depending on crash
severity and occupant location and
characteristics.
These fabrics permit use of lower output
inflators. Lower mass should reduce
punchout forces on OOP occupants.
These materials simplify bag folding
techniques. Lighter-weight fabrics are
less tolerant of particulates and high
temperature gases.
Fabrics having controlled porosity with
low variability could eliminate the need
for discrete vent holes.
The first compartment can be pressurized
much quicker to provide early occupant
protection, with subsequent compart-
ments maintaining the restraint force.
This is especially beneficial to OOP
occupants.
These systems provide pre-determined
variation in venting depending on bag
pressure. They provide rapid inflation of
air bags (with no venting) to reduce
occupant/air bag interaction.
Continuously variable systems must be
developed in conjunction with sensors
and control strategies.
Technology Maturity
Readiness Date
Two-stage inflators
could be ready for
production in 1998.
These inflators are
under development.
Technology has been
demonstrated with
inflators having low
particulates and lower
gas temperatures. These
materials could be
incorporated with hybrid
inflators for MY2000.
This is an evolving
technology, which could
be incorporated as
product improvement.
This technology could
be ready for
introduction in
MY2000.
Multilevel systems
could be available in
MY 1999. Continuously
variable systems are
being developed.
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Table 1. Summary of Advanced Technology C_aracteristics (Continued)
Technology
Item
Seat Belt
Systems
Pretensioners
Load Limiting
Devices
Inflatable Seat
Belts
Technology Description
and Function
This technology involves
high output pretensioners
to increase coupling
between occupant and
seat.
Single or dual level
devices provide a fixed
force level over the maxi-
mum occupant excursions.
Continuously variable
load limiters provide a
wide variation of forces.
A portion of the standard
three-point belt is inflated
to augment the belt
function.
Potential of Technology to Improve the
Robustness and Performance of Safety
Restrain! System
Maximizes ride-down distance for dissi-
pation of the occupap.t's kinetic energy.
Dual level load limiters can provide two-
level selection based _3nknowledge of
the occupant's characteristics. Further
adjustability is provided by continuously
variable devices.
These devices offer i lflated cushioning
and also provide some pretensioning of
the seat belt. Air belts are less
aggressive than air b_gs.
Technology Maturity
Readiness Date
Pretentioners are in
some vehicles now.
Newer high output
devices could be ready
in MY1999.
Load limiters are in
some vehicles now.
Continuously variable
devices could be ready
in MY2000.
These devices could
be ready by MY2001.
Seat belt spool-out sensons could provide additional information
about an occupant's size and proximity to the air bag module.
These sensors were not raentioned as being part of any current
industry use strategy and therefore may not be available by model
year 2001.
Static proximity (occupant position) sensors could identify
occupants in the keep-ou zone, but will be available only if an
aggressive development program is undertaken. They would not
reduce injuries to all out< f-position occupants, and they could be
"fooled" some of the time.
Response
Automatic suppression can prevent inflation when sensors
determine that an occupa at is in a keep-out zone where injuries
could occur.
Two-stage inflators can pc rmit relatively soft inflation for crashes
of lower threshold velocil y, and full inflation when necessary for
crashes of high threshold velocity.
• Compartmented air bags, r tdial deployments, and bags with lighter-
weight fabrics may reduce, • the size of the keep-out zone.
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Technologies that may be
available by model year 2003
Advanced belts can improve restraint system safety and
protectiveness. They may include pretensioners that can provide
better coupling of the occupant to the seat for improved ride-down
during the crash. Also, they can, to some degree, limit occupant
proximity to the air bag module. Load limiters can also improve
belt performance by reducing maximum belt loads on the occupant.
(Pretensioners and load limiters are currently in some vehicles.)
5.2.2 Model year 2003. By model year 2003, there could be
evolutionary changes in some of the systems and the possibility of
the introduction of occupant and proximity sensors.
Information
• Crash sensor/control system algorithms will continue to be
improved.
• Belt use sensors will be widely used already.
Integrated occupant and proximity sensors could be available that
would identify occupants in the keep-out zone or those who would
enter it.
• Precrash sensors may be available, but their application requires
further investigation.
Response
• Automatic suppression to prevent inflation will be available for
use with proximity sensors.
• Multistage inflators to provide more tailored responses for a variety
of occupants and crash severities could be available, if needed.
• Bag designs will continue to be improved, permitting a reduction
of the keep-out zone.
Pretensioners and load limiters will be placed in increasing
numbers of vehicles. Air belts will be available to improve safety
belt effectiveness.
5.3 NASA TECHNOLOGY
JPL conducted a search of NASA technology that might be applicable
to advanced air bags. We used two mechanisms to probe all NASA
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NASA has applicable generic
capabilities," two specific
sensors are being developed
No new major technologies
identified
centers and reviewed two databases. There are many generic
capabilities within NAS_ that could be applied to air bag
development. These includ_ sensors, computing, control systems,
neural networks, algorit[ m development, microelectronics,
simulations, propellants, propulsion, and inflatable systems. NASA's
systems analysis and engineering capabilities could also be applied
to a number of problems slch as assessing air bag performance,
developing a test program to evaluate effects of variability of critical
parameters on air bag performance, and applying defect detection
and prevention methodologies to enhance reliability. We identified
some specific technologies that could be applied to advanced air bags,
including two sensors that suppliers are currently evaluating. These
are a capacitive sensor for proximity sensing and a stereoscopic vision
system for proximity or precrash sensing.
5.4 NEW CONCEPTS
The surveys of industry and NASA did not identify major new
technologies or concepts. All of the technologies and concepts
surveyed had been previously described in published papers, company
brochures, etc., or were variations of these concepts and technologies.
Improvement of restraint system safety and protectiveness is primarily
one of evaluating and developing the known technology options from
a total systems perspective. Perhaps this report can be a catalyst for
new ideas.
6.0 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY AND PROTECTIVENESS
Methodology for evaluation
6.1 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
JPL considered several approaches to "establish the technological
potential for improved (smart) air bag systems" before selecting the
methodology used for this te,:hnology evaluation. Our evaluation was
oriented toward engineer ng design to permit comparison of
alternative advanced design.'. Real-world crash data, as exemplified
by the Fatality Analysis Ret:orting System (FARS) and the National
Automotive Sampling SysteJn/Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/
CDS) did not have data of f_e technical nature and detail needed to
support an evaluation basec, on field experience.
Thus, we decided that dunmy crash, sled and static test data,
supplemented by simulat on data was the best source of the
information to support olr evaluation. Our approach relates
probability of injury risk to dummy response measures for the head,
neck, and chest. We used tummy response measures to establish
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Effect of depowering
injury risk sensitivities, as a function of the critical parameters listed
above.
The figure of merit we selected for evaluating advanced technologies
is the reduction in injury risk from air bag deployment. Specifically,
we asked to what degree the probability of inflation-induced injury
in the full spectrum of occupants and crashes could be reduced with
the application of advanced technology.
To establish the merits of alternative advanced technologies, we
postulated scenarios for their implementation and conducted case
studies. With the current air bag systems as the base case, we
postulated advanced technologies that could be available. We first
compared current systems with depowered air bags. Then JPL
considered alternative technologies that could be available by model
years 2001 and 2003 in various configurations.
6.2 REDUCTION IN AIR-BAG-INDUCED INJURIES
With current air bag systems as the base case, JPL examined the
potential for reduction in air-bag-induced injuries in (1) model year
1998 with depowered air bags, (2) model year 2001 and (3) model
year 2003. For each model year, the applicable advanced technologies
listed above were assessed. The reduction of air-bag-induced injuries
on front-seat occupants resulting from the application of the
technology was estimated, as was the remaining risk to front-seat
occupants.
For model year 1998, depowering of air bags could reduce the air-
bag-induced injury risk of normally seated small-statured adults. Data
suggests that in lower-severity crashes, neck injury risk for small-
statured drivers is significantly reduced. (However, in a high-severity
crash test, neck injury risk for small-statured drivers remained
unacceptably high for a depowered air bag. It is not clear if this
result is due to individual design or is generic.) Also, depowered air
bags will reduce the keep-out zone where deploying air bags can
injure out-of-position occupants, putting fewer of the front-seat
occupants at severe risk. Remaining at significant risk of air-bag-
induced injury are occupants who are still out of position within the
new keep-out zone, children in the right front passenger seat, and
infants in rear-facing child seats (RFCSs) and forward-facing child
seats (FFCSs).
Compared to depowered air bags, the application of advanced
technologies in model year 2001 will further reduce the size of the
keep-out zone, which reduces the risk to front-seat, out-of-position
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Improvements with technology
available by 2001
Improvements with technology
available by 2003
Effect of unreliabili_'
Child seats
occupants. This reduction "viii be due to less aggressive air bag
response resulting from imp:oved air bag design and dual inflators
that provide more tailored responses. The risks to belted front-seat
occupants with these second-generation systems will be reduced
because of reduced air bag aggressivity, an increase in the threshold
velocity for deployment, and improvements in belts. The risk to
unbelted front-seat occupants will be similarly reduced by the changes
in air bag performance. Despite these improvements, some OOP
front-seat occupants will remain at severe risk from deploying air
bags, as will children in the light front passenger seat and infants in
RFCSs and FFCSs in the rigilt front passenger seat.
For model year 2003, further advanced technologies that could be
incorporated include more sophisticated integration of proximity and
occupant position sensors. The system could then suppress inflation
when it has a high likelihood of injuring an occupant in the keep-out
zone and provide an appropriate signal for multistage inflators.
Further advances in belt and air bag design could be introduced in
this time frame.
With these technologies, the only serious risk of air-bag-induced
injuries would come from the unreliability of the system. System
unreliabilities are expected to result in tens to hundreds of unintended
deployments per year. These unintended deployments could have
the potential of causing a few serious injuries per year.
In the summary above, the :esolution of the child seat problem is
projected to be achieved in the 2003 time period or after. This is
based on the requirement fcr implementation of reliable occupant
presence sensors. One ma:lufacturer (Mercedes-Benz) currently
provides a tag-based child se_tt detector that automatically suppresses
the air bag. Such a system could be used in other vehicles, but it
must be used with specific tags attached to the seats. The problem of
applying these tags to the difterent seats being offered and retrofitting
them to older seats creates significant potential for misuse. The
introduction of such a system would have to be carefully controlled.
6.3 INCREASED PROTECTIVENESS
During this assessment, the e valuation of the capability of advanced
technology to increase the p_ otectiveness of the occupant protection
system was a secondary priority. However, the following observations
can be made:
Depowered air bags will re,luce the inflation-induced injuries for
small-statured and fragile adults. However, they may also reduce
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Effect of depowering
Effects of suppressing
the air bag
Improvements with technology
available by 2001
System unreliability effects
the protectiveness of air bag systems for very large occupants and
occupants in high-severity crashes, but JPL had no data to assess this
premise quantitatively.
Strategies used to reduce air bag inflation-induced injuries include
suppression of the air bag deployment. Clearly, strategies used to
reduce inflation-induced injuries that result in the suppression of the
air bag leave occupants unprotected if they are unbelted.
Technologies that are expected to be implemented in model year 2001
have the potential for increasing air bag protectiveness by providing
improved sensing that permits an improved air bag response. The
capability that sensors provide permit the use of dual-stage inflators
that will offer increased protection to very large adults and occupants
in high-severity crashes when compared to depowered air bags. The
higher-level inflator stage offers that increased protection. Advanced
safety belts will provide increased protection by better coupling of
the occupant to the vehicle (pretensioners) and reduced decelerations
(load limiters).
In model year 2003, protectiveness will be increased further by
refinements in the air bag response capabilities and additional safety
belt improvement.
Data were not available to quantitatively assess the combinations of
circumstances where air bags might be expected to enhance
protection.
System unreliability may result in unintended nondeployments and
occupants will be unprotected. Based on projected air bag installation
and expected 0.9999 to 0.99999 system reliability, the number of
unintended nondeployments will be in the tens per year. High system
reliability is achievable through diligent effort; the actual number of
unintended nondeployments will depend on the effort made to achieve
high reliability.
In an advanced restraint system the desired air bag system response
will be tailored to perceived occupant and crash attributes in an attempt
to enhance the safety and protection of the air bag. However, this
more complex decision structure creates additional categories of
incorrect air bag system response, i.e., deployment may be desired in
a given crash and the air bag may deploy, but it may do so in a way
that is tailored to the wrong response state due to misperceived
occupant/crash attributes.
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Effects of complexity and
crash prediction
Air bag applications could be
more successful if predicated
on belt use
Crash attributes may be the most difficult to reliably perceive since
they are necessarily a prediction of an extremely stochastic event
whose attributes are generated during the event. To the extent that
perceived occupant/crash attributes produce a different tailored
response than the true attributes, air bag safety and protection can be
adversely affected. Even ignoring economic issues, it is a major
challenge to create a crash prediction system that is sufficiently
accurate to rely on for tailored air bag response.
Safety belts are the primau and most effective occupant restraint
system, and they are used by a large majority of occupants. Safety
and protection for belted occupants is likely to be substantially
enhanced if advanced air bag designs can be predicated on the use of
advanced safety belts, and not compromised by accommodation for
protection of unbelted occupants. The growing use of safety belts
may permit such a design strategy.
7.0 CONCLUSIONS
To list the conclusions here would be to repeat many of the statements
in the previous pages of this summary. Consequently, to avoid
unnecessary duplication the reader is referred to Section 9 of the
report for the specific conc usions.
8.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations are directed to NHTSA and industry, including
actions that require their cooperation.
8.1 NHTSA
8.1.1 The Need for a Bet :er Understanding of Restraint System
Performance. This assess nent revealed activities that will require
further study. Also, data required to conduct important analyses were
not available to JPL. As a co asequence, JPL recommends the activities
described below.
(1) Continue restraint system assessment, with emphasis on
restraint protection, and include consideration of costs and
benefits.
(2) Evaluate and quantify, to the extent possible, the benefits of
applying advance,t technology to improve safety and
protection of restrai at systems with respect to injury risk of
the full spectrum cf occupants in the full range of crash
severities experienc,_d by the public. The benefits, costs and
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risks of advanced technology should be investigated and
understood with respect to injury to head, neck, chest, and
other body regions across the full range of occupant categories
and crash severities.
(3) Expand the assessment of advanced technology to crashes
other than the frontal crashes that were the focus of this
assessment.
(4) Develop a systematic vehicle test protocol that (a) incorporates
measurements for comprehensive injury risk evaluation (head,
neck, chest, etc.) for the 5th-percentile female, 50th-percentile
male, and 95th-percentile male drivers as well as the full
spectrum of passengers, and (b) includes crash severities
representative of the full range of the "real-world" collisions.
(5) Evaluate the impact on air bag performance of deployment
time variability, inflator variability and system and component
reliability for any advanced technology. Again, the full range
of occupant size and crash severity that represent use by the
general public must be considered.
8.1.2 The Need for Better Real-World Data. The
recommendations that follow result from the deficiencies of the real-
world data that are available for diagnosis of safety problems or the
support of safety engineering analyses. These data were insufficient
for use in this assessment. Efforts should be undertaken to:
(6) Expand the National Automotive Sampling System (NASS)
and revisit the question of how it should be structured and
what procedures should be used to provide data needed for
safety diagnosis and engineering analysis.
(7) Study the feasibility of installing and obtaining crash data for
safety analyses from crash recorders on vehicles. Crash
recorders exist already on some vehicles with electronic air
bag sensors, but the data recorded is determined by the OEMs.
These recorders could be the basis for an evolving data-
recording capability that could be expanded to serve other
purposes, such as in emergency rescues, where their
information could be combined with occupant smart keys to
provide critical crash and personal data to paramedics. The
questions of data ownership and data protection would have
to be resolved, however. Where data ownership concerns
arise, consultation with experts in the aviation community
19
regarding the us_', of aircraft flight recorder data is
recommended.
8.1.3 The Need for a Better Understanding of the Future
Potential of Technology. NHTSA is routinely briefed by suppliers
and OEMs on the development of advanced technology and conducts
independent evaluations of important advanced technologies. We
therefore recommend that NHTSA:
(8) Evaluate specific technologies that have promise of significant
safety benefit, such as:
Precrash sensors--both separate and coupled with the
crash-avoidance sensors now being investigated--which
could provide improved crash type and severity sensing
Advanced belt systems and air belts that could improve
protection, but have been neglected because of the
emphasis on air bags
Air bag/inflator cesigns that could eliminate the keep-out
zone and the infoq'nation (sensors) required to support the
functioning of the design
8.2 THE NEED FOR CONTINUED ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT BY INDUSTRY
It is industry's responsibility to provide safe and protective vehicle
restraint systems, and to cevelop the technology to create these
systems. We recommend fiat industry:
(9) Continue diligent efforts to implement the advanced
technologies that h,'tve been shown to JPL, because those
technologies will niake restraint systems safer and more
protective.
(lO) Reduce the deployment time and inflator mass flow
variabilities; otherwise these variabilities will have detrimental
effects on advanced air bag system effectiveness.
(11) Continue diligent effi wts to increase restraint system reliability.
2o
8.3
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
NHTSA/INDUSTRY COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
Develop quantitative goals for safer and more protective
restraint systems that address air-bag-induced injuries and
protection in high-severity crashes.
Continue to develop and refine biomechanical injury criteria
for restraint systems using the best science available.
Develop protocols and procedures for testing air bag systems
to ensure air bag system robustness.
Inform the public of the specific risks associated with each
vehicle air bag, e.g., by providing the keep-out zone
dimensions, and recommend ways to mitigate the risk.
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SECTION 1reINTRODUCTION
Deploying air bags have
caused deaths and injuries
Application of advanced
technology to improve air bag
safety
1.1 SYMPTOMS OF A PROBLEM
Since automobile air bags were developed, both experts and the public
have become increasingly concerned about deployment-induced
injuries and fatalities. Deploying air bags in relatively low-speed
crashes have killed 49 children and 38 adults between 1990 and
October 31, 1997; 14 of the adults were small-statured females.
These deaths occurred when children or adults were well within the
path of the deploying air bag. Some of the children were in rear-
facing child seats, or were improperly restrained in child safety seats.
Most of the other people were unbelted or improperly belted and slid
or leaned forward during braking, which put them directly in the
path of the deploying air bag. Deploying air bags have also caused
numerous injuries, some of them serious.
The 87 air-bag-induced fatalities should be compared with the 2620
lives that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) estimates to have been saved during that time period. A
significant number of those survivors, however, suffered severe
injuries. To put these numbers in perspective, there are about 90
light vehicle occupant fatalities per day from vehicle crashes and
about 22 of these fatalities are in frontal crashes, where air bags are
designed to provide effective occupant crash protection.
The fact that an automobile safety system is causing fatalities and
injuries (and that there is increased public attention being brought to
the problem) has heightened the effort to seek solutions to it. Industry,
the federal govemment, and other organizations are making serious
efforts to solve the problem of air-bag-induced injuries. These efforts
include education of the public about air bags, improved labeling,
encouragement of safety belt use, on-off switches and the reduction
of air bag energy levels (depowering). Automobile manufacturers
and their suppliers are developing advanced technologies that are
intended to reduce air-bag-induced injuries and improve the
effectiveness of restraint systems.
Looking toward the potential of advanced technology to improve air
bag safety and effectiveness, the administrators of NHTSA and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) met and
agreed to work cooperatively on the problem. They recognized that
"cooperation between the two organizations can expedite technology
advancements."
1-1
NASA and NHTSA agreed to
cooperate in applying
advanced technology to
improve air bag safety
JPL was selected by NASA to
evaluate air bag performance,
establish the technological
potential for improved
performance and identify
expertise and technology
within NASA that could
significantly improve air bag
effectiveness
1.2 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
In mid-December 1996, the Administrators of the NHTSA and NASA
signed a memorandum of uJlderstanding for cooperative work with
the following purpose:
"Both agencies aglee that cooperation which leverages
NHTSA's expertise in motor vehicle safety restraint systems
and biomechanics with NASA's position as one of the nation's
leaders in advanced technology development including
sensors, microelectronics, propulsion technologies, and
systems analysis caa significantly contribute to NHTSA's
effort to: (1) understand and define critical parameters
affecting ai¢ bag performance, (2) systematically assess air
bag technology state of the art and its future potential, and
(3) identify new concepts for air bag systems. Such
cooperation will ena_9le the state of air bag safety technology
to advance at a faster pace to provide timely solutions to this
safety-related problem."
The terms of the agreement are:
m. NHTSA and NASA will cooperate in the development of
countermeasures to r_:duce potential injury from air bags while
enhancing their effectiveness in crash protection.
B° NHTSA will define the technical issues associated with
potential air bag injuries and be responsible for overall
countermeasure dew',lopment.
C. NASA will desigmte a NASA facility and responsible
individual as the fo_ al point for cooperation with NHTSA.
NASA will evaluale air bag performance, establish the
technological potent al for improved (smart) air bag systems,
and identify key exp raise and technology within the agency
that can potentially _:ontribute significantly to the improved
effectiveness of air tags.
D. Under separate agree ments, NHTSA will cooperatively fund
technology assessme it studies and mutually selected activities
at NASA centers that can potentially contribute significantly
to the reduction of p)tential injuries from air bags.
The NASA Administrator _ssigned the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL) as the focal point for cooperation with NHTSA, including the
1-2
The problems are rooted in the
fundamental characteristics of
air bags and the unpredictable
and variable crash
en vironmen t
The challenge is to reduce the
inju_ risk from air bags while
also improving their
effectiveness
task of assessing air bag technology. JPL planned the assessment
effort and initiated work in February 1997.
1.3 CHALLENGE
The injuries and fatalities resulting from air bag deployments are
symptoms of the underlying problems with air bags. The problems
are rooted in the basic characteristics of air bags and the high degree
of variability and broad range of crash parameters.
Air bags deploy rapidly and with great force toward an
approaching occupant. A significant engineering design
challenge is to provide crash protection without hazard
from the deploying bag. As currently designed, occupants
in the path of the deploying air bag can be severely injured.
The deployment of air bag systems is based on predictions
of crash severity. The deployment timing is based on tests
of a spectrum of crash types. However, a vehicle must
respond to a wide range and variety of crash parameters in
the field that cannot be replicated in any practical test
program.
Both the vehicle and air bag system responses are variable.
Vehicle response is variable even for a particular crash
scenario. The air bag system response is variable
particularly in deployment time and inflator output.
For these reasons, current air bag systems, which provide protection
over a wide range of crash scenarios, can cause injuries. That is,
their designs are not robust to the needs of the operating environment.
The challenge is: how can advanced technology and design
improvements increase the robustness of air bag systems?
Considering the above underlying problems, JPL interprets the
assignment of the NHTSA/NASA memorandum of understanding
as a challenge to assess the potential for advanced technology to:
(1) Reduce the deaths and injuries caused by air bags, and
(2) Improve the overall effectiveness of restraint systems to
reduce the approximate 8000 fatalities per year resulting from
direct frontal crashes of light motor vehicles.
This challenge is the basis for the assessment objectives.
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First priority--reduce injury
risk ofair bags
Second priority--impro ve
restraint system effectiveness
1.4 OBJECTIVES
1.4.1 Primary Objective. Identify and characterize advanced air
bag technology that effectiw:ly protects occupants while eliminating
the adverse effects of air bag deployment during frontal
crashes--particularly on children, small adults, and the elderly--and
recommend technology development needs.
1.4.2 Secondary Objective. Identify and characterize advanced
air bag technology for protecting occupants from a variety of crash
scenarios, and recommend technology development needs.
Note: At the initiation of the assessment, it was expected that some
work would be done with regard to the secondary objective; however,
this was not possible with the time and funds available.
1.5 CONSTRAINTS
The focus of the assessment is on applying advanced technology to
air bags and restraint systems. The assessment did not:
- Address regulator ¢ issues, rule-making, product liability,
legal issues, or go yernment policy
- Include technology development or testing
- Include crash tests, air bag experiments, or high-fidelity
simulations
JPL relied on NHTSA, "Iransport Canada, and industry for
biomechanics information as sociated with vehicle crashes.
1.6 ASSESSMENT PRIORITIES AND SCOPE
Because the primary problem that brought NHTSA and NASA
together in this cooperative effort was the concern about fatalities
and injuries caused by air ba t ;s, the first priority of this investigation
was to assess the capability 9f advanced technology to reduce this
problem. It is probable, however, that there is greater long-term
benefit from the application of advanced technology to increase the
overall effectiveness of occupant protection. Therefore, a second
priority was to assess advance t technology that would improve overall
occupant system effectivene, s.
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Assessment approach derived
from the requirements of the
NASA/NHTSA MOU
1.7 APPROACH
JPL constructed a series of tasks to meet the provisions of the NHTSA/
NASA MOU and the objectives listed in para. 1.4. JPL is required to
"understand and define critical parameters affecting air bag
performance, evaluate air bag performance, establish the technological
potential for improved (smart) air bag systems, identify new concepts
for air bag systems and identify key expertise and technology within
the agency (NASA) that can potentially contribute significantly to
the improved effectiveness of air bags." The following tasks were
established to meet the provisions:
(1) Critical parameters affecting air bag performance
(2) Air bag deployment requirements
(3) Air bag technology state of the art
(4) Applicable NASA technology
(5) Characterization of advanced air bag technology
(6) Advanced air bag analysis and evaluation
(7) Trends and strategies for advanced air bag system and
technology development
(8) Technology development recommendations
Early in the assessment it was determined that the effort required a
fundamental engineering approach. Further, it was determined that
real-world crash data were too limited to provide the analytical basis
needed for an engineering assessment. Therefore, crash, sled and
static test data and simulations, to the extent available to JPL, were
the basis for engineering analysis and evaluation. These were
augmented by supporting studies, where necessary, to obtain further
insight or scaling factors.
1.8 REPORT READERS GUIDE
This report documents an assessment of the capability of advanced
technology to make automobile air bags safer and more effective.
The report sections contain the following information.
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Section 2 is a very basic in:roduction to crash dynamics for those
unacquainted with the subje_:t. Readers experienced in the field may
want to skip this section.
Section 3 describes the parapaeters that are basic to the analysis of air
bag performance and to the assessment of improvements that could
be made by air bags. The most important of these parameters, or
critical parameters, are identified. They are the focus for evaluating
advanced technology.
Section 4 discusses the requirements for advanced technology, and
points out that these requirements are not readily available. Top-
level requirements are estabqshed as a guide to the assessment.
Section 5 describes advance d air bag and safety belt technologies.
This information was obta ned from visits with automakers and
restraint system suppliers, and from responses to a detailed survey
questionnaire.
Section 6 summarizes a searca within NASA for advanced technology
that is applicable to air bags.
Section 7 provides an analysis of air bag performance and an
assessment of advanced technologies. It describes the methodology
adopted, which is based on the reduction of injury risk to occupants
from deploying air bags by 1he application of advanced technology.
The data available is used to develop sensitivities of the critical
parameters. These sensitivites are applied to establish the improved
safety of air bags by the in_oduction of advanced technology for
future model year vehicles.
Section 8 provides a discussi _n of advanced technology development
needs and factors involved in implementing the required development.
Sections 9 and l0 provide he conclusions and recommendations,
respectively.
The appendices support special report topics for readers interested in
the details of those topics.
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SECTION 2mBACKGROUND
Vehicle and occupant
kin em a tics
Air bag deployment timeline
A crash typically occurs within little more than 100 milliseconds (ms).
A determination to deploy air bags must be made in the first 20 ms or
so in order to get them inflated within about 50 ms, or before an
occupant has moved forward more than about 12 cm (5 inches). This
timing ensures that the face of the bag has come nearly to rest before
the occupant encounters it. A vehicle occupant actually continues at
the original vehicle speed until he or she begins to be restrained by
the air bag and/or safety belts. The occupant then becomes coupled
with the occupant compartment and decelerates at a rate approaching
that of the vehicle.
A simplified description of the vehicle and occupant kinematics is
given in Figure 2-1 [17], which shows the velocity versus time for
the vehicle and occupant. The crash occurs at time 0. The vehicle
decelerates along the line AD with a deceleration of A v, stopping at
time D. The occupant continues at velocity A for time T until the
restraint system takes effect at time B, when deceleration, A D, occurs
along the path BC. The area P represents the vehicle crush distance;
the area S is the distance the occupant displaces before being
restrained, and R is the distance displaced after being restrained.
Figure 2-2 shows a typical timeline for the deployment of a driver air
bag and motion of a driver in a 48-km/h (30-mph) frontal collision
into a barrier. This is the crash specified in FMVSS 208. The timeline
begins when the front bumper contacts the barrier. The sensor obtains
vehicle acceleration and velocity change data during the initial 15 to
20 ms of the crash and processes that data to determine if the crash
pulse is likely to make air bag deployment desirable. (Some vehicles
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Area ABCD, Occupant Displacement
Relative to Vehicle
Figure 2-1. Simplified Kinematics
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have multiple sensors with iata processing in a central module, but
we shall refer to such a corlbination as a sensor.) Once the sensor
determines that the bag sh,,uld be deployed, it sends an electrical
signal to the inflator, where a typical inflation process energizes a
squib to ignite its sodium azide pellets. As the sodium azide burns, it
releases a copious amount of nitrogen that is filtered and cooled before
entering the folded air bag.
As gas enters the bag, it forces its cover open at about 25 ms. This
permits the bag to expand into the space between the steering wheel
and the driver or between lhe instrument panel and the right front
seat passenger. Within these first 25 ms, the occupant has continued
to move forward at the original vehicle speed of 48 km/h (30 mph)
while the vehicle has decelerated to around 40 km/h (25 mph).
Because of the vehicle deceleration, the safety belt reel will lock and
the occupants will move forward about 2 cm (less than one inch) in
relation to the vehicle interior. The head, however, will continue to
move forward after lockup.
By the time the bag is mostly inflated--typically just over 50 ms into
the crash--the occupant will have moved about 10 cm farther forward
in relation to the vehicle interior. If the occupant is belted, he or she
will begin to load the safety belt during this time. Very shortly after
that, the occupant and the f_ce of the air bag come into contact. The
bag (and belts if worn) then begin to restrain the occupant. Figure
2-3 shows the relationship between a belted driver and air bag within
the decelerating frame of the vehicle at the three critical times during
the crash. From this time fi)rward, the occupant will be decelerated
at about the same rate as the vehicle, which is on the order of 15 to 25
times the acceleration of glavity, until both come to rest at around
100 ms.
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Figure 2-3. Driver Motion and Air Bag Inflation Early in the Crash
Occupant air bag interaction
Figure 2-4 shows a time history of motion in a stationary frame of
reference where the face of the driver at the beginning of the crash is
the zero point on the position scale.
The vehicle is measured from the face of the steering wheel from
which the air bag will emerge. Initially, everything is moving forward
at 48 km/h (30 mph). As the vehicle decelerates from the crash forces,
the air bag deploys, and its face actually moves rearward for about
25 ms at which time the occupant moves into it. The vehicle and
occupant all come to rest over the next 50 ms or so. The velocity
history of the vehicle, air bag and driver are shown in Figure 2-5.
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Figure 2-5. Time History of Velocity and Belted Occupant in a
48-km/h (30-mph) Crash with Air Bag Deployment
During a crash, an occupar.t gains velocity relative to the vehicle
until restrained. The longer it takes to restrain an occupant, the larger
will be the restraint decelerating forces. A quick-acting restraint is
best to limit the loads on theoccupant. Therefore, rapid deployment
of the air bag is desired to limit deceleration loads as well as interaction
during inflation with a norrrally seated occupant.
Figure 2-6 shows the veloci _ change and acceleration of small and
large cars. Crash pulses cal_ also vary considerably with the object
impacted and the crash severity, i.e., the change in velocity, delta V.
The velocity and acceleratior_ profile differences can be more dramatic
than those shown in Figure 2-6, e.g., barrier-vs-pole crashes. (Note
that Figures 2-4, 2-5, and 2-6 are illustrative of 48-km/h (30-mph)
barrier crashes and do not r_ flect any specific crash or test.)
At the very bottom of Figu:e 2-6 is shown the air bag deployment
timeline. Note how brief tlie time is and how little information is
available when the air ba8 must be deployed. Thus, the timely
prediction of crash severity is a very difficult problem, while it is
critically important to the s fie and effective deployment of the air
bag.
The air bag response is desil_ned to protect the occupants based on a
standard test, which is spe,:ified in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) 208. Until recently, the critical test was a
48-km/h (30-mph) vehic e crash into a fixed barrier that is
perpendicular to the vehicle s line of travel with belted and unbelted
50th-percentile male dummies. The air bag must also be designed
for barrier crashes up to 48 km/h (30 mph) and angles up to 30 ° in
either direction from the per 9endicular of the vehicle's line of travel.
A recent temporary alte_ative to the barrier test for unbelted
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occupants, however, provides for a sled test with a prescribed 125-
ms, 17.2-g half-sine pulse that will permit manufacturers to test
vehicles on an expedited schedule with depowered air bags. The test
uses 50th-percentile male dummies that represent an average male
driver and passenger.
The automobile original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) conduct
a wide range of tests to ensure that the air bags will not deploy under
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Small and Large Car
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Deplovment/nondeploymen t
testing
conditions not requiring an a_r bag, such as when traveling over rough
roads or when involved in a fender-bender. These tests also ensure
that deployment will occur under crash conditions requiring an air
bag. As a result of these te ;ts, deployment threshold velocities are
established for each vehicle. They are typically 13 km/h (8 mph) for
nondeployment and 22 km, h (14 mph) for deployment. Between
these values is a "gray area" where the air bags may or may not
deploy. OEMs and suppliers are attempting, through technical
improvements, to reduce the gray area by raising the speed at which
deployment begins to occur. There are types of crashes that pose
special crash-sensing challer_ges, such as pole crashes and some types
of offset crashes.
Extensive work in biomechanics supports the design of restraint
systems. Studies of real-world crash data based on the Fatality
Analysis Reporting System (FARS) and the National Automotive
Sampling System (NASS) provide statistical information on fatalities
and injuries. Injuries are ranked according to an Abbreviated Injury
Scale (AIS), that varies from 0 to 6, where 0 is no injury and 6 is
death. Intermediate rankings vary with injury severity, and each
classification level has a list of representative injuries. Injuries are
often classified as 2+, 3+, or a+ to indicate a minimum level of severity
for all injuries being considered.
Dummy tests are used to
establish inju O' risk and air
bag effectiveness
These AIS levels are related by the probability of injury risk to various
injury criteria used in tests with dummies. The relationships have
been developed from tests v'ith cadavers, human volunteers, and, in
the past, animals. The durlmy injury criteria include head injury
criteria (HIC); chest accelen.tion criteria in g's, chest deflection, etc.;
several neck criteria; and femur loads. Acceptable injury criteria
levels are established for dummy tests, where the test results indicate
the severity of the test.
Air bags are typically teste,! in three modes: crash tests involving
the whole vehicle, sled test.,, involving only the critical parts of the
occupant compartment, and component tests or deployments in a static
frame of reference. Dummies representing adults (50th-percentile
males, 95th-percentile m_les, and 5th-percentile females) and
children, provide measures of performance in these tests, with and
without safety belts. These ests support assessment of the expected
performance of air bags. Ac ual performance comes from real-world
crash data.
Unfortunately, crashes typic_ lly are not neat, well-defined events such
as the FMVSS 208 frontal barrier crash. Vehicles of different types
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Large variation in crashes
(small and large cars, light trucks, vans) crash into a wide variety of
other things (the fronts, sides and rears of other vehicles that also
come in wide variety; poles; embankments; barriers; trees; and more).
They do so at speeds that range from a non-damaging tap to a full-
speed, demolishing crash, and at a variety of approach angles. The
occupants who must be protected include people of all ages and both
genders who range in weight from a few to well over 100 kilograms.
They range in height from less than a meter to more than 2 meters.
Although people usually sit normally in a seat, they also lean forward,
recline their seat backs, put their feet on the instrument panel, or get
into even stranger postures.
They may, or may not, be belted. In fact, the original impetus for the
development of air bags (initiated by the auto industry, not the
government) was the fact that fewer than one in eight Americans
used safety belts. Air bags were originally thought to be an alternative
to safety belts. Although virtually everyone in the field of auto safety
now believes that air bags are best considered a supplement to safety
belts, they are still designed, and must be tested, to protect unbelted
occupants. The challenge of air bag design could be considerably
simplified if they were only supposed to be a supplement to the
protection of well-designed safety belts. Other countries that have
high belt use, e.g., Australia and Canada, require air bag protection
of belted occupants only. European countries are considering this
requirement.
Cannot test for all crash
conditions
Manufacturers test air bags in a wider set of circumstances than is
required by FMVSS 208. They conduct offset tests, crashes at higher
speeds, and other types of crashes and sled tests. Their tests are
conducted using 5th-percentile female, 95th-percentile male, and child
dummies in addition to the 50th-percentile male dummy.
Nevertheless, they cannot possibly conduct tests that represent all
possible crash and occupant conditions.
It is this daunting variety of conditions under which an air bag must
perform that makes the job of designing safe and effective air bags
so challenging. It is hardly surprising that the first generation of
systems fell short of expectations.
Manufacturers and NHTSA have predicted that depowering will
reduce the inflation-induced fatalities and injuries caused by air bags.
The depowering inprovements may come at the expense of large
unrestrained occupants in severe crashes. It is not currently possible
for a "one size fits all," single-deployment-mode, air bag system to
provide completely safe protection.
2-7
btdustrv is developing
advanced technology
As a consequence, OEMs a_ d suppliers are developing advanced air
bag components and systems to improve the variety and
appropriateness of response to crash and occupant conditions. They
are focusing on sensors to cifferentiate occupant weight, determine
occupant proximity to the air bag module, improve crash severity
predictions, and determine belt status, which will provide improved
information about the crash and occupants. They are also working
on two-stage inflators, a variety of air bag and module designs, and
advanced safety belt conce_ts that will provide improved restraint
response. The current restraint system state of the art and advanced
technology options projected by industry are described in Section 5.
2-8
SECTION 3--CRITICAL PARAMETERS
Basic parameters derive from
the need for information for air
bag deployment and the need
to provide a safe and
protective response to that
information
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the paragraph titled "Purpose of the NHTSA/NASA Memorandum
of Understanding," NASA is specifically charged to "understand and
define critical parameters affecting air bag performance." JPL first
derived basic parameters to reflect the functions that may be required
of advanced technology. We established them by reviewing the
sequence of events of a crash and then classified them according to
the information obtained about the crash and occupants and the
response by the restraint system.
Basic parameters are described in Section 3.2 and shown in summary
in Table 3-1. Certain of the basic parameters are more important
than others in assessing the air bag system improvements that are
possible with advanced technology. A review of the basic parameters
led to a selection of the most important parameters, or critical
parameters, which are discussed in Section 3.3 and shown in bold
print in Table 3-1.
3.2 BASIC PARAMETERS
Basic parameters are those that describe both normal and off-design
performance of current systems and improved performance from
future systems using advanced technology. The functions of an
occupant protection system were analyzed according to the total set
of interactions that occur during a crash. These include interactions
between the obstacle and the vehicle, the vehicle and the restraint,
and the restraint and the occupant. This analysis assured that all major
functions were accounted for.
The basic parameters were classified by the information provided
about the crash and the occupants and the air bag system response.
This classification was used throughout the study to analyze and assess
the application of advanced technology.
For each function, parameters basic to the accomplishment of that
function are listed. These parameters were established to fulfill the
basic needs of each function. For example, in order to sense an object,
its specific features and required discrimination accuracy must be
specified. To detect motion, timing and accuracy of measurement
are basic parameters.
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Table 3-1. Basic Parameters
Category and
Function
Crash Information
Precrash*
Crash Severity
Occupant Information
Occupant
Characteristics*
Proximity*
Function Description
Safety Belt Status*
Predict crash scenario and severity.
Provide advanced crash information to
ensure more rapid and appropriate air
bag deployment and possibly precrash
:braking
Predict crash severity from analysis of
initial crash pulse
Determination of passenger and driver
characteristics relevant to air bag use
Determination of occupant's actual or
potential proximity to the air bag
module
Determine safety belt use
Basic Parameter
- Obstacle type
- Distance from vehicle
- Closing velocity
- Velocity vector
- Discrimination accuracy
- Reliability
- Delta V
- Crash pulse shape and variability
- Threshold velocity/acceleration
- Velocity vector
- Time to deployment decision
- Response time/accuracy
- Reliability
- Front seat passenger presence (including
whether the passenger is a child in a child
safety seat)
- Driver and front seat passenger
characteristics (weight, size, age,
gender...)
- Discrimination accuracy
- Reliability
- Distance of each occupant from air bag
module
- Occupant velocity toward the air bag
module
- Accuracy of the determination
- Time to update determination
- Reliability
- Detection of belt use
- Detection of proper use
- Discrimination accuracy
- Extent of spool-out
- Reliability
*Not currently part of most production vehicles.
Note: Bold print indicates critical parameter.
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Table 3-1. Basic Parameters (Continued)
Category and
Function
System Response
Control System &
Deployment Logic
Diagnostics
Communication
Inflator Response
Air Bag Response
Safety Belt System
Function Description
Computation to determine whether to
deploy (air bag or pretensioners)
based on processing of sensor input
data concerning the crash pulse,
occupant category, occupant proximity
and belt status
Determine system readiness by
measuring subsystem functions
Wiring of sensors, processors, and
restraint system
Inflator generates or releases, cools
and filters gas for the air bag
Air bag moves into place and applies
a decelerating force to occupant as a
function of crash delta V, occupant
weight (size), proximity to air bag,
belt use, inflator and air bag design
Occupant position control and
deceleration during a crash
Basic Parameter
- Speed of computation
- Validity of decision
- Reliability
- Validity of determination
- Reliability
- Speed
- Reliability
- Ignition time
- Inflation time
- Gas mass flow rate, peak pressure and
rise rate
- Gas mass flow rate variability
- Gas mass flow rate controllability
- Reliability
- Deployment time
- Cover design
- Air bag design, folding patterns,
chambering, venting design
- Fabric weight
- Air bag pressure
- Air bag force vs time
- Reliability
- Belt geometry & slack (including inte-
gration of belts with seats and adjustable
anchorage points)
- Elongation (stretch, spooling)
- Pretensioning (response time, force and
variability)
- Load limiting (load levels)
- Reliability
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Critical parameters are the
most important parameters
and are the basis for the
evaluation
Crash severi_'
Belt use
Occupant categories based on
test dummies
There are also a few paramet.zrs that are not derived from a functional
analysis of the air bag system, but are important to the implementation
of advanced air bag technology. Included in this category are cost,
development time, and custc,mer acceptance.
Some of the basic paramete:'s are more important than others. For
the purpose of this assessm,_'nt a limited set of parameters that are
considered to be the most important have been selected. These
"critical" parameters are discussed in the following section.
3.3 CRITICAL PARAMETERS
We have defined a subset of the basic parameters that are fundamental
to air bag operation. We call them the "critical parameters." In our
evaluation (Section 7) we ha_,e established the parametric sensitivities
of the critical parameters and used them to evaluate advanced restraint
technologies. The critical parameters are highlighted in Table 3.1.
3.3.1 Crash Severity (AV and Crash Pulse). The crash type and
the severity define what protective response is appropriate. These
parameters include the rangc of crash types and severities that must
be measured in order to dett:rmine the appropriate restraint system
response. They describe the total change in velocity (AV, a vector
quantity) during the crash, the peak acceleration (also a vector
quantity), and some indication of crash type.
3.3.2 Belt Use Status. BeP, use affects the job the air bag will have
to do because the belts take a substantial part of the force of the
decelerating occupant. As _n example, Mercedes-Benz raises the
minimum air bag inflation wdocity if an occupant is belted.
3.3.3 Occupant Weight, Size, Age, and Gender. The occupant's
weight and size are the mos; important of these, but since air bags
are tested with various dummies, the simplest set of values for these
parameters matches the dtmmies of a 6-year-old child, a 5th-
percentile female, a 50th-pert entile male, and a 95th-percentile male.
The existence of an infant in an infant restraint, or a small child in a
child safety seat, is a separate matter because these are likely to be
sensed using a different mechanism. Age relates to size (children)
and fragility (elderlyness) ofoccuparts. Gender is a critical parameter
in evaluating occupant injuJy risk because gender establishes the
occupants' fragility or likelihood of being injured by a given force or
load that results from a cr_tsh. The fact that females are more
susceptible to neck injury that males is reflected by the use of different
neck injury risk curves for females and males.
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Proximity
Deployment time
Inflator parameters
Air bag design
Reliability
3.3.4 Proximity of the Occupant to the Air Bag Module. This
parameter describes the necessary conditions for inflation-induced
occupant injury. For example, an occupant can be injured by an air
bag only if he or she is in the path of the deploying air bag.
3.3.5 Deployment Time Including the Time to Sense the Need
for Deployment. The timing of air bag deployment is important
because frontal crash forces can move an occupant into the path of a
deploying air bag if that deployment is delayed. For some types of
crashes and crash sensing systems, this can put an unbelted occupant
(and even some belted occupants) at severe risk. This parameter
depends on timing, from the onset of the crash, of the following:
crash sensor response, inflator ignition, and air bag deployment. This
parameter is complicated by variability in air bag component
performance that is not related to crash type or severity.
3.3.6 Inflator Response Parameters. Manufacturers are reducing
the aggressiveness of air bag inflation by reducing the amount of
gas-generating propellant in the inflators (depowering). This reduces
the adverse effect of air bags, but may also compromise the ultimate
protectiveness of air bags in high-speed crashes, particularly with
very large occupants. The inflator mass flow rate is the most important
inflator parameter.
3.3.7 Air Bag Response. The design, folding, venting, deployment
path, cover design, and material of the bag determine how it will
respond when inflated.
3.3.8 Reliability. The ability of an air bag to respond when needed
is fundamentally dependent on the reliability of all of its components.
Reliability also affects whether an air bag will inflate when inflation
is not appropriate (in the absence of a crash or in a crash where frontal
crash forces are not great).
Although there are other critical parameters, the ones discussed above
are considered to be the most important for the evaluation process,
which was aimed primarily at the reduction of air-bag-induced
injuries. In summary, the critical parameters are:
• Crash severity (AV and crash pulse)
° Belt use status
• Occupant weight, size, age, and gender
• Proximity of the occupant to the air bag module
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• Deployment time, inclutLing time to determine whether to deploy
the bag and the time to ceploy the bag
• Inflator mass flow rate
• Air bag design
• Reliability
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SECTION 4_REQUIREMENTS
OEMs establish requirements
within the constraints of
FMVSS 208
The process of developing advanced restraint technology is principally
governed by NHTSA, the OEMs, and the suppliers. NHTSA
establishes minimum safety levels through the federal motor vehicle
safety standards (FMVSS 208, 209, and 210). The agency also
influences development through its research and development, its
consumer information program [the New Car Assessment Program
56-km/h (35-mph) crash tests], and public persuasion. The OEMs
and suppliers work together to develop the systems that will meet
federal standards, customer needs and expectations, and their own
internal criteria.
Requirements for air bag
advanced technology are not
publicly available
The majority of advanced restraint development is conducted by the
suppliers in response to specifications and requirements established
by the OEMs. The OEMs are increasingly looking to the suppliers
for more complete system development. Because of the competitive
nature of the industry, its standards, goals, measures, and requirements
for advanced technology to improve field performance have not been
made public. The industry has made no public statements on what
specific trade-offs it deems to be acceptable for the overall
performance of restraint systems in the short or long term. A lack of
clear objectives hinders restraint technology development. Without
clear goals, system-level requirements can vary from OEM to OEM,
and subsystem performance can vary among suppliers.
The suppliers that JPL contacted did not define or justify specific
performance requirements for advanced technology. In most cases
they deferred to the OEMs, but noted that OEMs had not provided
requirements. Suppliers have been reluctant to define requirements
on their own. The OEMs have established some subsystem
requirements, such as for occupant weight sensing and child seat
sensing. However, the requirements made available to JPL were
insufficiently comprehensive to guide serious advanced system
development.
JPL had to independently
establish high-level
requirements
Some OEMs that have been working on advanced technology for
several years probably have established internal requirements, but
these were not provided to JPL. To conduct the assessment of
advanced technology, JPL established a candidate set of high-level
requirements for the critical parameters in order to evaluate advanced
technology. This is not a complete or comprehensive set of
requirements, but these are what we believe are the most critical
requirements for assessing the application of advanced technology.
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Requirements categorized by
information and response
The gray area
Deployment and
nondeployment AV thresholds
In setting requirements, the air bag system can be divided into two
parts: information and response. The information is provided by
sensors that may measure crash severity, belt status, occupant
category, and occupant proximity to the air bag module. The response
is provided by the control system, inflator, air bag, and belt system.
An ideal restraint system would have complete and accurate
information and an appropriate response. This provides a starting
point for establishing requirements. A system with less than perfect
information and responses would have to be relatively insensitive to
variations from the perfect conditions (robust). Therefore,
requirements must be established that demand some robustness, since
no system can be perfect. Requirements for the critical parameters
are as follows.
4.1 INFORMATION
4.1.1 Crash Severity (Crash Pulse Shape and Change in
Velocity). The system must predict the severity of the crash and
signal a deployment when the severity is sufficient to seriously injure
front seat occupants. Crash sensors typically measure the change of
velocity over a time period, _he immediate acceleration, the jerk, or a
combination of these param_ :ters established by the sensor algorithm.
In the past, manufacturers _ stablished target AV levels (that is, the
total change in velocity in a crash) for definite deployment and
nondeployment. These targets were based on crash injury data that
indicated the threshold AV when serious injuries or fatalities began
to occur and might be prey rated by an air bag. A nondeployment
level was also established wi hin which significant injury was unlikely
even for unbelted occupants There was a gray area between the two
levels where the system mi_ ht deploy or might not.
Because a significant number of injuries and fatalities have resulted
from deployments in low-se,_ erity crashes, there is an effort to increase
the nondeployment threshold and reduce the gray area. Advanced
systems that use a belt statu, sensor offer the potential of raising the
thresholds if it is known thai an occupant is using a belt. Mercedes-
Benz already manufactures a system in which the deployment
threshold is increased for be lted occupants.
Typical deployment threshol t requirements with belt use information
are:
• For belted occupants: 29 km/h (18 mph)
• For unbelted occupants: 22 km/h (14 mph)
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The nondeployment threshold is:
For belted occupants: 22 km/h (14 mph)
For unbelted occupants: 13 to 16 km/h (8 to 10 mph) (the trend is
toward higher values and reduction of the gray zone)
These values are approximate and will vary with vehicle manufacturer
and platform. OEMs also establish requirements for different crash
pulse shapes, representing different types of crashes--e.g., fixed
barrier crashes, deformable barrier crashes, pole crashes, etc.
Manufacturers specify more detailed requirements depending on their
analysis of crash protection needs and the capability of the crash
sensor algorithm. The move to higher thresholds for belted occupants
needs further evaluation. Preliminary work indicates that air bags
might not deploy in some crashes where they would provide important
occupant protection. In other crashes, deployment may be delayed
because the sensor algorithm delays the deployment decision. The
availability of multistage inflators will also lead to consideration of
alternative thresholds.
For this assessment the variability in crash severity was found to be
critical, since air bag systems must be robust for the range of crash
severities. The present lack of robustness is exhibited by late
deployments that permit an occupant to enter the keep-out zone and
interact with a deploying air bag. Pole crashes and some types of
offset crashes are examples where late deployments can occur. In
these crashes deceleration of the vehicle is relatively low in the early
part of the crash, but increases as major structural components or the
engine are engaged. Thus, the requirement for crash severity sensing
must also include a requirement for timely deployment when
deployment is appropriate. Deployment time, which is discussed
below, is one of the most critical parameters.
Precrash sensing may provide
for earlier air bag deployment
4.1.1.1 Precrash Sensing. An air bag should be deployed as early
as possible when it is needed in a crash sequence. This reduces the
potential for inflation-induced injuries and provides the maximum
ride-down distance for dissipating occupant kinetic energy. Early
air bag deployment requires early crash detection and discrimination.
The actual crash severity must be predicted at a time when the
kinematic parameters are very small and the system has relatively
little data on the crash.
A number of groups have proposed that precrash sensing of obstacles
could improve safety in two ways. First, it would alert drivers to
possible crashes so that they could take actions to avoid them. Second,
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it would provide additional, early information to the electronic crash-
sensing modules that would facilitate earlier, accurate detection of a
severe crash. With this information, the module could initiate air bag
deployment at a point earl-..er in the crash than would be possible
with a crash severity sensor alone.
Sensing for crash avoidance has been the subject of much research,
and such sensors are now used and are commercially available--
e.g., Eaton/VORAD radar-based sensors. The technical challenge for
precrash sensing is to provide sufficient accuracy (particularly an
extremely low false positive frequency) to reduce crash discrimination
times.
Precrash sensing
requirements not available
JPL has not found a set of detailed requirements that are guiding the
industry's current developrr.ent programs. Specific discussions with
technology developers indicate that the real requirements and, most
importantly, details of how _he sensor information would be applied,
have not been determined. Because of this, an accurate, quantitative
prediction of the efficacy of precrash sensing (in terms of reduction
of injury risk) is not possible. Such an analysis would be a crucial
step that should come prior to extensive development.
Need to measure closing speed
and obstacle inertia
No sensor available to
measure obstacle inertia
The basic physics of crash,:s indicates that the velocity vector and
offset are required to predict crash severity. Information that a vehicle
is approaching an obstacle at 48 krn/h (30 mph) is not sufficient to
predict a 48 km/h (30 mph) "barrier equivalent" crash severity, as
the obstacle's inertia is unknown. The sensor must predict whether
tile obstacle is fixed and ma,, sive (e.g., a barrier) or light and movable
(e.g., an empty refrigerator box), or somewhere in between. Most
obstacles will be other vehi "les, but some will be fixed. Note that a
determination of the inertia of a fixed obstacle also will require an
understanding of the attachment of that obstacle to the substructure.
Roadside hardware may post; difficulties due to the breakaway feature.
At this time there is no sens or that can determine obstacle inertia or
mass remotely.
Two scenarios for use
There are two possible sc marios for using the precrash closing
velocity information to rezluce discrimination times for air bag
deployment. A precrash st'.nsor could determine that a vehicle is
closing on a large obstacle at a high enough rate of speed that air bag
deployment is likely to be d_ sirable. This speed would be determined
specifically for each vehicle, depending on data such as seat belt
status and occupant positio 1/type. From an operational standpoint,
information on the obstacle closing velocity/size would be used to
reduce the discrimination threshold.
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Resolution and accuracy
Response time requirement
Early deployment may be possible by sensing a large obstacle and its
velocity with the precrash sensor and an early high acceleration and
jerk with the crash sensor. It is envisioned that the precrash sensor
would only supplement the crash sensing system; it would not be
used as a stand-alone system for predicting crash severity.
The precrash sensor also could be used to increase a deployment
threshold in a crash severity algorithm, based upon knowledge that
there is no significant obstacle approaching. This might allow the
crash severity sensor algorithm to be tuned to offer improved
immunity from certain nondeploy signals (e.g., rough road,
undercarriage strike, etc.) and would reduce the unintended
deployments.
For the purpose of reducing air bag deployment times, resolution
and accuracy of the measurement of closing distance are important
parameters. Resolution refers to the size of the minimum detectable
signal in some bandwidth, while accuracy refers to the absolute error
associated with the measurement. The requirements for system
performance will depend upon the extent to which precrash sensing
information is used in the deployment decision-making process.
Significant use ofprecrash information will push resolution/accuracy
requirements (for closing velocity) to approach those of inertial crash
sensors. Limited use of the information will relax these requirements.
Because of the large expected measurement range (e.g., 10 m) of
these systems, the required response speed will likely be much less
than for crash severity sensing. A simple rule of thumb would be that
response time, "c, is
a: _<dm/v v
where d m is the maximum measurement range and v v is the vehicle
velocity relative to the obstacle. This time is expected to be greater
than 0.1 second.
Accuracy of the measurement of obstacle mass (inertia) is also critical,
and this accuracy must be maintained with a variety of obstacle types.
For example, the composition of the obstacle (e.g., metallic or
nonmetallic) must not seriously affect the determination of its mass.
Also, a useful system should be able to ascertain the nature of the
attachment of the obstacle. The measurement of obstacle mass is a
very difficult requirement, and there is no known method to achieve
it. Obstacle size must substitute for mass as a current requirement.
4-5
Risks associated with pre-
crash sensor use need to be
studied
The risks associated with an increase or decrease of air bag
deployment thresholds are s_ mewhat different. An incorrect increase
of deployment threshold, b_sed upon precrash sensor information,
may put occupants at risk ir accidents with crash severity just at or
above current deployment "hresholds [-22-km/h (14-mph) barrier
equivalent AV]. The incremental injury risk caused by this factor
would have to be studied carefully to assess the magnitude of changes
of threshold, the expected reliability of the precrash sensor system,
and the frequency of accidents at this severity.
An incorrect decrease of deployment threshold would lead to a
number of additional deployments in those situations in which crash
sensor-predicted severity is just at or below the current nondeployment
levels [-13 km/h (8 mph)] The overall effect of these additional
deployments would depend upon their frequency and the status of
the occupant (e.g., type and position) at the time of deployment. If
there were no separate capability for detecting out-of-position (OOP)
occupants, for example, then the number of air-bag-induced injuries
would increase in this case. The magnitude of this increase would
depend upon the equivalent size of the deployment threshold shift,
as well as the frequency of situations in which at-risk (i.e., OOP)
occupants are in vehicles undergoing dynamic events that have crash
sensor signals in this range.
Disruption of driver operation because of an unintended air bag
deployment could also be a serious consequence. This could happen
in the case of a vehicle traveling at high speed, closing upon a
stationary low-mass obsta:le. In this case, the vehicle-obstacle
interaction would provide very little deceleration to the vehicle. Errors
associated with the precrash sensing system could lead to a precrash
prediction of a more serious accident than actually occurs. Use of
this precrash information to r_duce the crash sensor-based deployment
threshold could cause unint reded deployments at high speed. This
would be a potentially dan:;erous situation as the driver might be
prevented from avoiding ad titional obstacles. Many other potential
scenarios would have to bt, addressed before engineers seriously
consider advocating precrash sensor technology for air bag
deployment. JPL is aware of very little detailed precrash sensor
analysis that has been perfo: xned to date within the industry.
4.1.2 Belt Status. A belt s :atus sensor must reliably detect belt use
and nonuse. It also must be "eliable under expected scenarios of belt
misuse.
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Discrimination requirements of
drivers and passengers
Keep-out zone
Quasistatic sensing
Dynamic sensing
4.1.3 Occupant Category. The presence of both drivers and front
seat passengers must be detected with an accuracy that facilitates
discrimination between the categories used for testing. It is
unnecessary to discriminate beyond matching the capability of the
restraint system to provide varying responses. Therefore, occupant
sensors must detect or differentiate between:
• Small, medium, and large drivers
• Children and small, medium, and large adult front seat passengers
• Child seating systems, and particularly RFCSs
Small, medium, and large adults correspond roughly to the currently
available test dummies: 5th-percentile female, 50th-percentile male,
and 95th-percentile male. Children are represented by 3- and 6-year-
old dummies. The detector can use any method that will provide the
required discrimination.
4.1.4 Occupant Proximity to the Air Bag Module. Proximity
sensing has been proposed as a key component for an advanced air
bag system that will eliminate inflation-induced injuries. In its
simplest form, a proximity sensor could indicate that an occupant is
dangerously close to an airbag module at the time a deployment
decision is made. The application of a proximity sensor has led to
the concept of a "keep-out zone," which defines a dangerous zone
around an air bag module when the air bag is deploying. Present
concepts for advanced air bag systems use this zone in the following
manner:
If an occupant is inside this zone at the air bag deployment
decision time, then either suppress the air bag or deploy the
bag at a depowered inflation level.
If outside this zone at the air bag deployment decision time,
then, depending upon the status of other sensors, deploy the
air bag.
The earliest application of proximity sensors could be in a quasi-
static mode. The sensor could suppress or depower the air bag in
response to a static OOP occupant. A static OOP occupant is one
who is within the keep-out zone at the time of air bag deployment.
For full protection of occupants, dynamic proximity sensing is
required. Dynamic occupant sensing determines the occupant who
will move into the static keep-out zone during the air bag deployment,
effectively enlarging the keep-out zone. The industry seems to believe
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that dynamic proximity infcrmation can improve the performance of
advanced air bags by optimi_,ing the restraint system for a wider range
of occupant positions (beycnd detecting static OOP occupants) and
crash scenarios.
A discussion of the issues, and a list of initial requirements for
proximity sensing systems, are included as Appendix C. The following
is a summary of that discussion.
4.1.4.1 Dynamic Proximity Sensing Issues and Requirements.
JPL has investigated the application of dynamic proximity sensing
to an unbelted occupant undergoing a generic AAMA crash pulse.
Proximity sensing with a single keep-out zone shutoff boundary is
problematical if this boundary coincides with the edge of the keep-
out zone in front of the air bag. Occupants who are outside the zone
at (or just before) deployment may move into the zone as the bag is
deploying, putting them at risk of injury.
A decision zone larger than the
keep-out zone is required
because occupants move into
the keep-out zone during a
crash
Establishing a larger "decision zone" is one approach. The size of
this decision zone depends critically upon the crash discrimination
time. For some occupants, this zone may be larger than their initial
distance from the instrument panel (IP) or steering wheel. In such
cases, a proximity sensor could suppress the air bag in a large number
of cases where it is desirable to provide crash protection.
A secondary conclusion fror a our kinematic analysis is that in current
air bag-equipped vehicles without proximity sensors a large number
of unrestrained occupants may be moving into the keep-out zone of
deploying air bags in higher-speed crashes, in lower-speed crashes
with precrash braking, and in multiple-crash events. Those occupants
closest to the IP are at the greatest risk. Current air bag systems are
likely to be injuring occupa:lts in some of these crashes.
JPL has identified four impo "tant parameters: response time (position
update time), resolution/acceracy (position accuracy), full-scale range
resolution, and reliability.
Dynamic proximity sensing
req uirem en ts
For the AAMA sled pu se, response times are expressed
parametrically: 3 to 11 ms per cm of allowed error for crash
discrimination time ranging from 40 to 21 ms (Appendix C). The
allowed error depends on the occupant spatial tolerance to the
deploying air bag.
Data on that tolerance is not available for either current or advanced
air bags (which are intended to be more tolerant to occupant/air bag
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Quasistatic proximity sensing
response time is less stringent
than dynamic sensing
Need for rapid deployment
interaction). At this time, we have specified requirements of a few
milliseconds of response time and a few centimeters of accuracy.
Further testing and analysis could support better specification of these
values. The sensor must also be able to discriminate the occupant
from other objects in the vehicle, such as maps, newspapers, or
packages.
Full-scale range depends on a number of issues but is likely greater
than 30 cm, based on the analysis presented in Appendix C.
Reliability estimates are covered in Section 4.2.4 of this report.
4.1.4.2 Quasistatic Proximity-Sensing Issues and Requirements.
Proximity sensing with low-update-rate sensors could improve static
OOP occupant detection. The application of a sensor for this problem
should avoid the response time problems of dynamic proximity
sensing. Specifically, the response time, % should obey:
x min < x < Xmax
where: Xmin - 21 to 40 ms (a value that was determined by
the desire not to affect dynamic performance)
and: Zmax = 0.2 to 2 s (a time small enough to permit
detection of occupant-initiated motion into or out of a
danger zone)
A full-scale range for a quasistatic proximity sensor can be smaller,
as the intent is to measure only occupant intrusion into a smaller
keep-out zone. This holds only for sensors mounted near the air bag
module. The requirements for resolution and accuracy (including
discrimination between occupants and other objects) and reliability
remain the same as for dynamic proximity sensing.
4.2 RESPONSE
4.2.1 Deployment Time. Deployment time is one of the most
critical parameters, because it relates directly to proximity of the
occupant to the air bag. To be most effective in preventing occupant
interaction with a deploying air bag, the bag should be deployed as
rapidly as possible when it is appropriate for crash protection. The
crash sensor must discriminate between events that require
deployment and those that do not.
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The current minimum air bag fill time is about 30 ms, so that a key to
achieving rapid deployment is early crash-sensing. One guideline in
air bag system development _.sthe so-called "5 in. (13 cm) less 30 ms"
rule. This rule, used by air bag developers, is that the occupant should
not move more than 13 cm (5 in.) forward from the seat before the
air bag is fully inflated. Thus, the time allowed for sensing crash
severity is the time in which the occupant has moved forward 13 cm
minus 30 ms (the time required for bag inflation). For a 48-km/h
(30-mph) frontal barrier cra, h, this time for sensing is typically 15 to
20 ms.
Some moderate crashes can
result in late deployments
For other crash scenarios, cr for OOP occupants, the sensing time
would be different. Crash severity sensing is well tuned to the
48-km/h (30-mph) rigid barrier test required in FMVSS 208. For
other crash types, such as those into softer targets, the ability of the
sensors to predict the crash ::everity and provide timely deployment
of the air bag is compromi,_ed. This is particularly true when the
crash is in the gray zone discassed above, which varies depending on
sensor and logic. Work by a number of groups has shown that
deformable offset barrier crashes of moderate severity often result in
late deployments. In such crashes, belted 5th-percentile female
occupants can be severely irjured, while their injuries would not be
serious without air bag deph _yment.
Maximum allowable
deployment times
The crash severity sensors m ust provide early, accurate prediction of
the crash severity. Reliable pIediction is a particularly difficult sensing
requirement. New algorithm developments are intended to improve
the prediction capability of sensors. In setting requirements it is
possible to develop parametric relationships that define the maximum
allowable deployment times :br different crash types and AVs. These
parametric relationships will show trigger times of roughly 15 to
40 ms.
The system must deploy as
rapidly as possible when an air
bag is needed
The requirement, however, is always to deploy as rapidly as
information to the sensor pe Tnits when an air bag is needed. This
requirement applies also to t ae air bag deployment, and not only to
the crash sensor. Manufactul ers should consider air bag designs that
can deploy more rapidly and ceploy more safely in the effort to reduce
deployment time. By deploiling more rapidly, an air bag could be
more aggressive, increasing the keep-out zone. If more rapid
deployment is undertaken, de signs to reduce harmful aggressiveness
must also be introduced.
Achieving acceptable deployment times that are reliable and accurate
for all crash scenarios requires a substantial test program. A major
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AAMA sled pulse test is
inadequate for deployment
time testing
deficiency of performance testing with the AAMA sled pulse is that
it does not test the performance of the crush zone or the crash severity
sensors and algorithms. It is simply testing the performance of a
subsystem in the total air bag system. The deployment time is
specified to be early enough to avoid significant occupant interaction
with the deploying air bag. It is important for the future to test the
effectiveness of the complete system, including the performance of
crash sensors and of any other sensors that are added to the system.
As a starting point, it would be possible to perform the AAMA sled
pulse test on systems that rely solely on single-point sensing systems
by using the system's sensor to trigger deployment. However, for
crash severity sensing systems that employ crush zone sensors, this
would not be possible. Ensuring that adequate deployment times
will always be achieved would require an impracticably large testing
program. The more extensive the testing can be, however, the more
assurance a manufacturer will have that acceptable deployment times
can be achieved under a broad spectrum of crashes.
Ignition times are adequate
4.2.2 Inflator Parameters. The system-level specifications for
inflators are: ignition time, mass flow rate, mass flow rate variability,
and mass flow rate controllability. The ignition time must be as short
as possible, since any increase in air bag deployment time increases
the probability of injury risk. Ignition times of current systems are
on the order of 2 ms, so there is little opportunity for significant
reduction. Further development should not focus on ignition time,
unless necessary to ensure that ignition time does not lengthen
significantly in cold weather. The mass flow rate and its variability
and controllability are critical, however.
Mass flow rate profile
optimization needed
Analyses and tests available to JPL have not provided the optimal
mass flow rate profile. A profile with a high initial rate results in
lower chest injury risk when compared with alternatives. But a profile
with a more gradual rise rate and lower peak pressure reduces neck
injury risk. The performance of inflation with alternative profiles
needs to be researched to determine the optimum profile for different
crash pulses and occupants. This optimization process also needs to
be performed for dual inflators.
Inflator variabili_ is large and
must be reduced for effective
use of dual inflators
Today's pyrotechnic inflators have substantial unit-to-unit variability.
Several sources have reported 3-sigma total variabilities of 25% to
30% at standard temperature. The variability increases over the
operable temperature range. This variability is unacceptable for
advanced systems that rely on dual- or multilevel inflation systems
for a tailored response. The dual- or multilevel inflator response
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would be masked by such variability. The authors estimate that
inflator variability must be _0% or less for each stage.
Inflator controllability is necessary for a tailored response. If detailed
information about a crash and the occupants were available to
determine inflation characteristics, an appropriate response would
require an inflator with a highly variable mass flow rate and peak
pressure. With the information that will actually be available in
advanced systems, inflators with two or possibly three stages should
be adequate. However, more controllable responses may be desirable,
depending on the capability of the two or three stages to provide
acceptable injury risk for all air bag/occupant interactions. Each stage
must be capable of providing the appropriate response. The selected
rise rates and peak pressures will have to be determined from the
deployment strategies established for alternative crash scenarios. The
authors cannot establish these requirements here.
Air bag design goal is to
achieve a robust ,_vstem
4.2.3 Air Bag Response. There are many new air bag designs that
offer the potential of reducing injury risk for specific air bag/occupant
interactions. They have the potential of more rapid and benign
deployment via compartmented designs and other features. We cannot
establish specific requirements for advanced designs. However, the
general goal is to develop a r _bust system that will reduce deployment
injuries while maintaining effective protection. The ultimate goal is
that a deploying air bag should never cause injury. If that design
goal could be achieved by air bag design alone, there would be no
need for occupant and proximity sensors.
4.2.4 Reliability. The fai ure of an air bag to deploy when needed
or an unintended air bag del,loyment can have serious consequences
for automobile occupants. __ir bag subsystem mechanical reliability
limitations, in combinaticn with a deployment algorithm, will
determine the magnitude of both problems. An analysis is presented
in Appendix D as the firs step in an investigation of reliability
requirements.
Using 1994 air bag deployr lent statistics, we have generated tables
that show mechanical reliab:lity and functional reliability for a driver-
side air bag system as a fun_ :tion of unintended nondeployments and
the ratio of intended to total deployments. Assuming that there are
no more than one unintend,',d nondeployment per year, and that the
ratio of intended to total depl _yments is at least 0.999, then the average
subsystem mechanical reliability must be 0.999995 ("5+ nines") if
subsystem mechanical failures are independent. For the system, the
mechanical reliability will b : 0.99998 ("4+ nines") and the functional
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System mechanical reliability
requirement is nearly 5 nines,"
component reliabilities are
higher
System mechanical reliabilities
of 4 to 5 nines are consistent
with tens of unintended
nondeployments and tens to
hundreds of unintended
deployments in the year 2000
reliability will be slightly less than 0.999. As the ratio of intended to
total deployments increases, the mechanical reliability requirements
increase for a constant number of unintended nondeployments.
With expanded air bag installation (and deployments), a requirement
of no more than one unintended nondeployment per year and at least
0.999 intended to total deployments implies an average subsystem
mechanical reliability greater than 0.999995 and, at the system level,
a mechanical reliability greater than 0.99998, with a functional
reliability even closer to the ratio of 0.999 intended to total
deployments.
Based on year 2000 projections for air bag installations and assuming
1994 deployment rates, approximately 262,000 deployments can be
expected in the year 2000. If the system mechanical reliability is
between 4 and 5 nines, with corresponding higher component
reliabilities, and the number of unintended deployments is in the range
26 to 262 (0.01% to 0.1%), the number of unintended nondeployments
consistent with those system mechanical reliabilities will be 2 for 5
nines and 21 for 4 nines. That result is insensitive to the number of
unintended deployments within the stated range.
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SECTION 5--OccUPANT PROTECTION
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
Current system components
Safety belts
5.1 CURRENT SAFETY RESTRAINT SYSTEMS
Safety restraint systems in current vehicles typically include seat belts
and an air bag system. A block diagram of a typical safety restraint
system is given in Figure 5-1.
Current air bag systems include one or more crash sensors, a
diagnostic and control module, wiring, inflators, and air bags. The
inflators and air bags are packaged in modules that are under protective
covers in the center of the steering wheel (for the driver) and on the
right side of the instrument panel (for the center and right front
passengers). The crash sensor obtains data from the forces of the
crash. Those data are processed to determine whether air bag
deployment is desirable for occupant crash protection. If the decision
is to deploy the bags, an electrical signal is sent to the inflator to
generate or release gas to inflate the air bags.
Production safety belts for outboard occupants are universally three-
point systems consisting of a soft-edged belt that crosses the lap and
then the chest from a lower inboard attachment point to the upper
outboard attachment point. The upper outboard end of the belt usually
goes through a "D" ring mounted on the "B" pillar of the vehicle and
down to a spring-loaded reel. This reel permits the belt to feed out to
fit occupants and their movements, but takes up slack in the belt. The
reel has a device that locks it when forces on the vehicle indicate the
need for belt restraint.
UAir Bag System
I I I
I Crash _ Control/DiagnosticsSensors SystemI I IL
Inflators t_[ Air Bags
I I ,oadI Limiters
I
I Safety Belt System
Restraint
v
t
Restraint
Driverand Passenger
Figure 5-1. Schematic Diagram of Current Production Restraint
S_,stem
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Pretensioners and load limiters
Some safety belt systems ha ve pretensioning devices that pull 10 cm
or more of belt back into the reel to reduce slack and improve restraint
performance. Pretensioners are triggered by crash sensors similar to
those that trigger air bags. S__me belts also have load-limiting devices
that release belt webbing in _ controlled manner to reduce peak forces
on the occupant.
Automatic safety belts
For several years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, some
manufacturers used automatic safety belts to meet the requirements
of FMVSS 208. These systems typically moved a belt into place across
the chest when the door was closed and had manual lap belts to
complete belt protection. A few manufacturers used door-mounted
manual lap/shoulder belts to meet FMVSS 208 under the pretext that
these belts could be left buckled when the vehicle door was opened
and closed, providing auto;natic protection. In fact, users of these
vehicles almost never used the belts in this "automatic" mode. These
belts often had poor geomet_ with outboard mounting points too far
forward, permitting excessive occupant motion during a crash.
Electromechanical crash
sensors
Crash sensors are all-mechanical switches, electromechanical
switches, and/or electronic inertial sensors. Electromechanical
switches are typically used in combinations of discriminating and
sating sensors located at different points in the forward part of a
vehicle. This is sometimes called multiple-point sensing. The
discriminating sensors most often are highly damped
electromechanical switche,,', that activate at a specified change in
velocity. These discriminat ng sensors typically are placed close to
the front of the vehicle ia the crush zone in order to provide
information early in a crasl. Low-threshold sating sensors are used
to prevent unwanted air bag. deployment from localized damage.
Single-point electronic sensing
A recent trend has been toward single-point or multipoint electronic
sensing. In single-point sensing, an electronic accelerometer typically
is placed in the occupant compartment. Its signal is processed by
algorithms to determine cra;h severity. The intent is to make an early
determination (from the forces transmitted to the occupant
compartment), while maint_dning immunity from signals that are not
relevant to the need for occupant restraint. Electronic accelerometers
are also used as multipoint ;ensors.
Air bag module mounting
The size and geometry ofth _frontal air bag modules are different for
the driver and passenger. T.ae driver-side unit must be packaged in
the steering wheel. The passenger-side unit must be larger to
accommodate a larger air b_ g and is packaged in the right side of the
instrument panel. DiffereJ_t vehicles have alternative mounting
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Inflators
Air bags
Seat belts
positions to improve air bag performance. In some vehicles, the
passenger air bag is deployed in an upward direction to reduce loading
on out-of-position passengers during deployment. Mounting of the
side impact air bags is usually in the "B" pillars, doors, or the seat.
Typical components of a current production inflator include an
initiator, gas generator, filter/heat sink, and nozzle. The gas generator
typically has only a single stage with fixed output. Traditional
propellants are sodium azide or nitrocellulose. Hybrid gas generators
using stored gas and a solid propellant heating element have recently
been introduced in the passenger air bags of some vehicles. The filter/
heat sink removes particulate matter and reduces the temperature of
the output stream from the gas generator before it enters the air bag.
The nozzle directs the inflator output stream into the air bag.
Current air bags are usually made from multi-element sewn fabrics.
The bag fabric is folded into the module housing. The type of fold
used in the packaging of the air bag helps determine the bag geometry
during the inflation process. Two schemes currently used are Petri-
folding (P-folding) and Leporello-folding (L-folding). With the L-
folding technique, the air bag is folded in accordion-type layers to a
package that generally is located directly above the inflator. With the
P-folding technique, the air bag is configured in the form of several
concentric ring folds around the inflator. Tethers often are used to
provide control of bag geometry during deployment. Vents control
the release of gas from the air bag and permit the air bag to deflate
after a crash. Current vents are fixed in size and remain open during
the entire deployment.
The primary safety restraint system on current vehicles is seat belts.
They include a three-point belt attachment with a single belt retractor
and soft-edge webbing. The belt has a cable end-release buckle and
free-running tongue. Specific belt designs vary considerably among
current vehicles. Some new vehicles incorporate belt adjustment seat
mounting, webbing grabbers, webbing elongation tailored to air bags,
load-limiting devices, belt pretensioners, and belt sensors (to alter
air bag deployment thresholds) into the seat belt system. Current belt
pretensioners are low-output devices designed to eliminate belt slack
during a crash event.
5.2 ADVANCED SAFETY RESTRAINT SYSTEMS
5.2.1 Introduction. Team members have had numerous technical
exchanges with automobile manufacturers and system and component
suppliers about technologies that may be used in advanced safety
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restraint systems. The mganizations contacted are listed in
Appendix A. In addition, JPI, distributed a questionnaire to all OEMs
and suppliers who were km,wn to be developing advanced air bag
technology. The questionnaire is given in Appendix B.
Reporting qf technology
capabili_' limited by
confidential information
Most of the information received was confidential, including all data
that supported performance claims. The advanced technology
descriptions and capabilities presented here reflect the information
and data gathered, but do not include details protected by the
confidentiality agreements. Therefore, the descriptions do not include
comparisons among competitors' systems or detailed descriptions of
specific component capabilities. Instead, generic capabilities of
technology type are presented. A summary of the technologies
investigated and their characteristics is given in Table 5-1.
The technology survey and conclusions derived from it are based on
contacts with a limited number of vehicle manufacturers and suppliers.
The state of the art of advanced air bag technologies is in a high state
of flux, and the technologies discussed in the report, as well as other
technologies, may advance r_aore or less rapidly than indicated in the
report.
Based upon our discussions, we envision that future safety restraint
systems may include adva:lced seat/seat belt systems, advanced
inflatable restraints, and nun terous sensors (for detection of precrash
events, crash severity, occupant type/proximity, and safety belt status).
These systems will need an advanced control system to monitor all
of the sensor information and deploy selected elements of the safety
restraint system (based upon an internal algorithm).
Future safety restraint systems
In an advanced safety restraint system, the control system will: (1)
detect/determine crash seve_ ity from precrash and crash sensors; (2)
detect position and size of ,)ccupants using data from a variety of
occupant sensors and/or wei_;ht sensors; (3) detect belt use; (4) detect
the presence of rear-facing in;ant seats (RFISs) and front-facing infant
seats (FFISs); and (5) use the above data to modulate the performance
of the variable portions of i:oth the safety belt and air bag systems
(e.g., fire pretensioners, enal de low seat-belt load limits, turn offthe
air bag, etc.). This system may require more processing power than
is available in current air btg control systems, as the system will
process more data from mtltiple subsystems in a shorter time. A
schematic diagram of an adv raced safety restraint system containing
all of these elements is givell in Figure 5-2.
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Table 5-1. Advanced Technology Characteristics
Technology
Item
Sensors
Pre-Crash
Sensing
Crash Severity
Sensors
Sensing
Diagnostic
Modules/Crash
Algorithms
Belt Use
Sensors
Belt spool-out
sensors
Seat Position
Sensors
Technology
Description and
Function
These sensors provide
remote sensing
(electromagnetic) for
early crash severity
determination.
These sensors are
electromechanical
switches and analog
accelerometers for
determination of crash
severity.
Improved algorithms
are aimed at reducing
discrimination times
and unintended airbag
deployments. Evolu-
tionary design includes
improved hardware
compatible with an
increased number of
sensor inputs and
restraint firing loops.
These sensors
determine whether or
not a safety belt is
being used.
These sensors aid in
determining occupant
size.
These sensors could be
used to estimate driver
size and proximity to
the air bag and
passenger proximity.
Potential of Technology to Improve the
Robustness and Performance of Safety
Restraint System
The potential here is limited. The ability
to determine obstacle inertia has not been
determined. The implications of system
unreliability are not defined, but they are
potentially serious.
Critical capabilities already have been
demonstrated. A move toward analog
accelerometers (single-point sensors) is
underway. This reduces cost/complexity.
There is unclear potential for significant
improvement. Details of current system
performance are unavailable to JPL due
to confidentiality concerns by companies.
Hall-type sensors have been developed.
These sensors with seat position sensors
could provide approximate information
on occupant size and proximity, but JPL
knows of no plan by industry for their
use.
These sensors would be a surrogate for
occupant presence and proximity sensors,
but would only provide approximate
information.
Technology Maturity
Readiness Date*
These sensors could be
available for MY2001.
These sensors are
available now.
Development here is
ongoing.
These sensors could be
available for
introduction into
vehicles by MY2000.
These sensors could be
available by MY2001
These sensors could be
available for MY2000.
* Technology readiness dates are those dates when production subsystems could be ready. Implementation into vehicles depends
upon the OEMs' decision to include them and their technology deployment schedules, which could add one to three years to the
model year readiness dates provided here.
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Table 5-1. Advanced Technology Characteristics (Continued)
Technology
Item
Sensors (cont.)
Occupant
Classification
Sensors
Occupant
Proximity
Motion
Sensors
Computational
Systems/
Algorithms
Inflators
Non-Azide
Propellants
Hybrid
Inflators
Heated Gas
Inflators
Technology
Description and
Function
These sensors measure
weight and presence for
classification of at-risk
occupants.
These sensors involve
remote sensing systems
to provide range
information between
occupants and in-cabin
hazards.
Such systems record all
sensor signals to
determine/actuate
restraint system
response.
These materials replace
sodium azide propel-
lants to improve gas
generant properties (i.e.,
they are smokeless and
odorless, and they have
fewer particulates and
lower temperatures).
These inflators use
high-pressure stored gas
in conjunction with a
pyrotechnic charge.
These inflators use a
combustible mixture of
dry air and hydrogen
gas under high pressure.
Potential of Technology to Improve the
Robustness and Performance of Safety
Restraint System
Weight sensors have fiindamental
inaccuracies and systemic errors. They
have limited utility. P_esence sensors
show ability for occupant classifications.
System reliability requ rements are
unclear. Child seat tags will provide the
required performance. Required retrofit
of existing child seats is an impediment.
These sensors are usefid for static OOP
detection. The consequences of system
unreliability are not well defined. Ultra-
sonic/IR systems hold the greatest
promise. Utility ofdyr, amic proximity
information is not well understood at
present.
These might replace urgraded crash
sensor diagnostic modules, as systems
requirements expand. Hardware
currently is available. Utility of
currently envisioned acvanced algorithms
has not been demonstr_ ted.
These propellants have lower temperature
gas with no paniculate,,. This will
permit use of lighter-weight air bag
fabrics, which improve performance.
Simpler inflator design; are possible.
These inflators have more desirable gas
generant properties (i.e, fewer
particulates). There is :ower variability
m performance.
The gas generant is cle_ n and environ-
mentally friendly. The_ e inflators permit
use of lighter-weight ai bag fabrics to
_mprove performance.
Technology Maturity
Readiness Date
MY2000 could see
availability of weight
sensors and presence
sensors. Tags are
available now.
These sensors could be
available by
MY2000/2001.
These systems could be
in use by MY2000.
Some non-azide
propellants are now"
used; however, they
have higher gas
temperatures. Low
vulnerability (LOVA)
propellants should be
ready for MY2000.
More use is expected by
MY 1999. Units with
LOVA propellants could
be ready by MY2000.
These units are expected
to be ready by MY 1999.
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Table 5-1. Advanced Technology Characteristics (Continued)
Technology
Item
Inflators
(cont.)
Multistage
Inflators
Inflators with
Tailorable
Mass Flow
Rate
Air Bags
New Fabrics
and Coatings
New Woven
Fabrics and
Bag
Construction
New Bag
Shapes and
Compart-
mented Bags
New Air Bag
Venting
Systems
Technology Description
and Function
These systems use two
separate inflators
packaged as a single unit,
or two separate
pyrotechnic charges with
a single inflator.
These systems provide
control of inflator output
m near real-time.
Fabrics and coatings that
are more flexible, lighter
m weight and have lower
permeability are now
_vailable.
These materials use
controlled fabric porosity
and improved weaving
techniques to reduce or
eliminate bag seams.
These alternatives involve
air bags with multiple
compartments, which
inflate sequentially. Bags
expand radially during
deployment.
These systems provide
multilevel venting
systems with discrete
holes and continuously
variable venting designs.
Continuously variable
venting designs would be
controlled in near real-
time based on available
sensor information.
Potential of Technology to Improve the
Robustness and Performance of Safety
Restraint System
These inflators permit stages of air bag
deployment depending on crash severity
and occupant characteristics. Inflator
performance variability could
overshadow the potential advantages.
With appropriate sensor information, this
technology would permit control of air
bag deployment depending on crash
severity and occupant location and
characteristics.
These fabrics permit use of lower output
inflators. Lower mass should reduce
punchout forces on OOP occupants.
These materials simplify bag folding
techniques. Lighter-weight fabrics are
less tolerant of particulates and high
temperature gases.
Fabrics having controlled porosity with
low variability could eliminate the need
for discrete vent holes.
The first compartment can be pressurized
much quicker to provide early occupant
protection, with subsequent compart-
ments maintaining the restraint force.
This is especially beneficial to OOP
occupants.
These systems provide pre-determined
variation in venting depending on bag
pressure. They provide rapid inflation of
air bags (with no venting) to reduce
occupant/air bag interaction.
Continuously variable systems must be
developed in conjunction with sensors
and control strategies.
Technology Maturity
Readiness Date
Two-stage inflators
could be ready for
production in 1998.
These inflators are
under development.
Technology has been
demonstrated with
inflators having low
particulates and lower
gas temperatures. These
materials could be
incorporated with hybrid
inflators for MY2000.
This is an evolving
technology, which could
be incorporated as
product improvement.
This technology could
be ready for
introduction in
MY2000.
Multilevel systems
could be available in
MY 1999. Continuously
variable systems are
being developed.
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Table 5-1. Advanced Technology Characteristics (Continued)
Technology
Item
Seat Belt
Systems
Pretensioners
Load Limiting
Devices
Inflatable Seat
Belts
Technology Description
and Function
This technology involves
high-output pretensioners
to increase coupling
between occupant and
seat.
Single- or dual-level
devices provide a fixed
force level over the maxi-
mum occupant excursions.
Continuously variable
load limiters provide a
wide variation of forces.
A portion of the standard
three-point belt is inflated
to augment the belt
function.
Potential of Technology to Improve the
Robustness and Pe:formance of Safety
Restrait_t System
Maximizes ride-dowel distance for dissi-
pation of the occupanrs kinetic energy.
Dual-level load limiters can provide two-
level selection based on knowledge of
the occupant's characteristics. Further
adjustability is provided by continuously
variable devices.
These devices offer iaflated cushioning
and also provide some pretensioning of
the seat belt. Air bels are less
aggressive than air bags.
Technology Maturity
Readiness Date
Pretentioners are in
some vehicles now.
Newer high-output
devices could be ready
in MY1999.
Load limiters are in
some vehicles now.
Continuously variable
devices could be ready
in MY2000.
These devices could
be ready by MY2001.
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Figure 5-2. Advanced Safety Restraint System Schematic Diagram
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Limitations of current sensing.
insufficient crash and occupant
information
Need for more information is
to be provided by new sensors
Some sensors will evolve,"
others require the application
of new technology
5.2.2 Advanced Sensor Technology Development. Currently, the
primary sensors in air bag systems are crash severity sensors. These
sensors detect changes in the kinematic parameters (velocity and its
derivatives) of the vehicle in response to a crash event and make a
decision to deploy supplemental restraints (e.g., air bags) and/or
enhanced primary restraints (e.g., seat belts with pretensioners). Many
of the current limitations and liabilities of safety restraint systems
are a result of insufficient crash and occupant information. Decisions
by crash sensors to mitigate the hazards associated with very complex
crash events are being made on the basis of a limited amount of data.
Typically, only the first 15 to 20 ms of single-point crash sensor data
(a time series with under 100 sample points) are used to discriminate
between deployment and nondeployment events.
The general consensus in the industry is that restraint performance
could be enhanced through the collection and use of other information.
For example, restraint designers believe that a knowledge of the
precrash environment, of occupant types/sizes and proximity to in-
cabin hazards, and of the use of safety belts allow a restraint system
response that is better tailored to the specifics of a given crash. In
short, the view of restraint experts is that better crash information
early in a crash can be used to generate a more appropriate response.
Additional sensors will be required to provide this enhanced
information. The added sensors will enhance, but not replace, crash
sensor information. Detection of an actual crash will remain a basic
requirement for air bag deployment in the future.
Current advanced safety restraint sensor development is largely a
process of evolution. Crash severity sensing technology began with
multiple electromechanical switches, actuated at a specified vehicle
velocity change [e.g., V = 16 km/h (10 mph)]. The current state of
the art is analog accelerometers with data processing algorithms.
These provide more accurate discrimination between crashes that
do, or do not, require deployment. Ongoing refinements in crash-
sensing systems are geared primarily toward "parameter pushing."
That is, evolutionary development provides incremental
improvements to discrimination time values and immunity from
extraneous information.
A significant knowledge base exists from which advanced technology
improvements can develop. Some advanced systems, however, will
require the development and application of completely new
technologies. The most active area of new technology development
has been directed at elimination of inflation-induced injury 0 3) from
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Advanced sensor categories
Precrash sensors provide
advanced warning
air bags. The primary focus has been on the detection of at-risk
occupants in order to suppress air bag deployment. The industry is
developing sensing technology to determine occupant characteristics
and proximity to deploying air bags.
In the future the inherent speed of many proximity sensors should
allow dynamic sensing of occupant proximity to in-cabin hazards.
This capability should permit finer control of the response of the
restraint system, which will improve the efficacy of the restraint
system, in addition to mitigating its negative effects. To this end,
precrash sensing has been proposed as a potentially important safety
enhancement. Precrash sen_ing could provide both crash avoidance
capability as well as earlier prediction of crash severity, which may
allow earlier restraint system response. (Refer to Section 4. I. I. 1.) In
general, the requirements dviving this new technology development
are not as clearly understood, relative to crash sensors, because of
the lack of critical field performance data.
Seat belt sensing technology is becoming more reliable. Thus we
envision that seat belt status information will begin to play a role in
the deployment of active re straints.
The advanced sensor technalogies investigated by JPL are divided
according to function. The _:ategories are:
o
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Precrash sensors
Crash severity sensors
Diagnostic modules and crash detection algorithms
Occupant size or m_,ss sensors
Occupant proximity and motion sensors
Safety belt status se asors
Computational systt:ms/algorithms
5.2.2.1 Precrash Sensors. l'recrash sensors could provide advanced
warning of an obstacle. 1his information could facilitate crash
avoidance or earlier air bag deployment. Information from the
precrash sensor could prepare a crash severity sensor to make an
earlier decision on whether (r not to deploy the air bags. If an obstacle
is seen by the precrash sen ;or with a high closing speed, the crash
sensor could be programm _d to deploy the bags as soon as major
deceleration is measured. Oi the other hand, if no obstacle is observed
by the precrash sensor befo re the crash sensor detects deceleration,
the system may be programmed to require a higher level of
deceleration or change of v, flocity before the air bags are deployed.
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Precrash sensors are likely to be used first as part of a smart cruise
control that adjusts the speed of the vehicle for traffic conditions.
The industry is pursuing both radar and visible imaging technologies
for precrash sensors.
Radar systems
One supplier's radar system uses dual antennas, operating as a phased
a/ray. Millimeter-wave pulses are transmitted into the region in front
of the vehicle. Backscattered pulses are detected, with their travel
time providing an indication of the range of the reflector. The received
amplitude provides information on the size and composition of the
reflecting object.
Another supplier utilizes a 1-mm 2 chip that contains all of the
transmitter functions. The system is approximately 6×9x 1.3 cm and
fits under the front bumper. It senses an object within 3 meters and
tracks speed and distance, thus providing distance and time-to-impact
data to the crash recorder. It has been tested with many types of
obstacles, road objects, and in various weather conditions.
The transmitted beam shape depends upon the application. Narrow
beam shapes (high f-number optics) are used for automated cruise
control, where long-range forward-looking capability and low-lateral
interference are important. Short, wide beam shapes (low f-number
optics) are used for precrash sensing. Here, sensing ranges of 0.5 m
in front of the vehicle allow determination of closing velocity at least
100 ms prior to first impact. This provides sufficient early warning.
Sensor cannot resolve
obstacle mass
The precrash radar system, through its data processing algorithm,
can provide an indication of obstacle size by determining the solid
angle subtended by the reflector. The ability to determine the inertia
of the obstacle is not clear. No supplier could articulate any capability
to resolve obstacle mass. The radar system consists of antennas/power
electronics remotely located (at the front of the car) that interface
with a separate electronic controller. It is not clear whether the
controller's function could be implemented on the standard crash
sensor/air bag controller system or whether a separate, dedicated
system is required. One supplier quoted a cost for this system in the
$150-$200 range, installed. Another said that it would be $100 or
less. Systems could be ready for introduction in MY 2001 cars if
OEMs decided to do so immediately.
JPL's investigation found at least five precrash sensor development
programs. Two suppliers provided detailed information.
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Two O,pes of crash sensors
Electromechanical sensors
A ccelerometers
5.2.2.2 Crash Severity Sensors. Crash sensors are physical
transducers that convert variations in kinematic parameters (vehicle
velocity and its derivatives) to an electrical signal. Two general types
are in use: electromechanical switches that close an electrical contact
at some specified signal level (typically the change in vehicle velocity)
and analog sensors that pr_.vide an output voltage proportional to
signal input (such as acceleration). Switches provide essentially a
single response, while accelerometers provide a moderately large time
series of data (a few hundre J points) during a crash event.
Electromechanical switches typically are overdamped spring-mass
systems that trigger after a specific change in vehicle velocity.
Switches are placed in a number of areas, including the vehicle's
frontal crush zone. In this way, the switch will trigger at a specified
signal level, well in advance of that signal level being felt in the
occupant compartment. The technology is mature. JPL's work
uncovered no significant advanced development work in this area.
There was one new application of the technology worth mentioning,
however. One developer reT)orted a distributed crush switch to be
located at the extreme front of the vehicle where it would provide
early crash severity data over a wide angle. This system could detect
narrow-object impacts and highly offset crashes that would not trigger
the main crash sensor until later in the collision. Before the main
crash sensor could detect the crash, the occupants might move into
the keep-out zone. These sensors could work with the main crash
sensor like precrash sensors
The size of the electromechai Lical sensors (a few cm3), although small,
is an issue when compared to alternative technologies. One limitation,
communicated by end users, was the difficulty in reliably raising the
threshold of some present switch type sensors, because of limits to
damping factors achievable ¢¢ith current geometries.
Analog accelerometers us_ a number of sensing technologies
(piezoelectric crystals, silicgn-based piezo-resistive, and variable
capacitance) to develop extremely small (< cm3), low-cost sensors.
The scale factor and full-scale range of the accelerometer can be
adjusted easily during manufacture, and nearly all sensors have the
capability for electrical self-esting. Because of this, accelerometers
are seen to have advantages, especially from a systems perspective.
At this time, accelerometet technology is fairly well developed.
Further development is gealed mainly toward price reduction and
data processing.
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Electromechanical sensors are
being replaced by single-point
accelerometers
Sensor performances are good,
but the challenge is integration
with the vehicle, which has a
variable crash response
The trend is toward replacing distributed electromechanical crash
sensors (switches) with single- (or dual- ) axis accelerometers located
in or around the passenger compartment. They are placed in areas
that are likely to remain undeformed during a crash and that do not
resonate during the crash. A common mounting is near the centerline
of the vehicle behind the firewall on a structural component near the
toe board where it is protected from the elements. Multiple crush-
zone sensors are being replaced by a single analog accelerometer or
single-point sensor. The rationale is three-fold: to reduce costs
associated with multiple sensors and their installation, to improve
reliability by minimizing wiring to areas vulnerable during a crash,
and to improve the flexibility of the system. The latter point relates
to the fact that an analog accelerometer provides a much larger volume
of data with which to predict ultimate crash severity.
Processing of these data allows a prediction of severity on a time
scale similar to that of a crush-zone-mounted switch, except for soft
vehicle structures in narrow-object crashes, and possibly others.
Deployment thresholds may be adjusted through software rather than
the mechanical modification required for electromechanical switches.
Placing the sensor in the occupant compartment simplifies installation
(i.e., reduces its cost) compared to the crush-zone- mounted sensors.
Because the sensor is situated in a relatively benign environment,
there is less risk of malfunction of the sensor and its wiring. Although
single-point sensing is becoming quite common, there are certain
vehicle platforms that will still require multiple sensors. This is
because of the inability of a single sensor to provide early crash
detection for all crash scenarios.
The strong consensus of the companies surveyed is that the
performance of the sensor element itself is very good. The sensors
provide accurate triggering (in the case of switches) and high-fidelity
records of acceleration (in the case of analog accelerometers). The
main challenges involve its physical placement on a particular vehicle
and, most importantly, the processing of its data. Sensor placement
is a critical step in the "tuning" process, where the vehicle crush
characteristics over a wide range of crash pulses must be accounted
for. This is critical for crush-zone switches.
5.2.2.3 Control Modules and Crash Detection Algorithms.
Advanced development of crash severity sensing systems is
concentrating on digital algorithms for providing early, accurate
restraint deployment decisions. These algorithms are applied to the
data from analog accelerometers in single-point crash sensing systems.
The analog signals (voltage vs. time) from the crash sensing
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Single-point sensing presents a
challenging data processing
problem
Suppliers are working on
advanced algorithms for
improved crash severi_
prediction
accelerometer are digitized by the module, typically at 8- to 10-bit
resolution. The digital data are processed in real time, and the
processed data are compared to a threshold to determine whether or
not a restraint should be deployed.
With single sensors mounted in the occupant compartment, this task
involves determination of crash severity using a very small amount
of low-amplitude data. For _xample, as shown in Appendix C for a
representative AAMA crash pulse, a deployment decision must be
made when the velocity of the occupant compartment has changed
by only 3.4 km/h (2.1 mph). This can be compared to the approximate
16 km/h (10 mph) change in velocity seen at the same time by sensors
(electromechanical switches) located in the vehicle crush zone.
Although single-point analog accelerometer sensing is attractive from
a systems standpoint, it presents a challenging data processing
problem. A decision must be made at a point where the kinematic
parameters are very small.
All developers are working toward the goal of providing timely
decisions for a variety of crash pulses (including long duration events),
while reducing the number of unwanted deployments. Most advanced
approaches use either physical or pattern recognition algorithms (or
combinations of both) to improve this determination. Physical
algorithms attempt to calculate and evaluate physically relevant
quantities (such as accelerat-:on and jerk) that strongly correlate with
crash severity. Pattern recognition techniques operate on the premise
that particular crash events have unique signatures, and that these
signatures can be used to dis_zriminate crash severity. It was not clear
to JPL which of these approzches is superior. All suppliers view their
algorithms as valuable intellectual property, so it was not possible to
get more than a cursory glar_ce at any one approach.
The OEMs provide discrimination time requirements for each of a
number of crash types [e.g., 48 km/h (30 mph) rigid fixed barrier
(RFB), 40 km/h (25 mph) ceformable offset barrier (DOB), pole].
Requirements are also prowded for nondeployment in a variety of
events [such as crashes with AV in the forward direction < 14.4 km/h
(9 mph), rough road driving, and undercarriage strikes]. The standard
procedure for developing single-point crash algorithms is for the OEM
customer to provide a set ofa,:celeration data and required deployment
times for various events (bot a deployment and nondeployment) for a
given vehicle platform. The suppliers develop algorithms for
processing these data to mal, e proper deployment decisions with the
required timing.
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Some 7 to 12 types of different events must be considered, and often
there are multiple data sets for each event, reflecting in part the
observed variations in crash pulse. The algorithms must handle these
variations consistently. Suppliers indicate that developing and testing
these algorithms to handle this number of events is a large, time-
consuming task. It is JPL's view that the extent of variation in real-
world crashes is not fully accounted for in these developments.
Provision for crash variability
is a challenge
As pointed out in Section 4.1.5, the recorded variability of crash
discrimination times is large in some types of collisions with soft
objects, such as the sides of cars. This may indicate that the current
algorithms, while finely tuned for certain obvious crash pulses [e.g.,
48 km/h (30 mph) RFB per FMVSS 208], may have limitations in
some real-world crashes. An alternative viewpoint is that the observed
deployment time variability in some events is due more to variability
in the vehicle crush characteristics than to shortcomings in the
algorithms. The vehicle crush variability results in variability in the
signals recorded by the crash sensor.
In JPL's view, the current algorithm development process, relying on
"representative" data sets, would benefit from the inclusion of this
variability to a greater degree. One supplier articulated clearly that
OEMs provide insufficient data to account for this variability.
Providing these data is obviously a large and complex task. However,
further improvements in crash severity sensing probably will require
it. One supplier is attempting to include such variability into its system
testing. In this case, random fluctuations are introduced into the high-
frequency portion of the signals applied to a test thruster system.
The effects of this variability on the performance of the algorithm
could be monitored during lab testing and subsequently minimized.
This appears to be a good idea; however, an obvious future step would
be to extend the technique to lower frequency in order to better
simulate the effects of fluctuations in vehicle crush characteristics,
for example. Still, the acknowledgment of the effects of these
variabilities and the attempt to understand them is unique to this
supplier. The importance of crash sensing to the overall performance
of the restraint system makes it clear that any testing must include
the crash sensor system. For example, compliance testing on sleds
using generic crash pulses and a preset trigger time has limited value
as it does not test the vehicle crush characteristics, the crash sensor
system, or their interaction.
JPL discussed the development of advanced algorithms with six
different suppliers. A consistent response to questions regarding their
5-15
Pole crash prediction is a
problem
ability to provide timely cr_.sh discrimination for a range of crash
pulses was that "we are able to meet the requirements of our
customer." The only unsolved problem mentioned by a subset of these
suppliers was accurate deterrr ination of pole crashes. Here the obvious
problem is an inability to detect this event, with its soft initial pulse,
early enough to safely deploy the air bag. The suppliers provided
very little data to support their performance claims. The data that
were provided generally were the results from applying their particular
algorithms to the typical data sets provided to them by their OEM
customers. The extent to which the suppliers of crash sensing
algorithms participate in actual crash testing is unclear. There is
obviously some crash testing Jone by OEMs, but no supplier provided
information on the variabili_ in discrimination times observed in
actual crash tests. The numbers they did provide appeared to be based
on OEM-supplied data sets.
No field reliabili_ data
available
No supplier was able to provide specific reliability data for in-field
performance. Real-world performance data from vehicle crashes are
critical to understanding reliability in the field. The suppliers indicated
that they do not have detailed numbers relating to field performance.
At least one OEM, however, has investigated variability of
deployment timing (see Section 4.2.1) observed in crash testing. The
suppliers were not prepared to discuss the importance of field data.
Additional capabilities
Crash sensing modules are e,,olving to incorporate the requirements
imposed by new restraint systems. This includes adding firing loops
to control pretensioners, multistage inflators, and side impact air bag
modules. Additional sensor inputs are being provided by suppliers to
accommodate additional information from, for example, seat-belt
sensors and occupant type/proximity sensors. Similarly, air bag
deployment algorithms are be ng modified by suppliers (only slightly)
to incorporate this informati_,n in order to provide the first types of
"tailored response." The tezhnology is available to incorporate
increased data processing required by future systems. The quality of
crash sensor data and the methods by which the system response is
determined are uncertain in current systems.
Future improvements in cras a severity sensing systems will largely
be evolutionary. A large numl: er of single-point systems are currently
in production vehicles. Intrc_ducing new performance features to
existing products is a simpler process than introducing completely
new systems. This is why in lprovements to crash sensing systems
and their incorporation into _,ehicles will be a continuous process.
Most suppliers indicated that these improvements add little additional
cost.
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Sensing occupant
characteristics
5.2.2.4 Occupant Classification Sensors. Much of the advanced
sensor development has concentrated on occupant detection. This
includes classification of the occupant (size and/or weight) and the
detection of specific cases (rear-facing or front-facing child seats,
driver drowsiness, and so on). The initial use of this information is
for air bag suppression or depowering to eliminate air bag-induced
injuries. A more distant goal is to finely tailor the restraint system
response to the specific characteristics of the occupant. For example,
knowledge of occupant size or weight could allow different system
responses for children, 5th-percentile females (5% F), 50th-percentile
males (50% M), and 95th-percentile males (95% M).
Detecting occupant type is, by all accounts, a difficult task. It is made
more difficult by the apparent lack of detailed performance
requirements for the technology. Some OEMs have provided limited
performance requirements related to occupant detection for air bag
suppression. These include requirements for discrimination between
rear-facing infant seats (RFISs) and normally seated adults, for
example, but they stop short of providing detailed technical
requirements on critical issues such as reliability: The lack of clear
requirements is limiting technology development.
Four O'pes of occupant
classification sensors
Occupant classification sensing technologies fall into four main
categories: (1) weight sensors, (2) presence sensors, (3) seat position
and belt spool-out sensors, and (4) tag-based systems.
Causes of weight sensor
inaccuracies
5.2.2.4.1 Weight Sensors. The purpose of weight sensors is to
measure the mass of an occupant by measuring forces on the seat. In
addition, some approaches measure weight distribution on the seat
in order to improve the ability to classify occupants. There are many
obvious limitations of a weight sensor approach, including the inherent
inaccuracy of inferring mass and seating position from distributed
seat forces. A weight sensor probably cannot account for the multitude
of seating configurations for any one occupant. For example, the
distribution of supporting forces between an occupant's upper torso
(on the seat) and legs (on the floor) can lead to large inaccuracies.
Additional forces (such as from seat belt tension) can also cause
variability. Finally, tilting of the occupant (due to variable seat back
angle) relative to the gravitational vector leads to inaccuracies.
Despite these limitations, the simplicity of a weight sensor, and the
importance of knowledge of occupant mass, have led to a number of
developments in this area. Mercedes-Benz offers a right front
passenger seat sensor that shuts off the passenger air bag when the
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T)pes of weight sensors
Testing provided poor results
seat is loaded at less than 30 ._g, for example. NHTSA's consideration
of an under-30-kg air bag suppression requirement also has spurred
development.
The majority of sensors use resistive strain gauges that provide a
resistance change proportional to sensor strain. This strain is
proportional to stress applied to the element, leading indirectly to a
measurement of weight. Strain sensor technology is highly evolved:
thick film sensors are available on flexible substrates, allowing
integration into a wide ranse of structures. Separate sensors can be
distributed over the same substrate in order to measure stress
distributions. The technology is very durable and extremely cost
effective.
A second sensor approach uses a monolithic pressure sensor to
measure the load-dependent pressure increases within a sealed gas
bag. In some cases, the strain sensors are placed near the seat surface,
just below the trim, while in others they are placed deeper into the
seat. Both placement locations obviously can be affected by elastic
forces within the seat itself, in addition, either transducer type (strain
sensor or pressure sensor) will have a finite contact area dependence.
One proposed solution is t,) use similar strain transducers as load
cells to measure the total t_rce at rigid support points in the seat
frame. In either case, incor mration of weight sensors may require
modification to seat design, seat track design, and seat belt design in
order to limit systemic measurement errors.
All suppliers contacted understood (and to a limited degree would
communicate) the limitation: of their technologies. A common caution
was that the weight information "is used only to augment information
from a suite of sensors. By p "oviding even coarse weight information
(i.e., small or large), we can i:nprove the response of the smart restraint
system." The problem with this view is that inaccurate information
cannot realistically play a significant role in adjusting the restraint
system response. No suppliers could provide useful numbers on
system reliability for weigat sensors. They provided no detailed
performance data on resolul ion and accuracy.
Some OEMs have performe d comprehensive evaluations of various
weight sensors relative to lheir use for air bag suppression. They
performed a number of trials with a range of occupant types [(RFIS,
FFIS, 6-year-old anthropomorphic test dummy (ATD) in booster seat
and regular seat, 5% female ATD, 50% male ATD, and various live
child and adult occupants)], l'he objective was to measure the ability
of weight sensor systems to classify these occupants. The tests were
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Ultrasonic presence sensors
done under static and driving conditions, both belted and unbelted,
in a range of seat configurations. Their conclusion was that no system
would provide a reasonable capability for classification. Particularly
troubling was the common inability to distinguish between child seats
and 5% females and to distinguish children. Live occupants presented
classification problems for some systems. With some systems, there
was a large degree of variability within occupant classes, large enough
to cause overlaps between occupant categories. These generally poor
results were enough to dissuade further extensive development by
many suppliers.
Weight sensors are inherently inexpensive; however, integration costs
may not be. Most suppliers indicated they could supply weight sensors
for MY 2000 vehicles, which would require immediate
implementation discussions with OEMs who currently view the
technology as inadequate.
5.2.2.4.2 Presence Sensors. A wide variety of sensing technologies
has been applied to the remote detection of occupant presence and
type (e.g., RFIS). Each technology attempts to "image" an area in
and around a seat and provide a classification of the occupant from
this information. Technologies used include passive and active
infrared, superaural acoustic, capacitive (electric field), radar, and
visible imaging. The primary development goal has been to detect
and distinguish grossly at-risk occupants (e.g., RFISs) from normally
seated adult passengers. It does not appear that classification of adult
occupants by size has been a major performance goal.
Ultrasonic (acoustic) sensors are used in a number of systems.
Acoustic pulses are transmitted from a set of 3 to 4 transducers. The
transducers may be placed in the instrument panel, overhead console,
and the trim around the A- and B-pillars. The pulses undergo
reflections in the occupant compartment and are detected by the same
transducer. Time-of-flight considerations limit system repetition rates
to a few msec. Analysis of the echo signal, as a function of time,
allows detection of the presence and range of multiple objects in the
beam pattern. Multiple sensors provide the capability for classifying
complex objects (e.g., RFIS) according to their echo patterns. Pattern
recognition algorithms are used to generate these classifications.
One clear limitation is that unintended reflectors (books, newspapers,
body extremities, etc.) that approach close to the transducers will
block the signal. In theory, the use of multiple transducers provides
some relief from this. OEM tests of ultrasonic-only systems indicate
that they are very effective (stated at 100%) at static detection of an
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occupant in the seat. The detection of RFISs/FFCSs has been less
successful (reported to be 70-95%). The required performance levels
are unclear at present.
Infrared presence sensors
Infrared (IR) systems use either passive imaging of thermal signals
with detector arrays or active ranging using near-IR sources (LEDs)
and detectors. By itself, thermal IR imaging provides information of
human presence and motion, but it is not used extensively for
classification. Active IR systems are capable of providing ranging
information at high speed, and with multiple channels, generating
target-specific patterns. Unfortunately, IR systems are easily blocked
by passenger clothing and accessories and are sensitive to surface
properties of the target. OEM tests of selected IR-only systems have
shown success in detection ef occupant presence (100%) and RFISs/
FFCSs (90%).
Combined acoustic/IR
presence sensing systems
More advanced approaches are attempting to combine ultrasonic and
IR technologies. One leading supplier is relying on multichannel
acoustic ranging coupled with IR imaging to improve detection
efficiency. The fusing and interpretation of data from multiple sensors
(a considerable data processing problem) is seen by many groups as
the best way to provide re iable occupant detection, even under
continuously varying conditions. Many of the numbers quoted above
for RFIS detection involved fairly well-controlled experiments. The
real difficulty occurs in detecting a wide variety of occupant types in
the presence of real-world variations. Multiple sensor approaches
appear to provide the best capability for handling this.
Capacitive presence sensors
The third primary technology, is capacitive sensing. This technology
type senses the dielectric loi ding of an oscillating electric field set
up between sets of electrode_. A dielectric body (a human) changes
the field distribution. This change can be detected in a number of
ways--for example, through measurement of the variation in the
displacement current between the fixed electrodes. In this manner,
the impedance (or capacitanze) of the object can be detected. The
fixed electrodes can be place5 in a number of locations (IP, steering
wheel, headliner, or seat cushion/back). While primarily used to
measure proximity, the apwoach can provide classification. One
supplier uses a set of fou" electrodes in the seat. Through a
multiplexing approach in whi _,h one electrode is used as a transmitter
and another as a receiver, a set of eight separate capacitance
measurements can be made, each representing a unique dielectric
path through the object..Lnalysis of these data allows some
characterization of occupant ripe. OEM tests have shown some utility
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Tags for RFIS detection
in detection of RFISs as well as good discrimination between small
and large adult ATDs.
Expected production costs range from between $25 and $75 for this
technology. The cost of integration is highly dependent on sensor
location, however. Most suppliers indicate potential production
readiness in MY 2000; actual model year implementation would be
later and would be determined by OEM acceptance.
5.2.2.4.3 Seat Position and Belt Spool-out Sensors. Driver-side seat
position sensors can provide some indication of the size of the driver.
They offer a surrogate for more direct measurement of driver weight
or size, compared with the weight and presence sensors discussed
above. They could be less accurate, but could be available sooner
than the other sensors. Only one supplier mentioned work on this
type of sensor, and very little information about its design or
performance was provided. Hall-type sensors would be one approach
for providing seat position.
Belt spool-out sensors can provide some indication of both driver
and right-front passenger size, if coupled with seat position sensors.
Right-front passenger size determination would be less accurate than
that of the driver size, because the passenger seat position could not
be correlated with passenger size. No supplier mentioned this sensor
type, and we have no information on the expected accuracy of
measurement. We do not know if spool-out sensors would be accurate
enough to determine if an occupant is out of position.
The use of these two sensors would, of course, be an improvement
over the current system, which has no occupant sensors. JPL would
require additional information and need to conduct further analysis
to determine the potential of these two sensors.
5.2.2.4.4 Tag-Based Systems. Other approaches to the detection of
specific at-risk occupants, such as those in RFIS, have been developed.
These include magnetic and electromagnetic tags attached to the child
seat, either during manufacture or as part of a retrofit. The detection
of a tag causes automatic suppression of an air bag. This technology
has received considerable scrutiny, especially in light of plans to install
air bag cutoff switches in certain vehicles. The availability of
automatic tag systems could alleviate the need for operator
intervention (via a switch). This may reduce the effects of operator
error in specific cases. A number of technologies have been developed
for this purpose. Most systems include transmit-receive coils
(antennas) located in the passenger seat. The child seat contains a
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Tags for RFIS detection may be
sensitive to childseat
placement
Retrofitting car seats with tags
could be a problem
Application of proximity
sensing
specific tag that modulates the electromagnetic field generated by
the transmitter. The modulated field is detected and analyzed. The
tag is passive (unpowered).
There are a range of tag technologies. Some carry a unique code that
is used to modulate the fie_d in a specific manner. This approach
theoretically reduces the error rate associated with detection.
Specifically, it reduces the likelihood that a spurious signal could
disable the air bag when a child seat is not present. On the other
hand, there is general concern by OEMs over sensitivities of these
systems to placement of the child seats, and whether improper
placement could cause the system not to recognize a seat. This appears
to be significantly less of a problem than the detection/discrimination
requirements of either the weight-based sensors or the presence
sensors discussed above.
JPL was not provided any sabstantial information on these systems
by suppliers. Most of the information was provided by the OEMs,
and the impression received was that this technology is not currently
being considered for application by OEMs. One negative aspect is
the need to retrofit existing car seats with tags and the potential
consequences of the failure to do so. Based on JPL's technical
judgment, this technology would carry costs similar to capacitive
presence sensors. Its readiness has been demonstrated in Europe
(Mercedes-Benz currently offers such a system).
5.2.2.5 Occupant ProximityMotion Sensors. Occupant proximity
sensors are intended to deteq:t occupant position relative to in-cabin
hazards. The first applicatior is for air bag suppression or attenuation
for static out-of-position (O()P) occupants. This is to mitigate the air
bag deployment dangers for those individuals who are in the keep-
out zone at the time of the sig_ lal to deploy the air bag. This application
has commanded the largest _mount of technology development.
A longer-term goal is to use rc al-time position infornaation to modulate
restraint deployment in order to improve its performance. This could
include air bag suppression/attenuation to mitigate air bag-induced
injuries for dynamic OOP oc,-upants (those who have moved forward
due to vehicle decelerations l_rior to and early in the crash sequence).
As described in Appendi:_ C, the use of dynamic proximity
information for modulation t,fa restraint is problematical, due to the
finite time period for air bag inflation.
One simple, but important, p ece of information that can be provided
by a proximity sensor is the :nitial occupant position. Knowledge of
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the initial position allows, for example, more precise determination
of occupant kinematics, using only a single-point accelerometer. This
approach would apply to those crash sensing algorithms that calculate
and use unrestrained occupant displacement in crash discrimination.
The proximity sensor data establish the initial occupant position,
something a crash sensor cannot do.
Requirement information is
lacking
Requirements for proximity sensors are lacking. No supplier was
able to state what measurement range was required for static OOP
sensing, nor was there any information provided regarding required
resolution/accuracy for these measurements. As noted in
Appendix C, these requirements are air bag/inflator-specific. This
lack of data may indicate that the suppliers and OEMs have not
investigated these parameters in detail. Neither provided much
information on reliability requirements. Quantitative information on
the effects of various failures was not provided in any detail by either
the suppliers or the OEMs.
Quasistatic sensors could be
implemented in the next 3 to 4
model years
To be fair, it is probably premature to expect a thorough understanding
of dynamic proximity sensing requirements, as this is a future
application of the technology. The short-term option is to implement
quasistatic sensing within the next three to four years in order to
better eliminate static OOP air-bag-induced injuries. Understanding
the potential safety trade-offs associated with the proximity
performance parameters will be critical as this technology nears
production.
Proximity and presence
sensing technologies are the
same
Proximity sensor functions are derived from the same technology
described above for presence detection. Technologies that provide
range information (including passive and active infrared, superaural
acoustic, capacitive, radar, and visible imaging) can calculate occupant
proximity to air bag modules. The main technologies under
development by the suppliers use acoustic and active IR ranging and
capacitive position detection. One important characteristic of any
technology used for proximity sensing is the effective point of
reference on the occupant. That is, does the sensor detect the position
of the surface nearest to the sensor or does the technology have
volume-dependent sensitivities?
The critical distance is the one between the air bag module and the
closest surface on the occupant. Technologies that are volume
sensitive could only indirectly determine this distance, using
knowledge of the size (volume) of the occupant. Volume-sensitive
technologies lead to an inherent inaccuracy. Acoustic and IR ranging
are inherently surface sensitive. The disadvantage of these sensors is
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that they can be blocked easil¢ by thin objects in front of the occupant.
Capacitive proximity sensors are not as easily blocked by such objects.
However, their signals clearly depend on the volume of the occupant.
Stated another way, the output voltage vs. nearest-surface distance
for an analog capacitive detector may be strongly dependent on the
volume of the dielectric object. Knowing the distance of the
occupant's dielectric center to the IP or steering wheel is not
sufficiently accurate. It is not clear that any mounting location could
provide an accurate enough dstance measurement. The basic problem
of capacitive sensors may be mitigated through careful design of
electrode geometry, but it _:nust be addressed. The measurement
limitations had not been seriously considered by many of the suppliers
who are working with capacitive technology.
Visible imaging
Visible imaging has been e:_plored by some groups as a potential
technology for occupant ranging (proximity). The emergence of
highly integrated, low-cost detector arrays, as well as higher-
performance processors, has increased the applicability of this
technology. One approach uses stereo imaging along with firmware-
based algorithms for determining range information at each pixel in
a composite image. State-of-_he-art algorithms have enabled 100-ms
update rates, potentially suitable for quasi-static proximity sensing.
The resolution and accuracy of this approach is competitive with
those listed above. Processing requirements and their cost are an
obstacle at the present time. Image systems lend themselves readily
to a number of other measu;ement tasks. It is envisioned by some
groups that the same technology can be used for occupant
classification and for precrash functions (potentially allowing for
obstacle classification). This is a long-term opportunity, however.
None of the technology observed in this area was ready for near-
term (i.e., MY 2001) applica :ion.
Acoustic" and infrared sensors
hold the most immediate
promise
Because of the position meas lrement limitation of capacitive sensors
and the long-term prospect_ for visible imaging, it appears that
acoustic and IR-based rangi.ag systems hold the most promise for
meeting short-term requirements for static proximity sensing. There
are a number of suppliers Jeveloping these technologies. Most
suppliers state that static systems would be ready for introduction in
MY 2000 or 2001. Actual ir stallation time depends on the OEM's
decision to implement and the time to do so. Actual implementation
would be two years later. Targeted costs are in the range of $35-$60
for either acoustic or IR-bas,:d systems. Installation costs will vary
by platform.
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Capacitive sensors have
potential application in the
longer term
Dynamic ptvximity sensing
requires system-level
in vestiga tion
Hall effect safety belt sensors
are available for
implementation
Available control hardware is
adequate
Algorithms need further
development
Capacitive proximity sensors appear to have longer-term promise
for reducing system costs because of their inherent simplicity.
Suppliers of this technology see a readiness date of MY 2001.
All technology suppliers still face considerable development periods
for implementation of dynamic proximity sensing in a useful form.
Much of this development is unrelated to the actual sensor technology.
It will have to be geared towards a systems-level understanding of
the specific requirements and expected benefits and risks associated
with the use of this dynamic information in the restraint system.
All of these technologies have demonstrated the required response
speed for most dynamic applications (a few milliseconds; see
Appendix C). The physical mechanism of position detection does
not really limit any of these technologies, although acoustic ranging
at very large occupant distances may be limited by travel-time delays.
Similarly, signal processing system speed should not be an
impediment, as the requirements are quite similar to those for crash
severity sensing.
5.2.2.6 Safety Belt Status Sensors. Advanced safety belt status
sensors using magnetic Hall effect transducers have been developed
to improve reliability. Contact switches are considered to be too
unreliable. Most parties contacted were fairly positive about the
potential and readiness of Hall effect safety belt use sensors.
5.2.2.7 Computational Systems/Algorithms. In advanced systems,
an electronic computer module will analyze multisensor inputs and
will control restraint deployments according to a stored response
matrix. It was JPL's intent to solicit information on what developments
were under way to accommodate future system requirements. Our
investigation has shown that, across suppliers, availability of control
hardware is not an issue. Current microcontroller technology spans
a wide portion of speed/capacity phase space.
Interestingly, many suppliers of crash sensing modules have worked
at streamlining their systems to operate on the least expensive 8-bit
systems. Higher capacity (16- and 32-bit) processors are readily
available to handle future requirements. The lead times for these items
do not impose a significant impediment.
Advanced algorithms (software or firmware) are another issue. Nearly
every full-product-line supplier and all OEMs articulated strategies
for restraint deployment, based on data from their own specific set of
physical sens6rs. There will be no difficulty in implementing the
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strategies as proposed on a tit ae scale consistent with that of the sensor
technology. What appears to be lacking, however, is a detailed
understanding of the effects of inaccuracy, unreliability, and variability
in the system's components. This will require a good deal of testing
in real crash scenarios. JPL was provided no information on system-
level testing procedures from any OEM or supplier.
Advanced inflator
characteristics
5.2.3 Inflators. Inflators are undergoing continual development to
improve the gas characteristics for air bag operation. Desirable gas
characteristics include smokeless and odorless operation, cooler gas
temperatures, and gases free of particulates. These environmental
concerns have led to the development of non-azide propellants for
inflator gas generators. Although these new non-azide propellants
do offer improvements in gas characteristics, some of the new non-
azide propellants produce h,gher gas temperatures than the sodium
azide propellants and still contain some particulates. The particulates
and higher gas temperatures make them less desirable for application
with some of the new lighter-weight bag fabrics. Newer propellants
offering smokeless/odorless operation and cooler gas temperatures
are under development. Current pyro-type inflators are being modified
to permit their use in depowered air bags and for dual-stage operation.
Depowered inflators are being used in some current vehicles for
implementation of depowe_ed air bags to reduce inflation-induced
injuries.
Two-stage inflators
Two-stage inflators permit two stages of air bag deployment
depending on the severity of the crash. In some designs, the two-
stage inflators are actually two separate inflators packaged as a single
unit. In other designs, a single inflator has two separate propellant
charges, which can be igniled separately or at the same time. The
implementation oftwo-stag_ inflators is accompanied with the safety
issue of disposal of the infla :or after a crash in which only one of the
stages of the inflator is used. This issue was not specifically discussed
with industry. Therefore, tl-eir countermeasures are not known by
JPL. It is possible to provide automatic disarming of the second stage
after a crash, but the unit stil must be removed, and the second-stage
propellant must be fired or i emoved. Responsibility for the disposal
will need to be determined. Two-stage inflators will be ready for
production phase-in during 1998 by at least five suppliers.
Hybrid inflators
Hybrid inflators with pyrot_,chnic-augmented stored gas, as well as
heated gas inflators, are _n various stages of development. In
pyrotechnic-augmented sto:'ed gas inflators, the gas is stored in a
pressure vessel at high pre ;sure (e.g., 20 MPa) with the exit port
blocked by a burst diaphra;m. The pyrotechnic charge is ignited,
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Heated gas inflators
Cold gas inflators
Development of controllable
inflators
and the evolved gas mixes with the stored gas, causing the pressure
in the vessel to increase until the burst diaphragm is ruptured and
gases flow into the air bag. Hybrid inflators are being developed for
both single-stage and dual-stage implementations. Some dual-stage
designs will be ready for production in 1999. In some dual-stage
designs, the pyrotechnic charge is divided between two separate
chambers of stored gas. This design allows maximum flexibility in
tailoring the inflator output for specific crash requirements. The two
pyrotechnic charges can be used separately or together. In dual-stage
operation, the second stage can be fired when it is determined that
additional energy is required (e.g., 30 ms after the firing of the first
stage). When the newer propellants are implemented with hybrid
inflator designs, much more desirable gas characteristics are obtained
than those obtained with current sodium azide inflators. Hybrid
inflators also offer lower variability in performance than current
sodium azide inflators.
In heated gas inflators, a combustible mixture of dry air and hydrogen
gas is stored in a pressure vessel under high pressure. An igniter
ruptures the burst diaphragm and ignites the hydrogen-air mixture,
producing nitrogen gas and water vapor. Heated gas inflators are clean
and environmentally friendly, since no particulates or noxious gases
are formed in the combustion process. Both single-stage and dual-
stage versions of heated gas inflators are being developed. It is
expected that production of heated gas inflators will begin in 1999.
Another inflator type under development utilizes helium gas stored
under high pressure. This cold gas inflator produces a low-temperature
gas and is clean and environmentally friendly. The cold gas inflator
incorporates a variable throttling valve which can be used to adjust
the inflation rate depending on occupant characteristics. This type of
inflator shows significantly lower variability than pyro-type inflators.
Operationally, the most significant change in future inflators will be
the addition of the ability to tailor the inflator mass flow vs. time
characteristics to optimize air bag deployment aggressivity and
restraint force for different crash and occupant parameters. This
control may be achieved through multiple staging of fixed mass flow
stages or through continuously variable output inflator designs.
Optimization of inflator design and operation to allow accurate
variation of mass flow is an important area of current development.
Near-term implementations will utilize inflators with several (two or
more) fixed mass flow stages. Finally, technology is being developed
to allow continuous variability of inflator mass flow in near real time.
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This is a potential improwment over the quasi-static control of
discrete stages.
Inflator variability is a
problem
An important consideration in establishing a deployment control
strategy is inflator variability. Normally, inflators are characterized
in constant volume tank tests by measuring the pressure-time history.
Two parameters of importance in determining inflator performance
are pressure rise rate and final pressure level. The two factors leading
to inflator performance variability are ambient temperature and unit-
to-unit manufacturing variability. For inflators using azide propellants,
the maximum tank pressures show a variation of about 25% to 35%
over the temperature range from -30°C to +80°C. The temperature
sensitivity of inflators with non-azide propellants is about one-half
as large as that for azide propellants. Tank pressures measured early
in the inflation process show a much larger variability with ambient
temperatures. This is probabl,/due to the dependence of ignition delay
and burning rate on ambient temperature. Temperature variation is
significant in terms of the time required to inflate the air bag. At cold
temperatures, slower bag inflation could result in delayed deployment
time and/or a significantly depowered air bag. Temperature control
may be needed and is feasible. In principle, compensation for this
temperature variability coul t be obtained by changing the venting
rate as a function of ambient :emperature and/or providing heating in
cold temperature.
The unit-to-unit manufacturing variability is not easy to control. At
ambient temperature, the performance variability of pyro-type
inflators is due to a combin_Ltion of factors, including performance
of gas generant and igniter m_ terial, filter/heat sink materials, initiator,
quantity of gas generant, an d amount/geometry of igniter material
used. For inflators using azkLe propellants, the unit-to-unit variation
(one standard deviation) in rlaximum tank pressure is about +3% at
ambient temperature. The un t-to-unit variation of inflators with non-
azide propellants is about one-half as large as that for azide
propellants. The unit-to-uni: variation (one standard deviation) in
pressure rise rate is about + 0% for azide propellants and _+6% for
non-azide propellants. Unit-o-unit and temperature variabilities for
azide propellant systems are illustrated in Figure 5-3, which shows
the nominal and 3-sigma variations for unit lots at these temperatures.
The unit-to-unit variability and temperature sensitivity of current
inflators are significant and could, in many cases, overshadow the
potential advantages of irr plementing depowered or two-stage
inflators.
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a Function of Temperature
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Hybrid inflators and heated gas inflators show less unit-to-unit
variability and less temperatt re sensitivity than do other inflator types.
The maximum tank pressures for hybrid inflators show a variation of
about 10% to 15% over the temperature range from -30°C to +80°C.
Tank pressures measured early in the inflation process show a much
larger variability with ambient temperature. For hybrid inflators, the
unit-to-unit variability (one standard deviation) in maximum tank
pressure is about +1% to +2% at ambient temperature.
Better control of inflator variability is essential to enable
implementation of control strategies for advanced safety restraint
systems. Variability control must begin with the design, development,
and production process. Temperature compensation may be required.
Active, near-real-time control of inflator output could minimize the
deleterious effects of inflator variability.
Advanced inflator costs
Relative to baseline single-stage pyro inflators with azide propellants,
the projected added cost of advanced inflator types is $10-$15 for
dual-pyro inflators, $0-$8 for hybrid and heated gas inflators, and
potentially lower cost for high-pressure stored gas inflators.
Trend toward lighter-weight
fabrics
5.2.4 Air Bags. Air bag developments are moving in the direction
of thinner, more pliable fabrics, lighter coatings, and simplified sewing
patterns. This trend is in part to reduce cost, but it is also the application
of advanced technology. Fa.:tors which influence the choice of air
bag fabric include packaging volume in the air bag module, strength
requirements (based on the inflator aggressiveness), and thermal
requirements (based on the gas exit temperature of the inflator).
Several fabric manufacturers are developing lightweight, low-
permeability air bag fabrics. The light weight and low permeability
will permit the use of lower-_ _utput inflators, and that, in conjunction
with the lower air bag mass, should result in lower punchout forces
on out-of-position occupants The lighter-weight fabrics will simplify
bag folding techniques, possibly eliminating the need for tethers.
However, these lighter-weight materials are generally less tolerant
of particulates and high-tem}erature gases. Thus, these lighter bags
must be used with inflato]s that have lower temperatures and
minimum particulates.
Bag fabrication developments
There are some development efforts in weaving technology that have
produced a one-piece bag. E fforts are being made to better control
the processing of woven fal:rics to minimize the variability in the
porosity of air bags. The focas is to provide near-zero permeability
of the fabric on the front pane (i.e., the panel contacting the occupant)
and to provide known porosity of the fabric on the back panel for
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controlled venting. Controlled air bag porosity, with low variability,
could permit venting to be accomplished through the air bag fabric
and eliminate the need for discrete vent holes. Other, nonwoven
materials are being considered to simplify manufacturing.
New folding patterns
New folding patterns are being developed constantly, with the goal
of reducing occupant interaction effects, especially for OOP
occupants. One such folding pattern causes the air bag to expand
radially during deployment, putting much less force against an OOP
occupant. This folding pattern results in a reduced packing efficiency,
making it a challenge to pack it into some new driver side air bag
modules.
New tether designs also are also being developed. These new designs
will permit earlier loading of the tether, thereby reducing the energy
transmitted to an OOP occupant.
Compartmented air bags
show promise
New bag shapes and designs are being developed to reduce the loading
of OOP occupants. Air bags with multiple compartments are being
developed, the potential benefit being that the different chambers
can be pressurized sequentially, in order to maintain sufficient restraint
force. The first compartment can be pressurized much quicker than a
full-sized bag to provide some early occupant protection. When the
pressure in the first compartment reaches a predetermined level, a
port into the second compartment (a tear strip or perforated port)
opens to begin filling the second compartment at the predetermined
pressure level. Air bag concepts with the compartments arranged
axially and radially as well as bags within bags are under development.
The bag-within-a-bag configuration was developed and demonstrated
for 80 km/h (50 mph) occupant crash protection by Minicars, Inc. in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. It showed good performance in tests
by NHTSA. Compartmented air bag designs could be ready for
production by the year 2000.
Venting
Air bag venting systems are designed to be used in conjunction with
a combination of air bag volume, inflator performance, and desired
venting characteristics. Suppliers are evaluating multilevel and
continuously variable venting designs for use with future air bags.
Used in conjunction with appropriate occupant sensors, these designs
could control venting as a function of occupant type and position.
Current venting is achieved through constant area vents that are
continuously open and/or through porous bag material. Some venting
designs under development utilize no venting during the initial bag-
filling process until a predetermined bag pressure is achieved. At
that time, a constant-area venting port opens to provide venting for
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the remainder of the deployment event. The port (e.g., a tear strip or
perforated port) is designed t-_open at a predetermined pressure level.
This system will be in production in 1998. As with inflators, a longer°
term goal of providing real-time, variable bag response has been put
forward by several suppliers and OEMs.
JPL did not investigate some
advanced developments
5.2.5 Future Supplemental Safety Restraint Development. In
the future, more vehicles are likely to have additional supplemental
restraint systems such as air bags for side impact, rollover, and knee
bolster functions. Technologies to improve the performance of air
bags and inflators continue to evolve. Suppliers are also studying
potential improvements in air bag packaging techniques. JPL did not
investigate these developments in depth.
Safety belt systems can be
improved
5.2.6 Safety Belt Systems. Belt makers are developing several
performance enhancing features for three-point seat belt systems.
These include belts with high initial stiffness, high-output
pretensioners, and variable load-limiting devices.
Pretensioners
High initial belt stiffness, coupled with high-output pretensioners,
generates a high degree of coupling early in the crash between the
occupant and the passenger compartment or seat. One benefit of this
is to maximize the ride-down _listance for dissipation of the occupant's
kinetic energy. Higher belt sti ffness is gained through the use of low-
elongation webbing, short belt loops, rigidized belt anchorages, and
new seat belt geometries (including four-point harnesses). Higher-
output pretensioners also increase the initial stiffness of the primary
restraint system. Providing this high force over longer stroke lengths
is a key to improving occupa at coupling to the seat for a wide range
of initial occupant positions." 7o this end, longer stroke pretensioners
are under development.
Load lim iters
Variable load-limiting devices are tuned to provide a constant force
level over the maximum occupant excursions. Present concepts use
single and even dual levels qwhich are preset). Concepts exist for
continuously variable load lin liters, in which the force level could be
adjusted by the control system based upon information about occupant
mass and position provided b y"the system sensors.
Seat design
By initially coupling the occupant to the seat (e.g., with pretensioners),
the capability exists for using or adjusting the mechanics of the seat
itself to dissipate kinetic ene'gy. This approach requires seat belts
that are integrated with the seat as opposed to belts with attachment
points on the vehicle pillars. Concepts have been developed for
improving occupant energy management through tuning the initial
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stiffness of the seat, controlling seat attachment forces, and integrating
belts into the seats.
Air belts are a promising
technology to be investigated
further
Finally, seat belt designs with inflatable elements (air belts) are being
developed. The inflatable element augments the standard three-point
seat belt system by inflating the shoulder-belt portion of the belt during
impact. In one concept, the fabric of the inflatable element decreases
in length when inflated. Thus, the inflatable element also pretensions
the seat belt. Air belts are likely to be less aggressive than air bags
because they do not expand with great force toward the occupant.
At this time, no suppliers or OEMs are considering potentially more
effective safety belt designs, such as four-point harnesses.
Studies have shown that systems that combine the implementation
of advanced belts, pretensioners, load limiters, and air bags offer the
potential for enhanced protection.
5.2.7 Manufacturing Considerations. Manufacturing, production
quality control, and other related considerations, although important,
were secondary issues relative to performance in this assessment. A
detailed evaluation of manufacturing issues was beyond the scope of
this assessment. Manufacturing issues affect the technology costs
and availabilities. None of the suppliers mentioned manufacturing
differences between technologies as significant factors, other than
their effect on cost and availability. Manufacturing considerations
are imbedded in these values. Some suppliers have indicated that
manufacturing requirements will lead to phased implementation of
advanced technology.
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SECTION 6pNASA TECHNOLOGY
All NASA centers were
contacted to identify
applicable expertise and
technology
Databases searched
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The NHTSA/NASA memorandum of understanding stated that NASA
would "identify key expertise and technology within the agency that
can potentially contribute significantly to the improved effectiveness
of the air bags." To accomplish this, JPL contacted all of the NASA
centers and provided them with information about the Advanced Air
Bag Technology Assessment. These centers include:
• Ames Research Center (ARC)
• Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
• Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
• Johnson Space Center (JSC)
• Langley Research Center (LaRC)
• Lewis Research Center (LeRC)
• Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) (which also represented
Kennedy and Stennis Space Centers)
Two methods were used to contact the centers.
JPL contacted the centers' technology transfer offices, and the NASA
Chief Engineer contacted the centers' engineering, safety and mission
assurance organizations. Each center conducted a search for
technology relevant to the air bag problem. Both applicable expertise
and technology were identified.
In addition, JPL searched two NASA technology databases for
relevant capabilities and technologies. TechTracS.hq.nasa.gov
provides information on completed NASA technology developments.
A new technology database that is currently under development
provides information on current technology developments.
Except for JPL, we were unable to visit other NASA centers and
conduct seminars to solicit new ideas.
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NASA has broad applicable
capabilities
Significant applicable
expertise exists within NASA,
but it needs to be matched with
industry requirements
NASA has broad capabilitie; that can be applied to the development
of improved air bags. At this time, two technologies are being
transferred from NASA certers to suppliers where development is
being undertaken. These are a capacitive proximity sensor developed
at Goddard Research Center and a stereoscopic proximity and/or
precrash sensor under development at JPL. Expertise and other
technologies that have evolved from in-house NASA research and
contracted efforts, including Small Business Innovative Research
(SBIR), are described below.
6.2 EXPERTISE
NASA has relevant expertise in sensing, computing, control, neural
networks, algorithm development, microelectronics, simulation,
propellants, propulsion, inflatable systems, and systems analysis and
engineering. Brief comments about these capabilities follow.
Sensors. NASA has extensive expertise in a wide range of sensing
and detection. The most relevant capabilities are those that have
been or are being developed to support robotic operations. Obstacle
avoidance sensors and algorithms are specifically applicable. The
two sensors mentioned above are examples of these sensor types.
Both GSFC and JPL have in-depth applicable capabilities.
Computing, Control, Neur al Networks, Algorithm Development,
Microelectronics. These ca l,abilities apply to the control, diagnostics,
and communication functions of the air bag system. Within the NASA
community these capabilities are very broad and cover all related air
bag functions. JPL has exteasive applicable capabilities in all of the
areas. At JPL neural networks have been applied to automobile engine
control for a domestic OEM, and the Center for Space
Microelectronics Technolo_:y (CSMT) at JPL develops solid-state
components for space and ot aer applications. ARC has been working
with a contractor, IIS Corp., to develop mini-expert intelligent systems
on a chip. The speed of the chips plus their low cost make them a
candidate for application to air bag control logic systems.
Simulation. In its work NASA routinely performs a wide variety of
simulations. Two commer,:ial simulation codes that could have
application to air bags were', identified by LeRC. A finite-element
structural code used at LeR E for bird-strike blade simulations may
be applicable to the unfolding of the air bag. It could accommodate
the large displacements that _n air bag undergoes. A second possibility
is a multiphysics code called Spectrum that is applicable to
aeropropulsion problems. It may have application to the aero-
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structural response of the inflator/air bag system. It might be able to
simulate the entire transient event from initial air flow into the bag to
full inflation. There is, of course, a very significant air bag simulation
capability already in place, and it is constantly being improved. The
above two codes have not been investigated in detail by JPL for their
application to air bag simulation. Since the codes are commercially
available, any air bag simulation developer could investigate their
applicability.
Propellants, Propulsion. NASA and its predecessor organizations
have been developing propulsion systems and propellants since before
the space program started. The relevant capabilities include propellant
formulation and forming, propulsion containment structural design,
gas flow control and valve design, and filtering. This expertise
includes all aspects of the air bag inflator design and development.
Both MSFC and LeRC have broad propulsion and propellant
capabilities. An initial search for cleaner and cooler-burning fuel by
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) did not produce any candidates.
Researchers at LeRC have had discussions with one supplier regarding
the use of gelled liquid propellants. The supplier's analysis implied
that these propellants were too complex or expensive, but no details
of the study were made available to LeRC. Further investigation of
these propellants was not pursued.
Inflatable Systems. NASA has been developing and using inflatable
systems for space operations. These systems have included air bags
for Mars landing and an inflatable antenna (JPL). These NASA
systems have requirements that are considerably different from those
of automobile air bag systems. In particular, they do not need to be
deployed rapidly as do automobile air bags. The deploying propellants
also have different requirements. For example, toxicity may not be
the problem in space systems that it is in automobile air bags.
However, there are some common materials technologies that merit
exchange of information. Also, MFSC has an experimental
aerodynamics group with a good skill mix for analyzing chambered
or other air bag designs.
Systems Analysis and Engineering. NASA has systems analysis
and engineering capabilities in all centers. These capabilities are
broad and could be applied to a wide range of problems both within
industry and at NHTSA. Some specific examples of related
capabilities are the following. JPL has been managing the
development of a Variable Dynamics Testbed Vehicle for NHTSA.
This project, together with the air bag assessment, has exposed JPL
to crash avoid_ince sensing, which could be applicable to further
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The need for NASA to work
with OEMs and suppliers
A capacitive detector
assessment ofprecrash senscrs, as well as their integration with crash
avoidance sensors. JPL's e_perience in the analysis of stochastic
processes could be applied to further analyses of air bag systems,
including development of a statistically based test program. Several
centers, particularly those with requirements to deliver flight
hardware, have experience in improving system reliability. An
example is JPL's defect detection and prevention methodology, which
could be used to determine the impact of test requirements on system
protection.
Technology Transfer. Industry has access to NASA expertise and
technology through the individual centers' technology transfer offices
and publications, such as NASA Tech Briefs. Also, there are
organizations within some centers, such as the JPL Technology
Affiliates program, that provide mechanisms for companies to tap
into NASA expertise to solve specific problems. The mechanisms
are in place for identificatio 1 and transfer of NASA technology to
industry.
The implementation of any new technology in vehicles requires that
the technology be accepted by the suppliers and OEMs and developed
into products by them. NASA technology and cost goals are quite
different from those of automakers. These differences require
identification of specific appli cable NASA technology and significant
dedication by developers tc adapt the technology to automobile
requirements.
Since the capabilities to develop automobile air bags reside in industry,
any applicable NASA expertise would augment the industrial work.
Also, since industry is the ilaplementor of the technology, it must
decide what NASA expertise or technology it can use. An exception
to this would be that NH'I SA could decide that some NASA
capabilities could support the ir mission.
6.3 TECHNOLOGY
Two sensors initially developcd by NASA are being further developed
by suppliers for air bag applications. The "capaciflector," developed
at Goddard Research Center, ¢¢as licensed by Computer Application
Systems, Inc. (CASI). CASI has contacted JPL and provided some
information on their concept. They are working with a supplier who
has worked with an OEM to install a capaciflector in a vehicle and
test it. This system was conskered in the technology characterization
of Section 5 and its characteristics discussed in the Section 5.2.2.5
on capacitive sensors.
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A stereoptic vision system Stereoscopic vision systems have been under development at JPL
for several years. The application for these systems is robotic obstacle
avoidance for space systems. Development for application to military
systems has also been conducted. This technology is currently being
transferred to an air bag supplier who is evaluating its potential for
proximity sensing and precrash sensing. This technology was also
characterized in Section 5.2.2.5.
Improvements for air bag
crash sensor
Canopus Systems Inc. (CSI), a LeRC accelerometry contractor,
conducted work involving innovative technology improvements in
air bag crash sensors. Canopus Systems, in conjunction with the
University of Michigan Center for Integrated Sensors and Circuits
(CISC), performed a Phase I SBIR study and developed several
innovative designs, such as providing a digital output signal
proportional to the crash force. These designs have application to
automotive air bags. The Phase I study was completed, but Phase II
was not funded. CSI has continued to work with CISC to develop
innovative MEMS accelerometry systems.
Acoustic signature for crash
sensing
Also, a JPL staff member suggested another approach for crash
sensing. It uses the acoustic signature generated by the crushing of
the vehicle during a crash to establish the crash severity.
Radar antenna
EMS Technologies, Inc. has had NASA funding to develop space
communication systems---e.g., lightweight, multibeam antenna feed
networks. A fabrication technique called unibody construction was
used to integrate several beams into one, resulting in volume and
weight savings. EMS has successfully demonstrated a radar antenna
system that is low in cost, easy to produce, and has high RF
performance capability for use in precrash sensing. The unibody
construction method is the key to low-cost production.
At this time, JPL has found no technological breakthrough solution
to the problem of air-bag-inflation-induced injuries from within
NASA. It is hoped that this report will catalyze the identification of
additional new concepts.
6-5
SECTION 7 INJuRv RISK ASSESSMENT
Methodology determines effect
of changes in critical
parameters on air bag
performance
Dummy tests and simulations
are the basis for the analysis
7.1 METHODOLOGY
The injury risk assessment methodology for evaluating the effect of
changes in critical parameters of the air bag system on the risk of
occupant injury is illustrated in Figure 7-1. The critical parameters
considered are: (1) whether the occupant is belted or unbelted, (2)
the crash pulse shape, i.e., the deceleration-time profile, (3) proximity
to the air bag module, (4) occupant category, (5) deployment time,
i.e., the time at which inflation is initiated, as measured from the
beginning of the crash pulse, (6) the inflator parameters, including
mass flow-time profile and the temperature and molecular weight of
output gas, and (7) air bag design.
The dummy response matrix shown in Figure 7-1 is derived from
vehicle crash tests, sled tests to simulate vehicle crashes, static tests
and computer simulations. The preferred source of dummy response
data is vehicle crash tests; however, sled tests, static tests, and
simulations can show dummy response to the critical parameters.
The dummy response matrix is transformed into an injury risk matrix
by means of injury risk curves that are discussed in Appendix E. The
injury risk matrix clearly presents the injury risk of different occupant
Critical Parameters
• Belted/Unbelted t
• Crash Pulse
• Occupant Proximity
to the Air Bag Module
• Occupant Category
• Deployment Time
• Inflator Mass Flow Rate
• Air Bag Design
y
Crash Tests
Sled Tests
Static Tests
Simulations
DUMMY RESPONSE MATRIX
50M • HIC*
° Chest Deflection __
5F ° Neck Criteria
Ill
OCC. PROXIMITY
Injury Risk Curves
AIS
HIC, Neck Criteria, etc.
*HIC = Head iniury criteria
v
95M
50M
5F
6C
INJURY RISK MATRIX
I
Injury
Risk
@AIS
I
OCC. PROXIMITY
Injury
Risk
Sensitivities
Figure 7-1. Injury Risk Assessment Methodology
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Injury risk is determined
categories, i.e., 6-year-old ch: ld, 5th-percentile female, 50th-percentile
male, and 95th-percentile inale. Injury risk can be evaluated for
selected sets of critical paraJ neters so that sensitivities of injury risk
to changes in critical parameters can be determined. These sensitivities
will allow the impact of an advanced technology on injury risk across
occupant categories to be assessed.
Requirements for advanced
systems derive from injury risk
sensitivities
Advanced air bag system technologies of interest include systems
with the capability to: (1) determine occupant category and proximity,
(2) modulate inflator output, and (3) optimize deployment time
through real-time analysis of crash-pulse shape. The functional and
performance requirements lbr systems to provide these advanced
capabilities can be derived from the injury risk sensitivities.
Conversely, injury risk sensitivities are necessary to assess capabilities
of advanced technologies to mitigate injuries and enhance benefits.
Effects of alternative
technologies assessed by
changes in injury risk
Effects of alternative air bag system technologies on injury risk can
be assessed by means ofinjur/risk sensitivities. For example, consider
a proximity sensing technology that could define occupant position
with any needed accuracy and speed in conjunction with inflator
technology that can modulate inflator output. Injury risk sensitivities
for occupant categories with respect to inflator output and position
can be used to assess injury Iisk implications for these technologies.
Injury risk matrices for advanced technologies can be compared to
those of present systems to highlight changes in injury risk that are
attributable to each of an _dvanced technology across occupant
categories.
Data sources
Data and information to support the generation of the dummy response
sensitivities of Figure 7-1 were obtained from NHTSA publications,
discussions and test results provided by Transport Canada, and
discussions and information provided by the U. S. automobile
manufacturers and air bag su!,pliers. In particular, data from car crash
tests were provided by Transl_ort Canada to characterize sensitivities
of dummy response with respect to variation in crash pulse, inflator
output, and proximity for the various occupants with three-point belts
alone, and air bags plus three-point belts. In addition, results of
computer simulations that were calibrated with crash or sled tests
were provided by a U. S. au:omobile manufacturer. Additional car
crash test results and sled test results were provided by U. S.
automobile manufacturers an t were also taken from various NHTSA
publications and other refereaces in the open literature. The results
presented in Section 7.2 are based on car crash test results provided
by Transport Canada [2], on results of various tests performed by
NHTSA [22], and on the other information sources cited above.
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5%females are at high injury
risk in 30-mph rigid barrier
crashes, while 50% males are
not at risk
Deformable offset barrier
(DOB) crashes result in high
injury risk for 5%females
Late deployments in DOB
crashes cause the high
injury risk
7.2 OCCUPANT INJURY RISK
The results of vehicle crash tests performed by Transport Canada are
shown in Tables F-I, F-2, and F-3, in Appendix F. The results of
48-km/h (30-mph) rigid frontal barrier (RFB) tests are shown in Tables
F-1 and F-2 for belted 5% female and 50% male hybrid III dummies,
respectively. Table F-3 shows responses of belted 5% female driver
hybrid III dummies in deformable offset barrier (DOB) tests, with
and without air bag deployment.
The vehicle crash test results of Table F-la show that head injury
risk for the belted 5% female driver in 48-km/h (30-mph) rigid frontal
barrier (RFB 30) crashes is comparatively small for both three-point
belt (3PB) + air bag (AB) and 3PB cases. However, the vehicle
crash test results of Table F-la show that neck injury risk is typically
high. Table F-lc shows that chest injury risk is high for vehicles
A-96, G-96, 1-96, K-97, and P-97.
The RFB 30 tests with the 50% male driver hybrid III dummy shown
in Table F-2 show very low injury risk for the head, neck, and chest
for all seven vehicles in the crash tests. This is in contrast to the
results for 5% female drivers for the same vehicles. In particular, the
neck injury risk of 5% female drivers for five of seven vehicles is
higher than 10%, while the highest neck injury risk for the 50% male
in the same seven vehicles is 0.3%.
The head, neck, and chest response of the 5% female driver in
deformable offset barrier (DOB) tests are shown in Table F-3 for
vehicle crashes with and without air bag deployment. The head injury
risk of Table F-3a and the chest injury risk of Table F-3c are less than
6%. However, the neck injury risk shown in Table F-3b is extremely
high in five of seven crashes with the air bag deployment. For each
of the six vehicle types tested, the neck loads are significantly higher
when the air bag deploys, even when neck injury risk is low.
Table 7-1 shows 5% female driver injury risk for a deformable offset
barrier test and a rigid frontal barrier test for six vehicle types with
three-point belts and air bags. For four of the six vehicle types, neck
injury risk is higher in the DOB crash test. In five of the six vehicle
types tested, the neck injury risk is greater than 10% for either the
DOB or RFB crash test. The injury risk for the 50% male in RFB 30
tests is shown in Table7-2 for the same vehicle types as shown in
Table 7-1. The 50% male driver injury risk is low in all cases. A
paired comparison, with and without air bag deployment, of injury
risk for the belted 5% female for five car models in DOB tests is
shown in Table 7-3. Also shown is the time of deployment initiation
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Table 7-1. Injury Risk for 5% Female Drivers in Rigid Frontal Barrier and Deformable Offset
Barrier Vehicle Crash Tests Performed by Transport Canada
TC Test Test
Number Vehicle
TC96-101 A-96
TC96-021 A-96
TC96-102 B-96
TC96-211 B-96
TC96-112 D-96
TC95-206 D-95
TC96-114 E-96
TC96-025 E-96
TC97-110 E-97
TC96-122 G-96
TC95-021 G-95
TC96-115 F-96
TC96-002 F-96
TC96-125 1-96
TC97-108 P-97
Barrier Type Restraint Head Injw-y Neck Injury
(mph) System Risk (%_ Risk (%)
RFB(30) 3PB+AB 4,4 37.2
DOB(25 ) 3PB+AB 3.4 50.1
RFB(30)
DOB(25)
3PB+AB
3PB+AB
0.4
0.5
94.4
100
Chest Injury Risk (%)
ABt/Belt 2
10.0/30.6
0.0/5.7
0.1/11.7
3.2/23.3
RFB(30) 3PB+AB 0.4 71.3 0.0/6.6
DOB(25) 3PB+AB 0.7 99.4 0.0/5.2
RFB(30) 3PB+AB 0.2 2.1 0.0/4.5
DOB(25) 3PB+AB 0.1 1.8 0.0/4.9
RFB(30) 3PB+AB 0.1 2.2 0.0/11.3
RFB(30) 3PB+AB 0.1 19.1 12.6/32.5
DOB(20) 3PB+AB 1.4 64.2 0.0/7.8
RFB(30) 3PB+AB 0.4 10.6 0.2/12.7
DOB(25 ) 3PB+AB 0.1 0.8 0.0/5.7
RFB(30) 3PB 4.3 11.6 27.0
19.40.7RFB(30) 3PB 56.3
(1) Injury risk is calculated using AIS >3 rib fractures for distributed c.-'aest impacts in Figure E-4 in Appendix E.
(2) Injury risk is calculated using AIS >3 thoracic injury due to shoulder belt loading in Figure E-3 in Appendix E.
RFB: Rigid Frontal Barrier
DOB: Deformable Offset Barrier
3PB: Three-Point Belt
AB: Air Bag
Table 7-2.
TC Test
Number
TC96-102
TC96-112
TC96-114
TC96-115
TC96-125
(1) Injury risk
Injury Risk for 50% Male Drivers in 48-km/h (30-r _ph) [RFB(30)] Vehicle Crash Tests
Performed By Transport Canada
Test
Vehicle
B-96
D-96
E-96
F-96
Barrier Type
(mph)
Restraint
System
Head lnjur
Risk (%)
G-96 RFB(30) 3PB+AB 0.2 0.3
is calculated using AIS >3 rib fractures for distributed clest impacts
Neck Injury
Risk (%)
Chest Injury Risk (%)
AW/Belt:
RFB(30) 3PB+AB 0.2 0.0 0.0/2.1
RFB(30) 3PB+AB 0.1 0.2 0.0/6.9
RFB(30) 3PB+AB 0.3 0.1 0.0/4.6
RFB(30) 3PB+AB 0.2 0.2 0.0/8.6
0.0/5.5
in Figure E-4 in Appendix E.
(2) Injury risk is calculated using AIS >3 thoracic injury due to should_ r belt loading in Figure E-3 in Appendix E.
RFB: Rigid Frontal Barrier
3PB: Three-Point Belt
AB: Air Bag
7-4
2
o_
o_
a-o
o f-
(:h _ ooo_ t,¢ ,_. _.. _c), (-.,,i
< _ _
("-,I t'q
("-I
_" _ O_ c-_ •
' O_ -- _ _ --
H
+ m _ _
m _
0
>,-_
Em
E E
._-2"
"r o
,m
,,_ [--
+ m _ o_ _ _ .4
['-- --
mid
#-
0
¢_ _ ._ _ _ ._ .._ -_--,1::_1-
=__ {#_ u-<
,#,_
,"-'
.=-
U_
,."L
"u _o
b
"U.__
_I tj
..o_
At AI
r.fJ r..;9
,r"
"1 :m
-_ -_ .= _-
7-5
A 5%female "sclose proximity
to the air bag puts her at risk
of injury
Depowered air bag
significantly reduces injury
risk for 5%female; belts
alone are best
of the air bag. In the three cases where time of deployment initiation
exceeds 40 ms, the neck injury risk is very high. Late deployment
allows the occupant to move closer to the air bag, thereby exacerbating
the membrane effect with the attendant increase in neck loading.
The injury risk of the belted 5% female drivers and the belted 50%
male drivers for the same vehicle is shown in Table 7-4. The 50%
male experiences small injury risk, while the 5% female has a very
high neck injury risk. This difference may be due to the 5% female
being closer to the air bag module due to seat position, coupled with
the deployment time characteristics of this vehicle. A later deployment
time that would not increase 50% male injury risk could substantially
increase 5% female injury risk because the 5% female is closer to the
air bag module when the crash begins. A similar injury risk
comparison is shown in Table F-4 in Appendix F for a different
vehicle. The vehicle of Tab!e 7-5 shows low injury risk for both the
5% female driver and 50% _nale driver. This vehicle has an "early,"
i.e., 40-ms, deployment initiation time in Table 7-3.
Table 7-6 shows 5% female driver injury risk for the same vehicle
model for a baseline air bag with a three-point belt, a depowered air
bag, and a three-point belt alone. Note that the lowest injury risk for
the neck and the head is obt lined with the three-point belt alone, and
the lowest chest deflection is also with the three-point belt alone.
Even though lowest chest deflection is obtained with the three-point
Table 7-4. Injury Risk Comparison for Fully Powered Air Bags of Vehicle B-96. Hybrid III 5%
Female and 50% Male Drivers are Belted in 48-km/h (30-mph) Rigid Frontal Barrier
Vehicle Crash Tests Performed by Transport C_nada
1" 2* 3* 4*
Hybrid III 95% Male
Head: 0.2%
Hybrid [II 50% Male Neck: 0.0%
Chest: 0.0A/2.1B%
Head: 0.4%
Hybrid III 5% Female Neck: 94.4%
Chest: 0.1A/11.7B%
Hybrid III 6-Year-Old
*1 = Contact with module
*2 = Full forward (Typical position for Hybrid III 5% Female)
*3 = Midposition (Typical position for Hybrid III 50% Male)
*4 = Full rear (Typical position for Hybrid III 95% Male)
(A) Injury risk is calculated using AIS > 3 rib fractures for distributed chest impacts in Figure E-4.
(B) Injury risk is calculated using AIS > 3 thoracic injury due to shoulder belt loading in Figure E-3.
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Table 7-5. Injury Risk Comparison for Fully Powered Air Bags of Vehicle E-96 with Early
Deployment. Hybrid III 5% Female and 50% Male Drivers are Belted in 48-km/h
(30-mph) Rigid Frontal Barrier Vehicle Crash Tests Performed by Transport Canada
1" 2* 3* 4*
Hybrid III 95% Male
Head: 0.3%
Hybrid III 50% Male Neck: 0.1%
Chest: 0.0A/4.6B%
Head: 0.2%
Hybrid III 5% Female Neck: 2.1%
Chest: 0.0A/4.5B%
Hybrid III 6-Year-Old
*1 = Contact with module
*2 = Full forward (Typical position for Hybrid III 5% Female)
*3 = Midposition (Typical position for Hybrid III 50% Male)
*4 = Full rear (Typical position for Hybrid lII 95% Male)
(A) Injury risk is calculated using AIS > 3 rib fractures for distributed chest impacts in Figure E-4.
(B) Injury risk is calculated using AIS > 3 thoracic injury due to shoulder belt loading in Figure E-3.
Table 7-6. Injury Risk Comparison for 5% Female Driver in 40 km/h (25-mph) Deformable
Offset Barrier (DOB25)Vehicle Crash Tests with Fully Powered, Depowered
(3PB + AB), and No Air Bag
Dummy Response
HIC 15
Injury Risk, AIS 4+, %
Neck Tension, N
Neck Ext. Moment, Nm
Injury Risk, AIS 3+, %
Chest Deflection
_Injury Risk, AIS 3+, %
ABI/Belt 2
IPB = Three-point lap/shoulder belt
AB = Air bag
(1)
(2)
Car Model
D-95 D-97-D
3PB + AB 3PB + AB
TC96-206
367
0.7
2752
124
99.4
22.4
0.0/5.2
TC97-200
N/A
N/A
902
38.1
3.5
24.2
0.0/6.4
D-96
3PB
TC96-209
189
0.2
978
14
0.4
20.6
4.2
Injury risk is calculated using AIS _>3 rib fractures for distributed chest impacts in Figure E-3.
Injury risk is calculated using AIS >_3 thoracic injury due to shoulder belt loading in Figure E-3.
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Neck injury risk for 5%female
could be high in higher-
severity crashes, i.e., RFB30
Unrestrained passengers at
greater risk than drivers
belt alone, the injury risk i; higher because of the different injury
risk curves used for air bag loading and shoulder belt loading. The
depowered air bag does reduce the neck injury risk significantly
relative to the baseline air bag, but the injury risk performance of the
belt alone is superior to eith_'r the baseline or depowered air bag with
belt for the 5% female in the DOB 25 test.
The results of three vehicle c,.-ash tests performed by Transport Canada
with the 5% female driver dummy in vehicles with depowered air
bag inflators are available to JPL. Two of these three depowered
tests were DOB 25 crashes, and one was an RFB 30 crash. One of
the DOB 25 tests is shown in Table 7-6 for vehicle D (test TC97-
200). The other DOB 25 depowered crash test was of vehicle E, and
is not shown in any table. The DOB 25 test of vehicle D with a 25%
depowered inflator produced a substantial reduction in neck injury
risk--down to 3.5% from the 99.4% for a fully powered inflator
shown in Table 7-6 (test TC95-206). The RFB 30 depowered inflator
crash test of vehicle D produced an unacceptably high neck injury
risk at 51%. The higher-severity RFB 30 crash produces more rapid
movement of the occupant toward the air bag module. If deployment
time is late, the occupant will be closer to the module in the more
severe RFB 30 crash. This could be a factor in the high injury risk
with the depowered inflator in the RFB 30 crash of vehicle D. The
other DOB 25 test with a depowered inflator of vehicle E produced
essentially the same injury, risk as the fully powered inflator of
vehicle E shown in Table 7- 1 (test TC96-025).
Table 7-7 shows injury risl,: for the unbelted 50% male driver and
passenger for baseline, depowered, and no air bag cases in RFB 30
vehicle crash tests. The 50% male driver has a low risk of injury for
head and neck, even withot_t any restraint at all. However, the 50%
Table 7-7. Responses of Unbelted 50% Male Driver and P;issenger and Injury Risk For 48-km/h
(30-mph) Rigid Frontal Barrier Crash Tests*
Dummy 50% Male Driver 50% Male Passenger
Response Baseline Depowered No Air B g Baseline Depowered No Air Bag
HIC 15
Injury Risk, A1S 4+, %
Neck Tension, N
Neck Ext. Moment, Nm
Injury Risk, A1S 3+, %
Chest Deflection
Injury Risk, AIS 3+, %
28O
0.4
1518
34
0.5
32
0.0
560
2.1
1386
45
0.8
24
0.0
85O
8.7
1122
35
0.3
45
38.4
* Vehicle crash test performed by a U. S. automobile manufactui er.
150
0.1
297
18
0.0
17
0.0
48O
1.3
3696
49
6.9
10
0.0
850
8.7
5412
185
95.5
18.2
3.1
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Earl), deployment required for
low injuG, risk
Depowered air bag can
increase chest inju_' risk for
the unbelted 5%female
male passenger has high injury risk for the head and neck with no
belt and no bag.
Tables 7-8 and 7-9 show injury risk for the 50% male and the 5%
female drivers in 17G sled tests with preset deployment timing. These
results indicate that an airbag reduces injury risk for unbelted drivers
and passengers, providing that deployment initiation is sufficiently
early in the crash.
Tables 7-10 and 7-11 show injury risk from computer simulations
for the 50% male and the 5% female drivers for baseline and
depowered inflators for different crash pulses. Injury risk of the 50%
male for the head, neck, and chest does not change significantly with
respect to inflator output, crash pulse, or whether the occupant is
belted or unbelted. However, the chest injury risk for the unbelted
5% female does show an increase with the depowered inflator. Injury
Table 7-8. Responses of 50% Male and 5% Female Unbelted Drivers and Injury Risk For 17G Sled
Tests with 125-ms Pulse (from Reference [22])
50% Male Driver 5% Female Driver
Dummy Inflator Output Inflator Output
Response
350 x 22 300 x 13 No Air Bag 350 x 22 300 x 13 No Air Bag
HIC 15 134 231 553 93 122 269
Injury Risk, AIS 4+, % 0.1 0.3 2.0 0.1 0.1 0.3
Neck Tension, N 750 761 1821 924 808 707
Neck Ext. Moment, Nm 14 13 72 39 11 16
Injury Risk, AIS 3+, % 0.1 0.1 4.0 3.9 0.2 0.3
Chest Deflection 29 24 40 27 31 47
Injury Risk, AIS 3+, % 0.0 0.0 27.8 0.0 0.2 43.0
Table 7-9. Responses of 50% Male and 5% Female Unbelted Hybrid Dummy Passenger For 17G
Sled Tests with 125-ms Pulse (from Reference [22])
50% Male Passenger 5% Female Passenger
Dummy Inflator Output Inflator Output
Response
340 x 8.2 285 x 5.2 No Air Bag 340 x 8.2 285 x 5.2 No Air Bag
HIC 15 80 98 462 50 54 627
Injury Risk, A[S 4+, % 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.1 3.0
Neck Tension, N 924 528 1504 778 381 1177
Neck Ext. Moment, Nm 39 35 221 14 10 100
Injury Risk, AIS 3+, % 0.4 0.2 82 0.3 0.1 75
6
0.0
22
5.0
14
0.0
6
0.0
Chest Deflection
Injury Risk, AIS 3+, %
12
0.0
44
36.2
7-9
Wg
,.,,g
0
0
°_
:ii
:g,
r. ,,
d
"r,
,,D
0
0
0
0
ht_
+
0
all
+
©
,,,' mmo _o ,,o._.:c:;
0
o
1"-1
0
g_
¢"I
M 0
0
+
.<
,_:a_
_ e_. 0 _,-.,t
_::,_ 0". 0
-"2
_+"
z_
<
0
_ I_
_d
_.o_
_.o_
_. o. a,
_.o
:N
.=.< .,_
._
_._
_'_
._ .._
_[--,
N--,._-,..
7-10
°
i_
1311/1
1:13O
.....IT
-t-
P-_
iSc_
o_
E-_ o
"_. + _ _.-: _ _ c_ _c_'.d
a r-
0
z_
-,_®
vO 0
0_
_0_-
r_
.f,_
AI AI
-: c. ?_
_ Z
+_ _+_ _
Z
-< .._ <
- b _ ,, b _ bb 'E"E'..
E" -_ __ -
7-11
Depowering does not
reduce injury risk for
6-year-old child
Comparison of NHTSA
and Mertz curves
Summary of depowering
results
No characterization of critical
parameters was identified
risk for the belted 5% female is essentially invariant with respect to
inflator output and crash pulse type.
Table 7-12 shows the results of static air bag deployment tests for the
6-year-old child dummy. Dummy positions are shown in
Appendix E. In positions 1 and 2, depowering by 30% does not reduce
neck injury risk to acceptable levels. The normal power and 30%
depowered test results show high levels of neck injury risk, which is
consistent with the evidence from incidents in which children have
experienced fatal neck injuries from being in close proximity to
deploying air bags.
Tables 7-13 and 7-14 compare the injury risks as calculated by the
NHTSA curves and the Merz curves from the dummy response data
given in [26]. There is no significant difference in the risk of AIS 4+
head injury between the NHTSA curves and Mertz curves. However,
the risk of chest injury using _-hest acceleration and the NHTSA curves
greatly exceeds the risk of chest injury using chest deflection and the
Mertz curves. As discussed in Appendix E, chest deflection using
the Mertz curves gives a more realistic indicator of thoracic injury.
Table 7-15 shows the injury risk for different occupant categories for
fully powered air bags, and T; tble 7-16 shows the corresponding injury
risk for depowered air bags. The 30% depowered air bag results in a
significant decrease in injur3 risk for 5th-percentile female dummies
while very slightly increasiag injury risk for 50th-percentile male
dummies. Child injury risk is not significantly affected by this level
of depowering.
7.3 SENSITIVITY OF O_:CUPANT INJURY RISK TO CHANGES
IN CRITICAL PARAMETERS
7.3.1 Critical Parameters. The more important parameters that
affect air bag system perfor,nance as measured by occupant injury
risk include deployment tim,:, inflator output, occupant proximity to
the air bag module during illflation, occupant belt status (belted or
unbelted), crash pulse shape, eehicle velocity change during the crash,
occupant category, and air ba ; design. No comprehensive, systematic
characterization of the effi..cts of these parameters, considering
interactions, on occupant inj ary risk was found during the course of
this study. Such a characteriz ttion of the sensitivity of occupant injury
risk to a variation of these critical parameters is not available in the
open literature or from NH'_'SA. If any of the air bag suppliers or
automobile manufacturers have developed such a systematic
characterization, it was not made available of the JPL team when
requested.
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Table 7-15. Injury Risk Comparison for Fully Powered Air Bags. Belted Hybrid III 5% Female A and
Unbelted Hybrid III 50% Male Drivers 8 are in 32-km/h (20-mph) Deformable Offset
Barrier and 48-km/h (30-mph) Rigid Frontal Barrier Vehicle Crash Tests, Respectively.
Hybrid III 6-Year-Old Responses Are From Static Test in Reference [22]
1" 2* 3* 4*
Hybrid III 95% Male
Head: 0.4%
Hybrid III 50% Male Neck: 0.5%
Chest: 0.0%
Head: 0.7%
Hybrid Ill 5% Female Neck: 94.4%
Chest: 0.0c/5.2r'%
Head: 4.8%
Hybrid III 6-Year-Old Neck: >99.9%
*1 = Contact with module
*2 - Full forward (Typical position for Hybrid III 5% Female)
*3 = Midposition (Typical position for Hybrid III 50% Male)
*4 = Full rear (Typical position for Hybrid III 95% Male)
(A) Vehicle crash tests from Reference [2].
(B) Vehicle crash tests performed by U. S. automobile manufactu-er.
(C) Injury risk is calculated using AIS > 3 rib fractures for distrib lted chest impacts in Figure E-4.
(D) Injury risk is calculated using AIS > 3 thoracic injury due to ,'houlder belt loading in Figure E-3.
Table 7-16. Injury Risk Comparison for About 25% Depowered Air Bags. Belted Hybrid III 5%
Female A and Unbelted Hybrid III 50% Male Drivers s are in 32-km/h (20-mph) Deformable
Offset Barrier and 48-km/h (30-mph) Rigid Frontal Barrier Vehicle Crash Tests,
Respectively. Hybrid III 6-Year-Old Responses Are From Static Test in Reference [22]
Hybrid IIl 95% Male
Hybrid III 50% Male
Hybrid III 5% Female
Hybrid III 6-Year-Old
Head: 0.1%
Neck: >99.8%
2 •
Neck: 3.5%
Chest: 0.0c/6.4D%
3 •
Head: 2.1%
Neck: 0.8%
Chest: 0.0%
4 •
*1 = Contact with module
*2 = Full forward (Typical position for Hybrid III 5% Female)
*3 = Midposition (Typical position for Hybrid III 50% Male)
*4 = Full rear (Typical position for Hybrid III 95% Male)
(A) Vehicle crash tests from Reference [2].
(B) Vehicle crash tests performed by U. S. automobile manufactuJer.
(C) Injury risk is calculated using AIS > 3 rib fractures for distribltted chest impacts in Figure E-4.
(D) Injury risk is calculated using AIS > 3 thoracic injury due to shoulder belt loading in Figure E-3.
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To meet a goal of protecting the public from injury during vehicle
crashes, air bag performance must be characterized and understood
(1) for occupants of different sizes who sit at different distances from
the air bag module, (2) for vehicle crashes of differing severity ranging
from low-speed vehicle-to-vehicle crashes to high-speed, rigid-barrier
crashes, (3) for different ambient temperatures because temperature
has a large effect on inflator gas output characteristics, and (4) for
belted and unbelted occupants. The air bag systems currently in the
American vehicle fleet have been optimized for the 50th-percentile
male without a seat belt in a 48-km/h (30-mph) rigid frontal barrier
crash at ambient temperature.
Need to increase air bag
s),stem robustness
The performance of present air bag systems can be severely degraded
by variation of any of the parameters mentioned above. The
introduction of advanced technology must dramatically increase the
robustness of air bag system performance with respect to variation
of critical parameters encountered during public usage of automobiles.
7.3.2 Deployment Time. The performance of an air bag system
expressed in terms of occupant injury risk is strongly affected by the
time at which inflation is initiated, i.e., the deployment time. At the
beginning of a crash, an occupant begins to move forward relative to
the vehicle. The distance between the occupant and the air bag module
decreases as the occupant moves forward. If the deployment time is
late in the crash, the occupant can be close enough to the air bag
module to interact with the inflating air bag and can experience
inflation-induced injuries.
Deployment times exceeding
40 ms can cause severe injury
Deployment times are shown in Table 7-17 for six vehicles with
conventional air bags tested in deformable offset barrier crashes with
5% female dummies by Transport Canada. The deformable offset
barrier crash tests are representative of the "softer" vehicle-to-vehicle
crashes that commonly occur. In four of the tests the deployment
time exceeded 40 ms. In those tests, neck injury risk is extremely
high, while in the tests with early deployment time the injury risk is
low. Late deployment results in the occupant moving into the path of
the deploying air bag, increasing injury risk potential.
Results of reference [23] show that deployment time variability
increases inversely with crash severity. That is, as the crash severity
is reduced, variability in deployment time increases. Well over 90%
of automobile crashes occur with vehicle AV less than 48 km/h (30
mph), and about 70% of automobile crashes occur with vehicle AV
between 14.5 km/h (9 mph) and 35.4 km/h (22 mph). If late
deployment is-as prevalent as the Transport Canada tests and the
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Table 7-17. Injury Risk of Belted 5% Female Driver (Near Fositions) vs. Air Bag Deployment Time in
40-km/h (25-mph) Deformable Offset Barrier (1_OB25) and 32-km/h (20-mph) Deformable
Offset Barrier (DOB20) Car Crash Tests Performed by Transport Canada
C tr Model
B-96 F-96 E-96 G-95 D-95 Q-96
Dummy 3PB + AB 3PB + AB 3PB + AB 3PB + AB 3PB + AB 3PB + AB
Response DOB25 DOB25 DOB25 DOB20 DOB25 DOB25
TC96-211 TC96-002 TC96-025 TC96-021 TC95-206 TC96-024
100 ms* 30 ms* 40 ms* 91 ms* 56 ms* 100 ms*
HIC 15 338 85 112 490 367 240
Injury Risk, AIS 4+, % 0.5 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.7 0.3
Neck Tension, N 4583 1225 1330 4170 2752 2676
Neck Ext. Moment, Nm 134 17 24 45 124 67
Injury Risk, AIS 3+, % >99.9 0.8 1.8 64.2 99.4 62.2
Chest Deflection 37.6 23.1 21.9 25.9 22.4 33.9
Injury Risk _, AIS 3+, % 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8
Injury Risk", AIS 3+, % 23.3 5.7 4.9 7.8 5.2 17.2
*Air Bag Deployment Time
(1) Injury risk is calculated using AIS > 3 rib fractures for distributed chest impacts in Figure E-4.
(2) Injury risk is calculated using AIS > 3 thoracic injury due to shoulder belt loading in Figure E-3.
3PB: Three-Point Belt
AB: Air Bag
reference [23] would indicate, a substantial number of occupants are
being exposed to a significant risk of inflation-induced injury in
crashes that commonly occur.
Advanced technology may
reduce deployment time
variability
Advanced technology may :educe deployment time variability and
reduce the adverse effects of variability. Improved crash sensor
algorithms are intended to pr)vide more accurate and timely detection
of crash severity, which shoud reduce the deployment time variability.
However, there is no data a,,ailable to evaluate the extent to which
these intentions are achievable. The development of new
compartmentalized bags m _y reduce the keep-out zone and thus
permit later deployments wi :hout serious injury risk.
7.3.3 Inflator Parameters. The inflator output gas mass flow
versus time profile, the gas _nolecular weight, and gas temperature
all affect the forces exerted on an occupant during an occupant/air
bag interaction. Gas is exha asted from the air bag through the bag
vent holes, so the rate ofpres _ure rise inside the bag is determined by
inflator gas output and vent .Lrea.
A deploying air bag can cause inflation-induced injury during the
inflation process when the "membrane effect" occurs. The "membrane
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Forces on an occupant are
strongly affected by inflator
gas mass flow versus time
Reduced injury risk from
depowered air bags
effect" results from the occupant being close enough to the air bag
module to interact with the air bag before it can reach the size and
shape that it would have when fully inflated. If an occupant is close
enough to the module for a deploying air bag to become fully extended
while enveloping an occupant's head and neck, the increasing gas
pressure in the bag will act to forcibly expel the occupant. The forces
exerted on the occupant are strongly affected by inflator gas output
characteristics, in particular the output gas mass flow versus time
profile.
By reducing inflator rise rate and peak pressure, a reduction of neck
injury risk can be achieved for 5% female drivers. Available evidence
indicates a reduction of injury risk with depowered air bags in DOB
25 tests and static tets. However, the single RFB 30 vehicle crash
test with a depowered air bag that is available to JPL indicates high
5% female neck injury risk at 51%, although it is reduced from 99.4%
with a fully powered inflator. Tables 7-16 and 7-17 illustrate a
reduction in injury risk with depowering. Both 5% females and 50%
male drivers show acceptable injury risk, but child passengers remain
at considerable risk.
Depowering typically means that the inflator output has been reduced
from that of, say, 400 x 21 or 350 x 22 to that of 300 x 12 or 285 x 5 °.
With lower bag pressure and smaller pressure rise rates, a concern
arises that larger occupants such as the 50% and 95% males could
"bottom out" the air bag and experience high loads during more severe
crashes.
The information from a 48-km/h (30-mph) rigid frontal barrier crash
test, a 17G sled test, and calibrated simulations that is presented in
Tables 7-7, 7-8, and 7-11, respectively, indicates that injury risk does
not increase in any significant way for the 50% male in crashes up to
the severity of the RFB 30 crash test. The HIC for the 50% male does
increase slightly for the depowered cases shown in Tables 7-7, 7-8,
and 7-11, while chest deflection decreases somewhat. These changes
in HIC and chest deflection do not cause any significant changes in
injury risk.
For the larger 95% male occupant, no information is available to
make an assessment. However, the rigid frontal barrier car crash tests
shown in Table 7-14 indicate that the unbelted 95% male passenger
has a comparatively high HIC measurement, which may increase
with depowered air bags. Table 7-14 also shows a significant risk of
* Peak pressure (kPa) x pressure rise rate (kPa/ms) in a standard tank test
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Inflator unit-to-unit variability
is high; with this variability,
benefits of depowering are
problematic
chest injury for belted 5% female and 95% male occupants in
56-krn/h (35-mph) rigid frontal barrier crash tests.
The effect of depowering inflators by about 25% is summarized in
Table 7-16. With depowered inflators, the injury risk for the 50%
male driver is essentially unchanged, while that for the 5% female
driver is substantially reduced, and injury risk for the 6-year-old child
passenger in close proximity to the module remains extremely high.
Reducing inflator power by about 25% from pre- 1997 levels increases
robustness of airbag systerr: performance for the 50% male drivers
with respect to departures of critical parameters from their design
point values established for the 50% male in the RFB 30 crash.
Robustness may be decreased for other crash situations, i.e., for
higher-speed crashes and iarger occupants. JPL had no data to
evaluate this effect.
Inflator-to-inflator output variability of inflators with the same
specifications appears to be a significant problem. Data made available
to JPL from testing of about 50 inflators of the same specifications
and from the same manufacturing lot (Figure 5-3) shows that total
gas output and pressure rise rate vary significantly. The "three-sigma"
variability of this data is _+13%. Larger variabilities occur during
pressure rise and with va'iation in temperatures. This level of
variability would make th,: benefits of depowering problematic.
Inflator output variability of this magnitude would also interfere with
the effectiveness of dual-stage inflators as a means of extending air
bag protection to higher-se_,erity crashes.
Variability in inflator outpt t will result in variability of measured
dummy response. Dummy "esponse measurements from a series of
six static tests with an out-of-position 50% male dummy were
provided to JPL by an OEM. The tests were performed with six
inflators of the same type and from the same lot and with the dummy
in the same position for each test. The variability of dummy response
was significant from test to test. The coefficient of variation (the
ratio of the standard deviati_ n to the mean) for the six tests was 39%
for neck extension moment, 21% for neck tension, 36% for viscous
coefficient (V'C), and 32% _or HIC 36. Due to the nature of dummy
response, some variation ot response measures would be expected
even if inflator output did n.)t change from test to test. However, in
these six tests inflator outpqt variability is the likely source of the
high variability of dummy r,_sponse.
If inflator output variabilit!r is as large as these data suggest, high
priority should be given tc resolving this problem. The inflator
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variability increases at lower temperature and also increases at higher
temperature. The effects of temperature on inflator output should be
understood and incorporated into the deployment strategy for
advanced air bag systems. Through continuing development and
implementation of alternative inflator concepts, inflator output
variability should be effectively resolved.
Close proximity to a deploying
air bag module can cause
extremely high injury risk
7.3.4 Proximity. Occupants that are close enough to interact with
the deploying air bag as it is being inflated can experience inflation-
induced injuries due to the "punch-out" phase of deployment and
due to the membrane effect. The membrane effect is discussed in
section 7.3.3 above. The punch-out phase occurs as the folded air
bag initially emerges from the module. During the punch-out phase,
pressure in the air bag module builds up until sufficient force is
generated to tear the module cover or open the air bag door. The air
bag can emerge from the module with force sufficient to cause the
air bag module door to shatter a car's windshield if the door hits it.
The force imparted to a 6-year-old child dummy by even a depowered
inflator is high enough to cause extremely high injury risk.
The force exerted on an occupant by a deploying air bag increases
when an occupant is closer to the module at the beginning of
deployment. Static tests with 5% female dummies were performed
by Transport Canada to measure dummy response as a function of
distance from the air bag module. Figures F-1 through F-5 in
Appendix F show dummy response as a function of upper sternum-
to-module distance. The dummy response measurements include neck
tension, neck extension moment, sternal deflection, and peak head
acceleration. The neck injury risk and chest injury risk calculated
using Mertz' injury risk curves are shown in Figures 7-2 and 7-3 for
fully powered and depowered air bag modules, respectively, for two
vehicles.
Air bag system design can
reduce injury risk
The neck injury risk in Figure 7-2 for the fully powered module
increases abruptly as sternum-to-module distance decreases below
about 130 mm. There is a significant difference between vehicles D
and E, with vehicle E showing much lower injury risk. Chest injury
risk, shown in Figure 7-2, also begins to increase at 130 mm for
vehicle D but does not increase significantly for vehicle E. For both
vehicles, neck and chest injury risks are much lower with depowered
modules. The neck and chest injury risks for vehicle E with the
depowered module are not significant for a sternum-to-module
distance of 70 mm. There is no data for distances less than 70 mm.
The superior performance of vehicle E in these static tests is
attributable to the air bag module design. The module is recessed in
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Figure 7-2. Neck Injury Risk of 5% Female in Static Out-of-Position Air Bag Deployment Tests as
a Function of Sternum-to-Module Distance. Tests performed by Transport Canada
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Figure 7-3. Chest Injury of 5% Female in Static Out-of-Position Air Bag Deployment Tests as a
Function of Sternum-to-Module Distance. Te:;ts performed by Transport Canada
7-22
Belts offer opportunity for
setting high deployment
velocity thresholds
Crash pulse shape affects
occupant proximity to the air
bag
Effect of crash plus and AV
the steering wheel hub, and the air bag initially deploys radially when
the occupant is near the module.
7.3.5 Belt Status. Belts limit the extent to which occupants can
move closer to the air bag during a crash. Since inflation-induced
injuries are the result of close proximity to the air bag module during
air bag inflation, limiting occupant movement toward the module
during a crash can greatly reduce occupant interaction with the
inflating air bag.
If the initial position of the occupant is sufficiently close to the module,
occupant interaction with the inflating air bag is difficult, if not
impossible, to avoid. In this situation, the inflating air bag must not
exert excessively high forces on the occupant if inflation-induced
injuries are to be avoided. In most cases 50% male occupants are at a
very small risk of inflation-induced injuries with or without belts
unless they are out of position and very near the deploying air bag.
The 5% female driver normally sits so close to the air bag module
that inflation-induced injury with a fully powered module of
conventional design is likely to occur even when she is belted. With
depowering, 5% female drivers will have low probability of injury
risk unless they are out of position and very near the deploying air
bag.
Belt use can also provide the opportunity for setting higher
deployment velocity thresholds. Since the belts provide sufficient
protection in low-severity crashes, higher deployment thresholds, i.e.,
AV at which the air bag deploys, could be used for belted drivers.
7.3.6 Crash Pulse and AV. Crash pulse shape is extremely
important, because it governs the occupant position and motion during
the crash. The shape of the crash pulse depends on the car platform
and the obstacle being struck. All air bag systems are designed and
developed for specific vehicle platforms. For crash pulses with the
same AV, those having a high early acceleration spike of significant
duration will move the occupant forward faster than a softer crash
having the same AV. A "hard" pulse puts the occupant closer to the
air bag module earlier in the crash than does a softer crash pulse. To
avoid inflation-induced injury, vehicles with hard pulses, such as
utility vehicles, must have earlier air bag deployment.
The results of calibrated simulations that show dummy responses
and injury risk as a function of vehicle velocity, i.e., AV during the
crash, are shown in Figures F-6 through F-21 for fully powered and
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depowered inflators, for rigid and generic crash pulses, for 5% female
and 50% male occupants, and for belted and unbelted occupants.
These simulations were per_brmed with early deployment of the air
bag, so the results do not reflect late deployment due to deployment
time variability. Figure F-12 shows that neck injury risk for the 5%
female remains very small with the depowered inflator at AVs from
24 km/h (15 mph) to 56 km/h (35 mph), while it is significant for the
fully powered inflator. Figure F-20 shows that neck injury risk for
the 50% male is not significant at any AV from 24 km/h (15 mph) to
56 km/h (35 mph).
Figures F-13 and F-21 show that chest injury risk for both the 5%
female and the 50% male is significant due to shoulder belt loading
at AVs from 24 km/h (15 mph) to 56 km/h (35 mph). Advanced
technology belts with load limiters offer potential to reduce chest
injury risk due to belt loadir.,g.
7.3.7 Occupant Category. Smaller-statured drivers sit closer to
the air bag module and are therefore at greater risk of inflation-induced
injury. In addition, females and children are more susceptible to neck
and chest injury than are adult males. Differences in occupant fragility
are shown in the injury risk :urves of Appendix E.
7.4 APPLICATION OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
The technology characteriza::ion described in Section 5 and the injury
risk analysis and sensitivities given in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 provide a
basis from which to evaluate the performance of advanced air bag
technologies. The applicati )n of advanced technology changes the
knowledge or value of the critical parameters. This change in
knowledge is used with the injury risk sensitivities and advanced
technology application stralegies to establish the change in injury
risk, or air bag robustness, that advanced technology can provide.
This process is shown in Fi_ :ure 7-4.
Nontechnical strategies that can improve restraint system
effectiveness and reduce in ury risk are also shown in Figure 7-4.
For example, strategies that increase safety belt or child safety seat
use, or that ensure that chikren will be carried in the rear seat, will
be highly effective in reducil_g fatalities and injuries in motor vehicle
crashes. These strategies w.;re not the subject of this assessment.
Table 7-18 summarizes the advanced technologies applicable in a
given vehicle model year," the strategy for applying the technologies,
the improvements in terms of reduced air bag injuries, and problems
remaining after introduction tffthe advanced technology. The baseline
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ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY
CHARACTERISTICS
-'_'-i TECHNOLOGY
APPLICATION
STRATEGIES
/
CHANGE IN KNOWLEDGE
OR VALUE OF CRITICAL
PARAMETERS
CHANGE IN INJURY RISK
(AIR BAG ROBUSTNESS)
RESULTING FROM IMPACT OF
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY ON
CRITICAL PARAMETERS
i/
OTHER STRATEGIES I
(E.G., INCREASED ENFORCEMENT
OF BELT LAWS)
Figure 7-4. Advanced Technology Evaluation Process
Current svstem is baseline.
At-risk occupants identified
Depowering reduces risk to
small-statured drivers
for comparison is production air bag systems that were typical until
manufacturers began to depower their systems. The first modification
considered is the typical depowered system. Next are advanced
technologies that could be introduced by model year 2001. Finally,
we considered advanced technologies that might become available
after about 2003.
7.4.1 Baseline Case. The baseline case indicates the risks to drivers
and right front seat passengers in the majority of cars with air bags
currently on the road. These include all out-of-position (OOP)
occupants who are or will be within the keep-out zone. Static OOP
occupants are within this keep-out zone, while dynamic OOP
occupants will move within this region just before or during air bag
inflation. Fifth-percentile female drivers are at risk. Front-seat
passengers at risk are children, particularly those who are unrestrained
or who are in rear-facing child safety seats (RFCSs). JPL had no
data on the injury risk for children in forward-facing child seats
(FFCSs), but we have assumed that they are at risk.
7.4.2 Depowered Air Bags (Case 1). Depowered air bags were
introduced in a few 1997 and many 1998 model vehicles to reduce
inflation-induced injuries for 5th-percentile female drivers, and are
expected to reduce the risk to all OOP front-seat occupants because
of the reduction in the size of the keep-out zone. Although there was
some evidence that normally seated 5% female drivers could be
injured by depowered air bags (Section 7.3.3), it is assumed that
* The model year for introduction of advanced technologies will be determined
by the technologies' availability and the decisions of OEMs and suppliers to
introduce them. The model year for introduction in Table 7-18 is an estimate
of what is possible.
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Technology available by 2001
continued development wi 1 reduce that possiblity. Front-seat
occupants who are very clost', to the air bags, children and infants in
RFCSs and FFCSs remain at severe risk with depowered bags.
7.4.3 Model Year 2001 (Case 2). The technologies that are being
developed and that may be available for model year 2001 provide
both improved information and improved response.
Information
Crash sensors with improved algorithms that will better
discriminate whet, air bag deployment is necessary for
occupant crash protection, and can determine the
appropriate inflation level for two-stage inflators.
Belt status sensors that can detect when an occupant is
belted so that the aii bag deployment threshold can be raised
when belts are in u;e. (This approach is currently in use in
some cars.)
Seat position sensors that provide an approximate surrogate
measure of occupant size and proximity to the air bag
module. They can be used in combination with belt status
sensors to determine the appropriate inflator output.
Seat belt spool-o_lt sensors could provide additional
information about an occupant's size and proximity to the
air bag module. These sensors are not part of any current
industry use strategy that JPL knows of, and therefore they
may not be available by model year 2001.
Static proximity (o_ cupant position) sensors could identify
occupants in the keep-out zone, but will be available only
if an aggressive development program is undertaken. They
would not reduce injuries to all OOP occupants, and they
could be "fooled" some of the time.
Response
• Automatic suppres ;ion capability can respond when the
system senses that _m occupant is in the keep-out zone.
Two-stage inflator; permit relatively soft inflation for
lower-velocity-thre ;hold crashes and full inflation when
necessary for high-velocity-threshold crashes.
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Technology available by 2001
will provide marginal
improvements over depowering
• Compartmented air bags and bags with lighter-weight
fabrics that may reduce the size of the keep-out zone.
Advanced belts can improve restraint system safety and
protectiveness. They may include pretensioners that can
provide better coupling of the occupant to the seat for
improved ride-down during the crash. Also, they can, to
some degree, limit occupant proximity to the air bag
module. Load limiters can also improve belt performance
by reducing maximum belt loads on the occupant.
(Pretensioners and load limiters are currently in use in some
vehicles).
The application of advanced technologies in the 2001 time frame
will reduce the size of the keep-out zone, which reduces the risk to
front-seat OOP occupants. The inflation-induced injury risk to belted
occupants with these systems will be reduced because of reduced air
bag aggressivity, an increase in the threshold velocity for deployment,
and improvements in belts. The inflation-induced injury risk to
unbelted occupants will be reduced by the improvements that reduce
air bag agressitivity, e.g., controlled inflator output, compartmented
bags, and improved bag deployment design.
Despite these improvements, some front-seat OOP occupants, children
and infants in RFCSs and FFCSs in the front passenger seat remain
at risk.
Belt extension sensors, in combination with seat position sensors,
could provide marginal improvement by 2001 by providing an
indication of occupant size and proximity to the air bag module.
However, there is no current OEM strategy known to JPL for use of
belt extension or spool-out sensors. Nevertheless, OOP occupants
would still be at some risk.
7.4.4 Model Year 2001 (Aggressive Development-Case 3). It
might be possible to include a static proximity sensor in air bag
systems by model year 2001. This would require an aggressive
development program. The sensor would not have the capability of
making dynamic proximity measurements, and could be "fooled"
under some circumstances. In the event the sensor is fooled, air bag
protection would be denied. Nevertheless, such a sensor could reduce
inflation-induced risks to OOP front-seat occupants who are in the
keep-out zone at the onset of a crash. Those who would remain at
risk of inflation-induced injury include occupants who move into the
keep-out zone in the early phase of the crash, infants in RFCSs and
FFCSs, and child passengers in the front passenger seat.
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Occupant and proximity
sensors are needed to reduce
air-bag-induced injuries
7.4.5 ModelYear 2003 (Case 4). Further advanced technologies
that could be incorporated :gy about the 2003 model year include
more sophisticated integration of proximity and occupant position
sensors with crash and belt status sensors. The system could then
suppress inflation when it has a high likelihood of injuring an occupant
in the keep-out zone and pro-,ide an appropriate signal for multistage
inflators. Further advances in belt and air bag design could be
introduced in this time frame. Also, precrash sensors could be
available to augment crash sensors.
Unreliabili_ remains a
problem
With these more complex technologies, a risk of inflation-induced
injury could result from system unreliability, unless diligent and
productive effort is put into increasing the reliability of individual
components to levels required to achieve satisfactory system reliability
with the increased complexity of the system. As discussed in Section
4, the component reliability required to avoid unintended
deployments, which could put all occupants at risk, is extremely high.
Initiate restraint design
process with belts
7.4.6 Advanced Belts (Case 5). This case was added to illustrate
a potential development effort, rather than to definitively establish
the capabilities of advanced belts to provide protection. Since no air
bag is used, there are clearly no inflation-induced injuries. The
protective capability of advanced belts has not been determined.
Neither has there been any bc :It-emphasized approach put forward in
the U.S., because of the maldate to use air bags. Advanced belts
alone may be the best choice for occupants who always wear their
belts. Alternatively, advanced belts for belted occupants with an air
bag for head protection could be a better choice. The head protection
air bag could also provide pr)tection to unbelted occupants through
bag design and inflator contr 31. The key consideration is to start the
design process with belts alld then determine what supplemental
protection by air bags is requi red. Such a strategy must be predicated
on the realities of belt use in the U. S., however.
Tags for child seat detection
7.4.7 Child Seats. In the al alysis above, the resolution of the child
seat problem is projected to _e achieved in the 2003 time period or
after. This is based on the req Jirement for implementation of reliable
occupant presence sensors. One manufacturer (Mercedes-Benz)
currently provides a tag-base _1child seat detector that automatically
suppresses the air bag. Such _ system could be used in other vehicles,
but it must be used with sp,_cific tags attached to the seats. The
problem of applying these t_ gs to the different seats being offered
and retrofitting them to olde" seats creates significant potential for
misuse. The introduction ofs lch a system would have to be carefully
controlled.
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7.4.8 Increased Protectiveness. During this assessment, the
evaluation of the capability of advanced technology to increase the
protectiveness of the occupant protection system was a secondary
priority to reduction of inflation-induced injuries. However, the
following observations can be made.
Depowered air bags will reduce the inflation-induced injuries for
small-statured and fragile adults. However, they may also reduce
the protectiveness of air bag systems for very large occupants and
occupants in high-severity crashes, but JPL had no data to assess this
premise quantitatively.
Effect of air bag suppression
Strategies used to reduce air-bag inflation-induced injuries include
suppression of air-bag deployment. Clearly, strategies used to reduce
air-bag inflation-induced injuries that result in the suppression of the
air bag leave occupants unprotected if they are unbelted. The
reduction in protectiveness resulting from these suppression strategies
was not evaluated by JPL.
Dual inflators offer the
protential for improved
protection
Technologies that are expected to be implemented in model year 2001
have the potential for increasing air bag protectiveness by providing
improved sensing that permits an improved air bag response. The
capability that sensors provide permits the use of dual-stage inflators
that will offer increased protection to large adults and occupants in
high-severity crashes when compared to depowered air bags. The
higher-level inflator stage offers that increased protection. Advanced
safety belts will provide increased protection by better coupling of
occupants to the vehicle (pretensioners) and reducing deceleration
loads (load limiters).
In model year 2003 protectiveness will be increased further by
refinements in the air bag response capabilities and additional safety
belt improvements.
Effect of system unreliability
System unreliability will result in unintended nondeployments and
occupants will be unprotected. Based on projected air bag installations
and expected 0.9999 to 0.99999 system reliability, the number of
unintended nondeployments will be in the tens per year. High system
reliability is achievable through diligent effort; the actual number of
unintended nondeployments will depend on the effort made to achieve
high reliability.
In an advanced restraint system the desired air bag system response
will be tailored to perceived occupant and crash attributes in an attempt
to enhance the safety and protection afforded by the air bag. However,
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Effect of complexity and crash
prediction
this more complex decision structure creates additional categories of
incorrect air bag system response, e.g., deployment may be desired
in a given crash and the air bag deploys, but deployment is tailored
to the wrong response state due to misperceived occupant/crash
attributes.
Crash attributes may be the most difficult to reliably perceive, since
they are necessarily a prediction of an extremely stochastic event
whose attributes are generated during the event. To the extent that
perceived occupant/crash attributes produce a different tailored
response from the true attributes, air bag safety and protection can be
adversely affected. Even ignoring economic issues, it is a major
challenge to create a crash prediction system that is sufficiently
accurate to be relied on for tailored air bag response.
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SECTION 8mADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT: NEEDS AND IMPLEMENTATION
Emphasis on benchmarking,
not R&D
Suppliers lead in technology
development
Need to set requirements
8.1 OCCUPANT CRASH PROTECTION RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
Research is a fundamental compehensive inquiry into the nature of a
subject, whereas development is a response to a problem or challenge.
Development also extends research findings into practice, often while
pursuing a particular approach, concept, or technology. The product
of research is knowledge, while the product of development is the
answer to a problem or need. Development sometimes raises
questions that can best be addressed by further research.
Benchmarking is a process of assessing or investigating the
performance of particular concepts, technologies, or designs that result
from a development program. JPL does not regard benchmarking as
either research or development.
NHTSA and the automobile manufacturers are conducting a number
of development activities pertaining to occupant crash protection.
However, they are not conducting significant basic research, except
in biomechanics. They are developing near-term responses to the
challenges presented by injuries being inflicted by current restraint
systems and are benchmarking existing and proposed technologies
to address these challenges.
OEMs are increasingly relying on suppliers to develop and propose
technological approaches for improved restraint systems. JPL found
that the bulk of development in occupant crash protection is conducted
by the supplier industry. In keeping with this trend, we found that
suppliers had most of the technical expertise in this field. Their
expertise has been built up within their companies as well as through
collaboration and joint ventures. The suppliers' capabilities were
not comprehensive, however; they rely, for example, on NHTSA and
the OEMs for biomechanical expertise.
Although suppliers are currently conducting the bulk of advanced
restraint technology development, their work can lack the technical
direction that comes from an overall systems perspective and that is
critical to finding robust solutions to the problems with air bags. An
incomplete understanding of a technological problem and
performance requirements at an early stage of development is likely
to lead to less than optimal performance from the developed
8-1
NIITSA, OEMs and suppliers
need to cooperate to develop
pepformance goals
technology. It can also mal, e the development process inefficient
and excessively time-consun rag.
JPL believes that this situation impedes the development of advanced
technologies for occupant crash protection. The challenge is to find
a way that NHTSA, the OEMs, and suppliers can work efficiently
together to define problems and determine complete and quantifiable
performance goals and reqqirements. The requirements would
provide the underpinning for improved and more comprehensive
research and development. We believe that this process is necessary
to produce robust occupant crash protection for new motor vehicles--
restraint systems that are safe and effective in the full spectrum of
automotive use and misuse.
The current governmental and private environment has not been
optimal for this process. The history of air bag development, attitudes
within both industry and government, and public concern about air
bag safety present a less than ideal climate for such a program. We
believe that it is critical to initiate a comprehensive research program
to answer basic questions underlying occupant crash protection. This
program should be coordinated between government and industry,
possibly along the lines of the Partnership for a New Generation of
Vehicles (PNGV). The results of this program should be in the public
domain to support optimal Jestraint system development. Well-
directed development programs, some of which may be proprietary,
are equally critical to ensure that the next generation of occupant
restraints will provide good l:rotection without introducing hazards
of their own.
8.2 DEVELOPMENT NEE DS
The concept that a public heal :h measure be safe and effective is well
established in medicine. It is less of a consideration in the field of
automotive transportation. Occupant restraints must provide
protection from the harm of _rash forces (effectiveness) while not
inflicting significant harm th,_mselves (safety). A restraint should
not exacerbate harm in a crasll where restraint protection is needed,
nor should a restraint cause h:_rm in minor crashes or in the absence
of crashes.
Technology development is
needed to provide a robust
system
Because of the very wide vari,,,ty of normal operating conditions and
of crashes of motor vehicles, z restraint system must be robust. That
is, it must be reasonably safe under the full spectrum of vehicle
operations and crashes while providing protection in the specific
subset of crashes for which it i'. intended. To the extent that a restraint
system causes or exacerbates injury, that performance may have to
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Deployment time elements
New bag designs merit
development effort
be accepted for a time as a reasonable cost of the greater protection
provided by the restraint. For example, people accept the risk of
bruises and possibly broken clavicles from safety belts in a crash as
a reasonable cost of their protection. Significant numbers of deaths
and serious injuries--particularly to children--are not generally
accepted.
As a consequent of our inquiry into air bag technology and
performance, we have been convinced that improvement in the
robustness of air bags is feasible. An orderly process would begin
with a comprehensive research and development program into the
challenge of occupant crash protection. In the current climate, which
is demanding immediate results, it is probably unrealistic to expect
such a program. It is critical, however, that the industry conduct
additional development and comprehensive testing to fully evaluate
new technological concepts. In this section, we outline what we
believe to be the critical developmental challenges.
8.2.1 Deployment Time. Minimizing deployment time is critical
to robust air bag performance. The time from the outset of a crash to
full inflation has three phases. The first and most critical is the time
to sense that a crash of sufficient severity is occurring. For most
crashes, this is 10 to 15 ms, but it can be substantially longer. The
second is the time to send a signal to the inflator and precipitate
ignition. This is only 2 to 3 ms and probably needs little further
attention, except for cold temperature effects. The third is the time
for actual bag inflation, which is typically 30 ms for current systems.
This time is not affected by the type of crash or other external factors
but may vary because of inconsistent performance among inflators.
Effective bag inflation time may be reduced by the introduction of
new bag designs, such as those that deploy radially or that use
compartments or variable venting. These designs may permit
occupant interaction in less than 30 ms and with smaller keep-out
zones.
For the near term, developers need to investigate the maximum time
available for air bag deployment before occupant injury (from the
bag or from the crash) becomes likely in a given vehicle for the
spectrum of crashes and determine the effect of applying advanced
air bag designs on the deployment time. For the longer term, it is
desirable to develop air bags and vehicle interiors that virtually
eliminate air bag inflation-induced injuries.
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The effectiveness of new
crash sensor algorithms
needs evaluation
Crash sensors predict cr_sh severity. Some current industry
development programs a'e aimed at improving crash sensor
algorithms. The effectiveness of these improvements will have to be
evaluated. Precrash sensing has the potential to reduce deployment
time. The discussion ofprecrash sensing in Sections 4 and 5 revealed
a number of unanswered questions about its applicability that need
to be addressed. Finally, what does the stochastic nature of the crash
environment tell us about the; limitations of crash severity prediction?
Occupant and proximity
sensors are key to reducing
air-bag-induced injuries
8.2.2 Occupant and Proximity Sensing. Our evaluation of
occupant and proximity sensing showed them to be key to reducing
air-bag-induced injuries. Current development programs do not
appear to be sufficient to support the introduction of either occupant
or dynamic proximity sensors by model year 2001. JPL believes that
accelerated development of these sensors is warranted.
Inflator variability must be
reduced
8.2.3 Control of Air Bag Inflation. Controllable air bag response
depends on having an inflator that can be staged. Staged inflators
have been developed (and were, in fact, part of the first commercially
produced air bags). Unfortunately, inflator variability may overwhelm
the capability to effectivelystage the systems. The current level of
inflator variability is unacceptable, in our view. Variability must be
addressed as part of the dev ._lopment of staged inflator systems.
Safety belts can and should be
improved; air belts should be
evaluated and provided as an
option
8.2.4 Safety Belt Systems. Advanced safety belt systems
development has not received the emphasis it deserves, possibly
because of the focus on air bag development. Pretensioners and load
limiters have been installed in a small number of mostly European
vehicles, and there are pl_ ns by various OEMs to expand their
installation. Advanced safety belt systems merit increased
development effort. The laJge majority of drivers in cars with air
bags wear safety belts, anc they deserve the benefit of improved
systems. The developmenl efforts should include alternative belt
designs, pretensioners, load limiters, and air belts. The possibility
that a system with advanc,,'d belt designs and air belts could be
designed to be more effecti_ e, and less injurious, than conventional
air bags with three-point be] ts should be investigated.
High reliability is required
8.2.5 System Reliabilit3. Based on our limited analysis of
reliability, we found that very high system reliability is required to
minimize the number of unintended deployments and
nondeployments where air i:ags could reduce occupant crash injury.
Even with the highest possible reliability these events will occur.
They could result in signific ant injury under certain circumstances.
Vehicle manufacturers and t[ eir suppliers must continue to make high
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Need for better real-world
crash data
NHTSA should expand NASS
reliability a high priority in design, manufacturing, and maintenance
programs.
8.3 DATA NEEDS
Our assessment found a paucity of publicly available data from which
to evaluate air bag system performance. Two types of data that are
critical to evaluation were lacking. First, there is a critical lack of
real-world crash data for vehicles with air bags from which to
determine the performance of air bag systems and to diagnose the
full nature and extent of inflation-induced injuries. Second, test
protocols for air bag systems available to JPL are inadequate to
evaluate the effectiveness and safety of these systems. The
consequence is that we lack adequate information on the performance
of systems currently being produced as well as on the performance
of advanced air bag technologies.
8.3.1 Real-World Crash Data. It was revealed early in this study
that insufficient data exist on real-world experience with air bags. In
particular, the existing crash data were insufficient to support an
engineering assessment of this technology. One of the principal uses
of a crash data base in an engineering analysis of restraint systems
might be to establish the important variables influencing injury under
diverse scenarios.
Malliaris, in a current effort for the AAMA [10], has shown that the
National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) data base cannot
support such a study at the detailed level required for a comprehensive
engineering analysis. In part, that is a consequence of NASS funding,
which is now much lower than originally planned to meet desired
coverage and precision levels. In a stratified sampling plan such as
NASS, sample size, and hence funding needed to run the system, are
derived from the coverage and precision requirements. Underfunding
results in an inability to use the database to answer the kinds of detailed
questions essential to guiding an engineering analysis.
We believe that only the federal government is capable of conducting
a comprehensive crash investigation and data collection program.
At minimum, NHTSA should expand NASS to its original size, with
full funding to conduct roughly 18,000 crash investigations annually.
However, since it has been nearly 20 years since NASS was originally
designed, JPL recommends that NHTSA revisit the question of how
NASS should be structured and what procedures it should use before
expanding it.
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The feasibility of crash
detection using recorders with
single-point sensing sholdd be
dete_wtined
Improved test protocols and
modeling are" required
We also recommend that data collection in at least a substantial subset
of cases in the Fatality Aaalysis Reporting System (FARS) be
expanded. The additional data should approach the
comprehensiveness of NASS cases.
Another source of real-world data may be available. The crash sensors
in most current production vehicles use some kind of single-point
accelerometer that lends itself to crash data recording. OEMs now
use these systems in fleet test programs and in some production
vehicles to evaluate air bag systems. If most new vehicles were fitted
with data recording devices from which key data could be obtained,
it would provide a very valuable source of data for analysis. This
could improve our understanding of real-world crashes and the
conditions for which air bag,_; must be designed. The development of
a low-cost crash recording device is technologically feasible, but the
institutional problems, such _s data collection, ownership, and privacy
would have to be resolved before such a program was initiated.
These recorders could serve other purposes also, such as emergency
rescues where their information could be combined with occupant
smart keys to provide critical crash and personal data to paramedics.
8.3.2 Test Protocols, Procedures, and Requirements Needs.
Further protocols and procedures for testing air bag systems need to
be developed that provide the assurance of air bag system robustness.
Statistical test methods can be and should be applied to develop test
matrices that provide an adequate picture of air bag performance.
Minimal data and modeling "equirements to support the engineering
analysis of restraint technoh,gy are:
° A comprehensive data base for establishing engineering
properties, variability, and reliability of restraint system
components.
. A comprehensive cr lsh test/simulation program capable of
supporting the evahLation of crash protection alternatives
relevant for the expo _ure of the population at risk.
. Consensus risk models (not necessarily simple parametric
curves) that translate physical parameters into bodily insult
for the population at risk.
Three fundamental questions are: (1) How should such test protocols
and procedures be developed? (2) What mechanisms should be
employed to make sure th _t these tests are used to ensure that
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production restraint systems are both safe and effective? and (3)
What provision should be made for dispensing the information to the
public? JPL believes that industry, government, and others with
interest and expertise in the subject can and should all contribute to
these activities.
Both the public and the automotive industry (OEMs and suppliers)
have a critical interest in ensuring that there is a broad consensus on
which tests are necessary to produce occupant restraint systems that
are safe and effective. They also have an interest in ensuring that
such tests are conducted on all systems provided for sale to the public
and that performance under these tests meets reasonable minimum
levels appropriate for public safety. We do not believe that a federal
regulatory program alone can achieve these ends, even with full public
participation in rule-making that is used for the development and
adoption of regulatory requirements.
While the basic requirements of FMVSS 208 are critical to ensuring
that new motor vehicles provide a minimum level of occupant crash
protection, we do not believe it is feasible to incorporate the full
spectrum or matrix of test requirements in that standard. Thus, a
program to supplement the requirements of FMVSS 208, which may
include a limited expanded test requirement, should be considered.
The mechanisms to be used would have to be acceptable to the
government and industry participants, and operate within their
regulatory and competitive environments. Organizations such as the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) and the American Society
for Testing and Materials (ASTM) could play key roles. They have
long and distinguished histories in the development of recommended
practices and technical standards of the type needed in this instance.
Note that a federal government standards acceleration program is
under way by the Intelligent Transportation System Joint Program
Office of the U.S. DOT. That program may be a model for this
recommended activity.
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SECTION 9_CONCLUSIONS
. The injuries and fatalities resulting from air bag deployments
are symptoms of underlying problems in designing air bags for
a broad spectrum of crash types and severities. Air bags are a
significant engineering design challenge because they deploy
rapidly and with great force toward an approaching occupant.
Their deployments are based on predictions of the crash severity
early in the event, where the crash environment is highly
variable. Also, air bag system response is variable.
. There is little evidence that air bag performance has been fully
characterized, i.e., that air bag capabilities and deficiencies are
fully known. Such capabilities and deficiencies are not available
in the open literature or from NHTSA. If any of the air bag
suppliers or OEMs have developed such a systematic
characterization, it was not made available to JPL when
requested.
. Air bags cause injury if an occupant is in close proximity to
them when they deploy. The region of high injury risk is defined
by a keep-out zone. As long as air bags are capable of causing
injury, there will be a keep-out zone. Injury risk will continue
until the keep-out zone is eliminated by technology or design,
or if the air bag is disabled when an occupant is within it. Of
course, if an air bag is disabled, it will not provide protection.
. The development of advanced restraint systems is influenced
by government regulatory requirements and industrial cost
issues. Because of the nature of the regulatory process and the
industrial technology implementation process, the resulting air
bag systems may not achieve optimum safety or be introduced
in the most timely way.
. Advanced technology can improve the safety of air bag systems
by providing (1) more information about the crash, and (2) a
better restraint response that is tailored to the individual
occupants. Improving air bag safety is an incremental process,
and implementation of advanced technology will be
evolutionary. The following improvements can be expected,
but data will be required to confirm the projection.
(The projections in paragraphs 5b and 5c are based on limited
contacts with a limited number of vehicle manufacturers and
suppliers. The state of the art of advanced air bag technologies
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is in a high state of fit x, and the technologies discussed in this
report, as well as others, may advance more or less rapidly than
indicated.)
a, At present, depowered air bags will greatly reduce the
air-bag-induced injury risk to normally seated, small-
statured drivers. Also, these air bags will reduce the "keep-
out" zone, where deploying air bags can injure out-of-
position front-seat occupants. Thus, fewer of these
occupants will be at severe risk. Remaining at risk of air-
bag-induced inj'ary are the front-seat occupants who are
still out of positron within the new keep-out zone as well
as children and infants in rear-facing child seats (RFCSs)
and forward-facing child seats (FFCSs) in the right front
passenger seat.
b, By model year 2001, advanced technologies such as
improved crash sensors, belt-use sensors, seat-position
sensors, automatic suppression, two-stage inflators,
compartmented air bags, pretensioners, and possibly seat
belt spool-out sensors and static proximity sensors will
be available. Compared to depowered air bags, the
application of advanced technologies in model year 2001
will further redt ce the size of the keep-out zone, which
in turn reduces :he risk to out-of-position (OOP) front-
seat occupants This reduction will be due to less
aggressive air b_g response--a result of improved air bag
design and dual inflators that provide more tailored
responses. The risks to belted front-seat occupants with
these second-geJ ,eration systems will be reduced not only
because of diminished air bag aggressivity, but also
because of an ncrease in the threshold velocity for
deployment, an zl improvements in belts. The risk to
unbelted front-seat occupants will be similarly reduced
by the changes in air bag performance. Despite these
improvements, s )me OOP occupants will remain at severe
risk from deplo5 ing air bags, as will children and infants
in RFCSs and FI _CSs in the right front passenger seat.
C° For model year 2003, more sophisticated integration of
proximity and occupant position sensors could be
incorporated. Tae system could then suppress inflation
when it has a l:igh likelihood of injuring a front-seat
occupant in the 1,eep-out zone and provide an appropriate
signal for multistage inflators. Further advances in belt
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and air bag design could be introduced in this time frame.
With these technologies, the only serious risk of air-bag-
induced injuries would come from the unreliability of the
system. System unreliabilities are expected to result in
tens to hundreds of unintended deployments per year.
These unintended deployments could have the potential
of causing a few injuries per year.
During this assessment, evaluating the capability of advanced
technology to increase the protectiveness of air bag systems
was a secondary priority. However, the following observations
can be made:
a. Depowered air bags may reduce the protectiveness of air
bag systems for very large occupants and occupants in
high-severity crashes, but JPL had no data to assess this
premise.
b. Strategies used to reduce air-bag-induced injuries include
suppression of the air bag deployment. Clearly, strategies
used to reduce air-bag-induced injuries that result in the
suppression of the air bag leave occupants unprotected if
they are unbelted.
Co Technologies that are expected to be implemented,
beginning in model year 2001, have the potential for
increasing air bag protectiveness by providing improved
sensing and improved air bag response. Sensors permit
the use of dual inflators that will offer increased protection
to large adults and occupants in high-severity crashes
when compared to depowered air bags.
The above expected improvements in safety and protectiveness
of air bags must be tempered by the understanding that there
are key technology development needs to be overcome, namely:
ao Air bag deployment time variability must be reduced by
improvements in the vehicle crush/crash sensor system.
b. Inflator variability must be reduced so that dual-stage
inflators can be applied effectively.
C. System and component reliability must receive diligent
attention to achieve the high levels required under field
conditions.
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d. Occupant sensor:; must be developed that can distinguish
with high accurtcy small, medium, and large adults;
children; and infant seats.
e. Position sensors to measure occupant proximity to the air
bag module with the required response time and accuracy
must be demonstrated.
All of the above are tile subject of current development, but
development, test, and integration of the advanced technologies
needs to be accelerated to enable its incorporation into
production vehicles.
. There are many generic capabilities within NASA that could
be applied to air bag development. These include sensors,
computing, control systems, neural networks, algorithm
development, microelectronics, simulations, propellants,
propulsion, and inflatable systems. NASA's systems analysis
and engineering capabilities could also be applied to a number
of problems such as assessing air bag performance, developing
a test program to evaluate effects of variability of critical
parameters on air bag performance, and applying defect
detection and preventk n methodologies to enhance reliability.
We identified some specific technologies that could be applied
to advanced air bags, iacluding two sensors that suppliers are
currently evaluating. These are a capacitive sensor for proximity
sensing and a stereoscopic vision system for proximity or
precrash sensing.
. Safety belts are the primary and most effective occupant restraint
system, and they are t sed by a large majority of occupants.
Safety and protection for belted occupants is likely to be
substantially enhanced if advanced air bag designs can be
predicated on the us,: of advanced safety belts, and not
compromised by acco:nmodation for protection of unbelted
occupants. The growin g use of safety belts may permit such a
design strategy.
10. When specific technolo ;y is mandated, the mandate can impede
the development of akexmtive, possibly superior, technologies.
Specific advanced rest'ant system technology should not be
mandated.
11. The application oftechr ology is often thought to be the solution
to today's problems. Tt is assessment concluded that advanced
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technologycanmakeair bagssaferandmoreprotective.These
air bagimprovementsareimportantandsignificant,andshould
be implemented.However,the improvementsthat will result
from advancedtechnologyapplicationsaresmallcomparedto
safetyimprovementsthat couldbeachievedthroughchanges
in driver behavior,suchasincreasedsafetybelt use,reduced
drunk driving and aggressive driving, which have been
documentedto bemajorcausesof crashes.
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SECTION 10mRECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations are directed to NHTSA and industry, including
actions that require their cooperation.
10.1 NHTSA
10.1.1 The Need for a Better Understanding of Restraint System
Performance. This assessment revealed activities that will require
further study. Also, data required to conduct important analyses were
not available to JPL. As a consequence, JPL recommends the activities
described below:
(1) Continue restraint system assessment, with emphasis on restraint
protection, and include consideration of costs and benefits.
(2) Evaluate and quantify, to the extent possible, the benefits of the
application of advanced technology to improve safety and
protection of restraint systems with respect to injury risk of the
full spectrum of occupants in the full range of crash severities
experienced by the public. The benefits, costs and risks of
advanced technology should be investigated and understood
with respect to injury to head, neck, chest, and other body
regions across the full range of occupant categories and crash
severities.
(3) Expand the assessment of advanced technology to crashes other
than the frontal crashes that were the focus of this assessment.
(4) Develop a systematic vehicle test protocol that (a) incorporates
measurements for comprehensive injury risk evaluation (head,
neck, chest, etc.) for the 5th-percentile female, 50th-percentile
male, and 95th-percentile male drivers as well as the full
spectrum of passengers, and (b) includes crash severities
representative of the full range of "real-world" collisions.
(5) Evaluate the impact on air bag performance of deployment time
variability, inflator variability and system and component
reliability for any advanced technology. Again, the full range
of occupant size and crash severity that represent use by the
general public must be considered.
10.1.2 The Need for Better Real-World Data. The
recommendations that follow result from the deficiencies of the real-
world data that are available for diagnosis of safety problems or the
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support of safety engineerillg analyses. These data were insufficient
for use in this assessment. Efforts should be undertaken to:
(6) Expand the National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) and
revisit the question cf how it should be structured and what
procedures should be used to provide data needed for safety
diagnosis and engineering analysis.
(7) Study the feasibility of installing and obtaining crash data for
safety analyses from crash recorders on vehicles. Crash
recorders exist already on some vehicles with electronic air bag
sensors, but the data recorded are determined by the OEMs.
These recorders coLld be the basis for an evolving data-
recording capability that could be expanded to serve other
purposes, such as in emergency rescues, where their information
could be combined with occupant smart keys to provide critical
crash and personal data to paramedics. The questions of data
ownership and data protection would have to be resolved,
however. Where data ownership concerns arise, consultation
with experts in the aviation community regarding the use of
aircraft flight recorder data is recommended.
10.1.3 The Need for a Better Understanding of the Future
Potential of Technology. NHTSA is routinely briefed by suppliers
and OEMs on the development of advanced technology and conducts
independent evaluations o' important advanced technologies. We
therefore recommend that __'HTSA:
(8) Evaluate specific technologies that have promise of significant
safety benefit, such as:
Precrash sensors--both seperately and coupled with the
crash-avoidance sensors now being investigated--which
could provide im proved crash type and severity sensing
Advanced belt s',stems and air belts that could improve
protection, but have been neglected because of the
emphasis on air tags
Air bag/inflator c esigns that could eliminate the keep-out
zone and the info "mation (sensors) required to support the
functioning of th,' design
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10.2 ThE NEED FOR CONTINUED ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT BY INDUSTRY
It is industry's responsibility to provide safe and protective vehicle
restraint systems, and to develop the technology to provide these
systems. We recommend that industry:
(9) Continue diligent efforts to implement the advanced
technologies that have been shown to JPL, because those
technologies will make restraint systems safer and more
protective.
(10) Reduce the deployment time and inflator mass flow variabilities;
otherwise these variabilities will have detrimental effects on
advanced air bag system effectiveness.
(11) Continue diligent efforts to increase restraint system reliability.
10.3 NHTSA/INDuSTRY COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
(12) Develop quantitative goals for safer and more protective
restraint systems that address air-bag-induced injuries and
protection in high-severity crashes.
(13) Continue to develop and refine biomechanical injury criteria
for restraint systems using the best science available.
(14) Develop protocols and procedures for testing air bag systems
to ensure air bag system robustness.
(15) Inform the public of the specific risks associated with each
vehicle air bag, e.g., by providing the keep-out zone dimensions,
and recommend ways to mitigate the risk.
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APPENDIX A--ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED
APPENDIX A--ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED
The following is a list of the organizations that were in contact with JPL.
A.1 ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS (OEMs)
American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
American Suzuki Motor Corporation
Chrysler Corporation
Ford Motor Company
General Motors Corporation
Mercedes-Benz of North America
Nissan North America, Inc.
A.2 COMPONENT SUPPLIERS
Ad Astram Technologies, Inc.
Advanced Safety Concepts, Inc.
AirBe|t Systems
Allied Signal Corporation
ASD Simula
AutoLiv Corporation
Automotive Systems Laboratory, Inc./Takata
Automotive Technologies Intemational, Inc.
Breed Technologies, Inc.
Computer Application Systems, Inc.
Delco Electronics, Inc.
Delphi Automotive Systems
Header Products, Inc.
Hittite Microwave Corporation
Johnson Controls, Inc.
Mentor Technologies, Inc.
Morton International (Autoliv)
Narricot Industries, Inc.
NEC Technologies, Inc.
Petri, Inc.
Precision Fabrics Group, Inc.
Robert Bosch Corporation
TRW
Universal Propulsion Company, Inc./Talley Industries
William Lear Corporation
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A.3
A.4
ASSOCIATIONS
AAMA
AIAM
Farmers Insurance Co.
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
USCAR
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
NASA Centers
NHTSA
Sandia National Laboratories
Transport Canada
Volpe Transportation Systems Center
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APPENDIX B--QUESTIONNAIRE
APPENDIX B--ADVANCED AIR BAG TECHNOLOGY SURVEY
QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire has been developed to apply to all aspects of occupant protection. Select and
respond only to those questions relevant to your technology. Provide test data where possible.
Specific answers to the questions are requested; see the example attached. If answers to the questions
do not provide all the relevant information about your technology, please provide additional
information. If information is proprietary, JPL can protect it and can sign nondisclosure agreements.
It is requested that all questionnaires be returned no later than September 5, 1997. Please return the
questionnaire to:
Robert L. Phen
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
4800 Oak Grove Drive
Pasadena, CA 91109
Fax: (818) 354-8453
Email: robert.l.phen@jpl.nasa.gov
For questions call: (818) 354-3453
A. TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIER INFORMATION
Company Name
Address
Point of Contact
Phone/Fax
E-Mail
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Co
Check
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY TYPE
your technology development areas.
Precrash sensors
Crash severity sensors
Sensing diagnostic modules/Crash detection algorithms
Occupant type sensors
Occupant proximity/motion sensors
Computational systems/algorithms
Inflators
Air bags
Seat belt systems
Other primary restraint systems
Systems integration
a. Diagnostics (status) sensors
b. Other system integration sensors (define)
c. System integration computational systems/algorithms
d. Data communications/transfer
12. Other (define)
TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTIONS AND PERFORMANCE
For each technology checked above, please provide the following data.
1. Precrash sensors
a. Description of system
b. Method for obstacle detection
- Describe sensing method
- Describe determination method/algorithm
c. Detectivity
- Define ability to measure obstacle (type and size) at various ranges/closing
speeds
- Define response time, ranging resol ation/accuracy, obstacle size threshold
d. Reliability - Describe
- Failure modes
- False positives/total number of trials not involving a significant obstacle
- False negatives/total number of trials involving a significant obstacle
e. Description of other performance metri cs/other performance data
f. Test methodologies
g. Output format (high-level identification, low-level data for external data
acquisition systems, etc.)
h. Systems requirements for implementati on in vehicle
i. Expected production costs
j. Current state of readiness
- R&D
- Developmental testing with OEM
- Fleet testing
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k. Model year in which system would be ready for introduction.
Crash severity sensors
a. Description of sensor
b. Description of sensor placement in vehicle
c. Discrimination time and variability in discrimination time for the following
tests (Feel free to quote vehicle specific times/variabilities)
- 30-mph rigid fixed barrier (RFB)
- 30-mph offset deformable barrier (ODB)
- 35-mph+ RFB/ODB
- AAMA sled pulse (if possible for sensor system)
- 20-mph RFB/ODB
- Minimum crash leading to air bag deployment
d. Description of algorithms, if applicable
e. Reliability - Describe
- Failure modes
- No deploy decisions/total number of trials deployable event
- Deploy decisions/total number of trials involving nondeployable events
f. Systems requirements for implementation in vehicle
g. Expected production cost
h. Current state of readiness
- R&D
- Development testing with OEM
- Fleet testing
i. Model year in which system would be ready for introduction
Sensing diagnostic modules/crash detection algorithms
a. Operational requirements of hardware and/or software
b. Hardware overview
c. Software overview
d. Specific fault-tolerance/fault-detection features
e. System processing time (update rate)
f. Reliability
- Failure rates across large sample (define failure specification)
Test methodology
Describe data outputs to other vehicle systems
Describe data inputs to system
Systems requirements for implementation into vehicle
Expected production cost
Current state of readiness
- R&D
- Development testing with OEM
- Fleet testing
m. Model year in which system would be ready for introduction
o
h.
i.
j.
k.
I.
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1 Occupant type sensors.
For each separate occupant type detectior system, please address the following
applicable occupant types when providing the performance information.
- Rear-facing infant seat
- Front-facing child seat
- Child passenger
- Adult passenger
- Adult driver
- Occupant size/weight
- Empty passenger seat
- Inanimate object in passenger seal
a. Detection principle
b. Ability to detect/distinguish occupant types
c. Detection accuracy and repeatability
d. Reliability
- Current failure modes/confounding data
- False positives/total number of trials not involving that type of occupant
- False negatives/total number of trials involving that occupant
e. Methods to correct current problems; expected future performance
f. Description of other performance metrics/other performance data
g. Output format (high-level identification, low-level data for external data
acquisition system, etc.)
Systems requirements for implementation in vehicle
Current state of readiness
- R&D
- Development testing with OEM
- Fleet testing
Model year in which system would be ready for introduction
h.
i.
j.
Occupant proximity/motion sensors.
For each separate sensor, please answer the following questions.
a. Sensor type/detection principle
b. Dimensionality (1-D range, 2-D, 3-D)
c. Sensor location (IP headliner, seat, va:iable, etc.)
d. Detection point(s) of occupant (surface or internal, point or curve, etc.)
e. Speed/accuracy
- Response time (e.g., response to 1/e for step input) for each measured
direction
- Measurement resolution/accuracy for that response time (for variable
response time systems, variability of resolution/accuracy with response
time)
- Testing method
f. Description of other performance metrics/other performance data
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g. Reliability
- Estimated variability of response time, resolution accuracy specifications
across a large sample
- Estimated failure rate across large sample (define failure specification)
h. Output format (analog time series, digital time series, high-level indication,
etc.)
i. Systems requirements for implementation into vehicle
j. Expected production cost
k. Current state of readiness
- R&D
- Development testing with OEM
- Fleet testing
1. Model year in which system would be ready for introduction
Computational systems/algorithms.
For each system please address all of the points in section C.3 of this questionnaire
Inflators
a. Design description
- type of propellant
- composition of evolved gases
- temperature of evolved gases
- time delay from inflator signal to full flow from inflator
- mass flow rate versus time profile (show alternative for 2 + stage inflators)
- duration of inflator operation
b. Unique features of the design
c. Performance variability of the design
- unit-to-unit variability in rise rate
- unit-to-unit variability in pressure level
- unit-to-unit variability in flow rate
- temperature sensitivity
- element of the design that is responsible for the variability
d. Reliability
- failure modes
- failure rate across a large sample (design failure specification)
e. Current state of readiness
- R&D
- development testing with OEM
- fleeting testing
f. Expected unit production cost
g. Model year in which system would be ready for introduction
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10.
Air bags
a. Design description
- bag material
- porosity of material (venting capa _ility)
- fold pattern
- tether design
- bag volume, bag depth, bag surface area
- vent area
b. Unique features of the design
c. Reliability
- failure mode
- failure rate across a large sample (define failure specification)
d. Current state of readiness
- R&D
- development testing with OEM
- fleet testing
e. Expected production cost
f. Model year in which system would be ready for introduction
Seat belt systems
a. Design description
- webbing material and design
- attachment points for belts
- retractor design
- pretensioner (force levels, adjustability, response time).
- load limiter (load, adjustability, re:;ponse time)
- automated operation?
- status sensor systems?
b. Unique features of the design
c. Reliability
- failure mode
- failure rate across a large sample (define failure specification)
d. Current state of readiness
- R&D
- development testing with OEM
- fleet testing
e. Expected unit production cost
f. Model year in which system would be ready for introduction
Other primary restraint systems
a. Design descriptions
b. Unique features of the design
c. Current state of readiness
- R&D
- development testing with OEM
- fleet testing
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11.
12.
d°
e.
What is the expected unit production cost
Model year in which system would be ready for introduction
Systems integration (e.g.,
communications/transfer)
a.
b.
C.
d.
e°
f.
g.
h.
diagnostics, computational systems/data
Description of technology
Operations performed by technology
Unique features of technology relative to that in current systems
Performance (define performance metrics, and quantify system
performance)
Reliability (estimate variations in performance and failure rates across a large
sample)
Systems requirements for implementation into vehicle
Expected performance costs
Current state of readiness
- R&D
- development testing with OEM's
- fleet testing
Model year in which technology would be ready for introduction
Other
Describe salient features of the technology
SAMPLE RESPONSE (FIcrITIOVS)
A. TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIER INFORMATION
Bo
Company Name:
Address:
Crash Prediction Inc. (CPI)
Detroit, MI
Point of Contact: James C. Maxwell
Phone/FAX (810) 333-3333/444-4444
Email delcrossB@CPI.com
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY TYPE
Co
XXX. 1. Precrash sensing
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTION AND PERFORMANCE
a° The CPI precrash sensor is a two-antenna, radar system operating at 35 GHz. The
right and left fender-mounted antennas allow for two separate ranging measurements
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relative to each antenna at an update rate of 100 Hz. The far-field pattern of the two
antennas overlap at a distance of 50 m, pro,, iding a near real-time indication of radar
cross-section at a point 50 m in front o7" the vehicle. The system detects the
instantaneous range of metallic/dielectric objects relative to both antennas. The
sensing area is approximately 10m 2 (5 x 2 m centered with respect to the vehicles
longitudinal axis and the top of the hood). The two independent antennas provide
both redundancy and limited lateral resolution. The radar cross-section (determined
by the amplitude of returned signals) allows for a determination of obstacle size.
The radar signals are processed by a radar processing unit (RPU) integrated with
each antenna. The RPU's output real-time range and size information. The range
information from each antenna is combined and processed by a central data processing
unit (CDPU) located in the occupant compartment. The CDPU outputs information
on instantaneous range, closing velocity, and exact size to any of a number of air
bag electronic control modules (ECM) currently used on vehicles. The sensor is
capable of providing a reliable warning of an impending crash, as much as 5 seconds
prior to collision.
b. The CPI system uses transmission and reception of multiple mm-wavelength pulses.
The pulses reflect off of objects in the field of view of the antennas. The round trip
time of the pulses provides an accurate measure of range. The echo pulse amplitude
provides an accurate measure of obstacle size and mass. The range information is
differentiated to provide closing speed. The pulse amplitude information is similarly
differentiated to allow estimation of the spatial distribution of the obstacle outside
of the current field of view.
C° The CPI system can detect metallic objects as small as 1 m 2, with a signal-to-noise
ratio of 10:1, at an update rate of 100 Hz. "l'he ranging resolution at this bandwidth
is better than 1 ram. The accuracy is under 2 mm. The calculated closing speed
resolution and accuracy are 0.1 m/s and 0.2 m/s, respectively.
d. The total system reliability for the CPI sen_, ing system is:
10 false positive signals of 3 m 2 or arger obstacle per 1 million trials not
involving an obstacle.
• 1 false negative signal in the presence of such an obstacle per 1 million trials
The reliability/unreliability is evenly dislribul ed among the three subsystems (antenna,
RPU and CDPU)
e. CPI has defined an additional performance metric that relates sensor response to
effective, relative permittivity of the obstazle. For a 1 m 2 obstacle with 100-Hz
response time, the resolution accuracy vs re lative permittivity are:
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f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
Relative perm. Resolution/accuracy
10 0.1 m/0.2 m
20 0.05 m/0.1 m
50 1 mm/2 mm
CPI tests its system only in stock vehicles on actual roads. The system response is
logged, and the data is attached to a real-time stereo video record. The radar data is
correlated with the video data off-line.
The output format from the CDPU is an RS-488 message of time, range, closing
velocity, and obstacle size.
The radar antennas must be mounted on the exterior of each front fender. A 4- wire
cable is routed from the CDPU (in the occupant compartment) to each antenna.
The estimated production cost will be $100.
The CPI radar is in extended fleet testing with two American auto makers.
The system will be ready for implementation in 1999 MY cars.
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APPENDIX C_PROXIMITY SENSING
Appendix CmProximity Sensing
C.1 USE OF PROXIMITY SENSORS
Proximity sensing has been proposed as a key component for an advanced air bag system designed
to eliminate the inflation-induced injury (I 3) problem. In its simplest form, the proximity sensor
would be used to indicate that an occupant is dangerously close to an air bag module at the time a
deployment decision is made. In this case the proximity sensor would provide data to a decision-
making algorithm which, after weighing a number of factors, would control air bag deployment.
Depending upon the form of the future air bag inflation system (single-stage, dual or multi-stage,
continuously variable, etc.), the detection of an occupant in close proximity to an air bag module is
generally expected to lead either to the deployment of an air bag at low inflation levels or to total
suppression of the air bag. The proximity sensor might provide simple one-dimensional range
information, i.e., scalar range between some portion of the occupant and the instrument panel (IP).
However, more powerful techniques for two and three-dimensional ranging of multiple body points
have been developed for proximity sensing applications.
The application of a proximity sensor has led to the concept of a "keep-out zone," which defines a
dangerous zone around an air bag module when the air bag is deploying. Present concepts for
advanced air bag systems use this zone in the following manner:
• If inside this zone at the air bag deployment decision time, then either suppress the air bag or
fire a depowered inflation stage.
• If outside this zone at the air bag deployment decision time, then, depending upon the status of
other sensors, deploy the air bag.
At present, the deployment decision time is set by a crash severity sensing system which consists of
one or more inertial sensors/switches in conjunction with a decision-making algorithm.
The earliest use of proximity sensors could be in a quasistatic mode, in which the sensor is used to
suppress (or reduce) the air bag in response to a static out-of-position (OOP) occupant. Static OOP
means that the occupant is within the keep-out zone for a length of time greater than or equal to the
nominal crash pulse duration (on the order of 125 ms). Simply stated, an occupant that is "planted"
within the keep-out zone for a time comparable to 125 ms will modulate (suppress or reduce) the
air bag deployment. Consistent with this static application, many concepts for low-speed proximity
sensing (response times 0.1 to 1 s) have been advanced. Often other information can be provided
on this time scale, and technologies are under development that promise detection of, for example,
occupant type (adult, small passenger/child, child seat, inanimate object), occupant size/mass, and
occupant state (e.g., driver drowsiness).
As expected, applications for high-speed, dynamic proximity sensing have been envisioned. The
physical process related to proximity sensing (ranging) would allow measurements to be made at
ms or sub-ms rates with reasonable accuracy (absolute position determination) and resolution
(minimum resolvable position difference).
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Repeatabilityandreliability arekeyquestions.Industryvie_es using dynamic proximity information
to improve the performance of advanced air bags by opti nizing the restraint system for a wider
range of occupant positions (more than just static OOP) an, 1 crash scenarios. In the ultimate case, a
near real-time determination of occupant position with lespect to in-cabin hazards may be an
improvement over the current approach for crash sensing, in which the expected occupant motion
is inferred from limited information related to the type and severity of the crash. This approach has
been proposed by a number of groups.
From the following analysis, it can be seen that the extension from static sensing to dynamic proximity
sensing carries with it some fundamental problems, particularly with unrestrained occupants.
Specifically, dynamic proximity sensing applications cause enlargement of the keep-out zone and
increased air bag suppression.
C.2 DYNAMIC OOP SENSING: ANALYSIS OF OCCUPANT KINEMATICS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROXIMITY SENSING
The analysis of occupant kinematics is intended to be simple. From this simple analysis, however,
the criticality of certain parameters can be identified, and an understanding of the physics of the
problem can be gained.
C.2.1 Occupant Kinematics in AAMA Crash Pulse Sequence. It is assumed, as stated by the
industry, that the AAMA vehicle crash pulse (17.2 g peak, 125 ms half-sine deceleration) is indicative
of a large number of frontal crashes. The crash pulse is shown in Figure C-1. This pulse is designed
for sled testing of safety systems with no relative displacement, or crushing, of any vehicle structures.
It is also assumed that the occupant compartment, and specifically the instrument panel (IP) will be
decelerated according to this pulse. The position of the IP is of particular interest as this is the point
at (or near) which the passenger-side air bag is anchored. II the case of the driver, the deceleration
of the steering column is of interest, as this is where the driver-side air bag is attached. The IP will
be the reference in the following analysis, but the steering column could be substituted just as
easily. This is an important point in that recent statistics (Traffic Safety Facts 1995) show that the
numbers for driver fatalities and injuries are roughly twice as large as those for passengers.
Consideration of driver kinematics, therefore, is probably more important. It is assumed that the
occupant is unbelted or "unrestrained."
Both the occupant and IP are assumed to be traveling at 48 km/h (30 mph) at the start of the crash
(at time t--0). For reference, 48 km/h (30 mph) is the integrated AV contained in the AAMA pulse.
This pulse will decelerate the vehicle to zero velocity in 125 ms.
During the crash, the occupant (i.e., its center of mass) ccntinues forward at 48 km/h (30 mph)
while the IP is decelerated. This leads to a relative velocity and displacement of the occupant with
respect to the IP. In this simple analysis, the occupant is treated as a simple point mass, neglecting
obvious details related to the motion of specific body parts t e.g., head, legs, etc.) around the center
of mass. The point of interest on the occupant can be defined as a point which is translated from the
center of mass to a more relevant location (e.g., the surface of the chest). In this case, the kinematic
calculations simply chart the motion of the chest surface w_th respect to the IF'. Figure C-2 shows
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Figure C-1. AAMA Sled Pulse (17.1 g, 125 ms)
the closing velocity of the occupant with respect to the IP vs. time. Figure C-3 shows the relative
displacement of the occupant with initial separations of both 30 cm (12 in.) and 60 cm (24 in.) from
the IP, vs. time.
C.2.2 Application of Proximity Sensing to the Unrestrained-Occupant Scenario. It is assumed
that the air bag deployment time will be determined with a crash sensor placed somewhere in the
vehicle. For the generic sled test (with no structural deformation), the air bag deployment time has
been fixed to 20 ms after the sled reaches an acceleration of 0.5 g. For the AAMA pulse, the air bag
deployment time i s approximately 21.2 ms. This is a relatively short time, only slightly longer than
deployment times for more severe crashes [e.g., 48-km/h (30-mph), rigid frontal barrier crash]
according to data that we have received.
Because 21.2 ms is a shorter discrimination time than may be found in some crashes, it is important
to consider longer discrimination times (up to 40 ms). The analysis then concentrates on a range of
discrimination times between 21.2 and 40 ms. Figure C-4 shows the velocity of the IP vs. time for
the AAMA crash pulse. The early and late decision times are noted on this graph, along with the
times corresponding to full bag deployment. The vehicle velocity change for each of the
discrimination times is listed. For a 21.2 ms time, the vehicle has only slowed by 3.4 km/h (2.1
mph). Using this range of deployment decision times, the unbelted occupant position relative to the
IP can be calculated at both the decision time and the time of full bag deployment. It is assumed that
the bag is significantly filled at 30 ms after the deployment decision. By significantly filled, it is
assumed that it has been inflated enough to fill a volume extending 15 cm (6 in.) from the IP. The
15 cm distance is not meant to reflect the performance of any real world air bag system. It is chosen
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only for the purposes of this discussion. Although the bag is not fully deployed at this time, the 15
cm (6 in.) distance is chosen as the edge of the keep-out zone, reflecting the observation that occupants
interacting with a deploying air bag within this zone are at risk of inflation-induced injury 03). This
assumption is consistent with the general understanding of the 13phenomenon presently held by the
industry. In truth, the generic 30 ms time attributed to the bag deployment process is smaller when
the bag's leading edge is only 15 cm from the IP. As will be apparent in the simulation data shown
below, a small reduction in fill time will not greatly affect the conclusions that can be made. Using
these assumptions, it is required in this study that the unrestrained occupant not enter this zone
during (or before) the end of the 30-ms inflation time.
C.2.3 Analysis of Simple Keep-Out Zone. Figure C-5 shows the relative position of an occupant
with respect to the IP for three initial distances 24 cm (9.3 in.), 36 cm (14.1 in.), and 60 cm (24 in.).
A number of points can be made.
Figure C-5 reflects the current air bag situation (crash sensor determination of deployment time,
with no proximity sensor). Two rectangles span the range of times, respectively, for deployment
decision and corresponding "bag full," for deployment times between 21.2 and 40 ms. With an
early deployment, most occupants all starting farther than 24 cm (9.3 in.) from the IP would remain
outside of the keep-out zone during deployment. This is the intended early deployment scenario to
protect unbelted occupants. Some number of occupants might be temporarily out of position (e.g.,
leaning forward) at a distance inside of 24 cm from the IP. It is well understood that these OOP
cases could lead to harm.
c-5
0.6
0.5
0.4
E 0.3
Q.)
o 0.2
t-
0.1
n 0.0
13_
Z -o.I
Q)
o_ -0.2
o -0.3
09
o_ -0.4
13_
-0.5
-0.6
60 cm (24") Initiar
Distance
36 cm (14.1 ") Initial
Distance
23 cm (9.3") Initial
Distance
.....................................
,...................... ° .............
21.2 to 40 ms
Decision Time
5_cm (6_)_Keep-Out-Zone
..,__Hds IP
\ "
I [ I i I I _ I i I i I i I
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14
Time (s)
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For later deployments (e.g., 40 ms decision time) larger initial separations are required to remain
outside of the 15 cm (6 in.) zone during deployment. An i.aitial distance greater than 36 cm (14.1
in.) is required. This is fairly large, especially for drivers relative to the steering column. Based
upon known seating positions, a significant total number of small drivers would be at serious risk in
these late deployment events.
Most small drivers and all occupants with initial separations greater than 19 cm (7.6 in.) would be
outside of the keep-out zone at the latest deployment decision time. For the early decision time
(21.2 ms), all occupants outside of 16 cm (6.2 in.) would b_ outside of the 15 cm Keep-out zone at
the deployment decision time. In these cases, a deployrrent decision based upon the occupant
position relative to the 15 cm (6 in.) zone at the decision tim_., would cause the air bag to be deployed,
even though the motion of close-seated occupants, during the bag fill time, would cause them to
enter the keep-out zone prior to full bag deployment and b _ subject to injury.
This analysis indicates that a simple deployment decision 9ased upon a 15 cm (6 in.) zone would
not prevent occupants from being in the zone during depl,_yment, making them susceptible to 13.
Later deployment clearly increases the problem. Assuming that a significant number of occupants
fall within these ranges under "normal" conditions it is cor eluded that these occupants are both at
risk with the present systems that have no proximity sensor:',, and would not be helped significantly
with a proximity sensor, using a simple 15 cm (6 in.) keep-out zone.
C.2.4 Analysis of Separate Decision Zone. One possible solution worth considering is to define
a separate, second keep-out zone that relates to the occupaI_t's position at the deployment decision
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time. This new zone ("decision zone") would necessarily be behind the 15 cm (6 in.) danger zone
and closer to the occupant's initial position. The position of the zone boundary can be chosen so
that the forward trajectory of the occupant after the deployment decision carries him or her just to
the edge of the true danger zone [15 cm (6 in.) assumed keep-out zone] at the bag-full time. This
new zone would function in the same manner as the single keep-out zone described above:
• If inside the decision zone, then suppress or fire a lower-level bag.
° If outside the decision zone, then deploy.
The position of the decision zone boundary depends upon the deployment threshold. Figures C-6
and C-7 show both the trajectory and the zonal boundary positions for an unrestrained occupant
during the typical 48 km/h (30 mph), AAMA crash pulse for 21.2 ms and 40 ms discrimination
times, respectively. The graphs show the required initial separation of the occupant center of mass
from the IP, in order to be just at the edge of the 15 cm (6 in.) zone at full deployment time. As stated
above, the required separations are large, particularly for temporarily OOP situations. An important
point is that the position of the decision zone boundaries [23 cm (9.1 in.) and 31.5 cm (12.4 in.),
respectively] is very close to the assumed initial position of the occupant. In the case of an early
deployment threshold, the difference between the initial position and the decision zone boundary is
so small (0.2 in.) that the air bag will be (and should be!) shut offand on continuously, even with
only very minor (as is typical) occupant motions.
To summarize: constructing an appropriate decision zone will in theory solve the major problem
associated with a single 15 cm (6 in.) keep-out zone -- occupant penetration during the time of bag
deployment. However, the required position for the decision zone boundary and the required initial
position of the occupant are significantly farther back than the 15 cm (6 in.) keep-out zone boundary.
A large number of occupants (small-stature drivers, particularly) will be in a position to deactivate
the bag. Based upon the earlier analysis, it is reiterated that the bag should be deactivated in these
cases, as these unrestrained occupants would enter the danger zone and be harmed by the deploying
air bag.
One concept for reducing the frequency of low-speed 13 episodes is to increase the deployment
thresholds (effectively to higher velocity). The kinematic analysis shows, for a given initial position,
the unrestrained occupants will be in greater danger as they will have had more time to move
forward during the air bag deployment phase prior to full deployment. This is consistent with the
concept discussed above (refer to Figure C-7). It is also consistent with the analysis of several
groups that advocate never deploying an air bag past a certain time in the crash sequence. In contrast,
the use of crash sensors/algorithms, to provide earlier deployment, would improve the dynamic
performance of a proximity sensor.
In conclusion, proximity sensing with a single keep-out zone sh utoff boundary is problematical if
this boundary coincides with the edge of the danger zone in front of the air bag. Occupants that
begin outside of the zone at deployment, may move into the zone during the 30-ms bag fill time.
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Establishing a second, larger decision zone is one solution. The size of this decision zone depends
strongly upon the crash discrimination time, and may be larger than the initial separation of many
passengers from the IP (or steering column). Because of this, a proximity sensor-based system may
ultimately suppress the air bag in a large number of cases. A secondary conclusion from the kinematic
analysis is that in current air bag-equipped vehicles (withoutproximity sensors), a large number
of unrestrained occupants may be encountering deploying air bags in higher speed crashes.
Those occupants closest to the IP are at the greatest risk. Current air bag systems are likely to be
causing injury in some of these cases. This, however, has not received the same public scrutiny as
P episodes related to lower speed crashes. What remains to be understood (and is outside the scope
of this analysis) is the marginal benefit of air bag deployment in these dynamic OOP situations.
That is, is it better to encounter an expanding air bag in these dynamic OOP situations or to have no
air bag at all?
These analyses are overly simplified. For example, a one-dimensional analysis of a keep-out zone
neglects the fact that occupant kinematics and occupant-air bag interactions are really complicated
three-dimensional problems in the real world. A detailed analysis would need to incorporate three-
dimensional proximity sensing with a thorough understanding of the spatial dependence of a keep-
out-zone for a real system. Similarly, the expected variability within a given system would have to
be understood and accounted for in the analysis.
C.2.5 Dynamic Proximity Sensor Performance Requirements. Some of the issues associated
with the use of dynamic proximity information have been conveyed above. Most of the problem
appears to be unrelated to the proximity sensor itself. In addition to the effects of finite bag deployment
time, there are also issues of variability in the performance of other system components (e.g., air
bag inflators). Not only do these factors complicate analysis, but their effects may dominate the
performance of the entire system including the proximity sensor. Putting these issues aside, some
estimates for performance requirements related to proximity sensors can be derived. The focus is
on four critical parameter specifications: resolution/accuracy, reliability, response time, and full-
scale range. The focus on unbelted occupants is a major driver for some of these specifications.
Specifically, it demands faster response times and larger full-scale ranges, as both the relative
velocity and the free-flight distances are larger for the unrestrained occupant.
C.2.5.1 Resolution/Accuracy. Resolution/accuracy refers to the minimum detectable position
change and the absolute error associated with the measurement of occupant position. For proximity
sensors used in a keep-out algorithm, accurate detection of position relative to the IP (or steering
wheel) will be crucial, as the keep-out zone is defined with respect to this reference point. The
required accuracy (yet to be determined) should be specified as an absolute total system error, dx,
defined as
dx = Xsystem output - Xactual
where Xsystem output refers to the occupant position as measured by the proximity sensor system and
x ctua_is the true position of the occupant. Note that dx can be positive or negative. It is quite likely
that some applications will be able to tolerate larger systemic errors that are of one sign (indicating
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thattheoccupants,arecloserthantheyreallyare,for example),thanthose of the opposite sign. It is
important to note that resolution and accuracy may be strong functions of response time.
C.2.5.2 Reliability. See Section 4.3 and Appendix D for more information.
C.2.5.3 Speed/Response Time. Response time requirements for proximity sensors can be calculated
only parametrically, at present. That is, if we assume a given error limit for proximity reported by
the sensor, dx, then the required response time, t, is
t=dx/v
OCC
where Vo_c is the occupant velocity with respect to the proximity sensor.
A finite response time leads to an error related to the motion of the occupant during this time
interval. If we state the maximum tolerable position error, then we can calculate a maximum tolerable
response time for the sensor. It is important to note that the response time may be dominated by any
one (or some or all) of a number of factors, including the following:
• inherent analog sensor response time
• digital sampling rate
• latency in digital computation system
• digital output rate to other systems.
Therefore, the inherent response time of the analog sensor _t the front-end of the proximity sensor
signal chain may or may not dominate the overall respon,e time. Also, discrete sampling theory
tells us that for a critically sampled (i.e., nonaliased) analog sensor, contributions to the response
times from digital sources (sampling/output rate, computer latency) are indistinguishable from
those of the analog sensor. All sources may contribute, ant all must be considered.
Refer to Figure C-2, which shows Voc vs. time for the case o 'an unrestrained occupant experiencing
a typical crash pulse. At the decision times for air bag del:loyment (21.2 ms to 40 ms for early to
late deployment, as described above), the relative unrestrai:led occupant velocity ranges from 0.93
ms (93 crn/s) to 6.22 ms (310 cm/s). (It is just equal to the instantaneous change in velocity of the
IP.) The required response time for a proximity sensor, ther_ fore, ranges from 10.7 ms to 3.2 ms per
cm of allowed error. Once again, the required measurem,'nt accuracy is somewhat unknown at
present. It involves details of the occupant/air bag interactk.n and a thorough examination of injury
criteria. In many dynamic cases, these numbers indicate that _ast response will be important. Because
of this, it is important to note that the relationship betweel response time and position error may
dominate the sensor's inherent resolution/accuracy in a dyJtamic measurement.
C.2.5.4 Full-Scale Range. This specification refers to the need for the proximity sensor to have a
large enough measurement range. It must be able to sens: occupant motion at some maximum
distance, in order to measure occupant penetration into a dec sion zone. As stated above, the decision
zone must be larger than 31.5 cm (12.4 in.) for an unrestr;tined occupant with a late deployment
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thresholdin a standardAAMA crashscenario.The ability to sensetheoccupantat evenlarger
distances(i.e.,thosecorrespondingto the initial positionof a largeadult)wouldbe important.
C.3 QUASI-STATICPROXIMITY SENSING
This analysis turns from the potential difficulties associated with the use of dynamic proximity
information, to the specific application of static proximity sensing. Here, the intention is to disable
(or modulate) air bag inflation in response to a quasistatic OOP situation. By quasistatic, reference
is made to a situation in which the OOP occupant is in a danger zone for a relatively large amount
of time prior to the beginning of the crash. This larger residence time distinguishes the quasistatic
situation from the dynamic scenario above. The same evaluation criteria can be used as with the
dynamic problem. That is, proximity sensor system specifications for resolution/accuracy, reliability,
response time, and full-scale range are also important in this application. The requirements for the
first two (resolution/accuracy and reliability) in the quasistatic application are similar to those for
the dynamic one. The one potential benefit of longer integration times is the reduction of random
noise in the system. This can improve both resolution and accuracy.
The requirements for the sensor system response time and the full-scale range are modified
significantly. Regarding response time, it can be assumed that based upon the conclusions regarding
dynamic proximity sensing, the sensor should not shut off the air bag for an initially in-position,
unrestrained occupant. Clearly, this is an arguable assumption. In other words, the proximity sensor
should have no effect on the dynamic performance of the current air bag system. The static proximity
sensor is to be used only to modulate air bag deployment for an occupant who has a large residence
time in an initially defined danger zone. In order to achieve this, the sensor must not respond too
quickly. Specifically, the response time, t, must be larger than the time interval between the start of
the crash and the deployment decision time (21 to 40 ms for the AAMA pulse). Faster response
times would allow the air bag to be shut off in some dynamic scenarios involving initially in-
position occupants. This should be avoided. In some situations, it is desirable that there be a
maximum response time. That is, the quasi-static detection system should be able to detect slow
motion of an occupant into or out of the danger zone prior to the beginning of the crash. The
alternative, namely determining occupant position only at vehicle start-up, for instance, would not
be as useful. These two requirements (no dynamic air bag modulation and ability to detect slow
motion of an occupant), therefore, bound the response time
t <t<t
mln max
where
tmin _ 21 to 40 ms, determined by the desire NOT to affect dynamic performance
and
tmax is chosen low enough to detect occupant-initiated motion into and out of a danger zone.
Estimates for tma x in the range of 0.2 to 2 s seem appropriate.
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The full-scale range for a quasi-static proximity sensor can b,_ smaller than used for dynamic sensing,
as the intent is to measure only occupant intrusion into a sir aller danger zone (nominally 15 cm, as
stated above). Sensor systems placed in or near the inst_ment panel would have smaller range
requirements in the quasi-static applications. For sensors mottnted in the seat back or certain positions
of the headliner (as has been proposed by some groups), the range requirements may not be
significantly reduced, as the sensor location may be far from the zonal boundary.
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Appendix D--Air Bag Deployment Reliability
Air bag subsystem mechanical reliabilities are critical parameters that need to be investigated. It is
also important to consider the functional reliability of the air bag system since air bag failures,
either failure to deploy or inappropriate deployment, could lead to serious injuries. The following
analysis is a preliminary investigation of subsystem mechanical reliability requirements and how
such requirements in conjunction with changes in air bag technology affect the functional reliability
of the air bag system.
N l = intended deployments
N 2 = unintended deployments
N 3 = unintended nondeployments
N = Nj + N 2 = observed number of deployments
N I = _jVo,
N 2 : (1-_)N
where _ is the fraction of intended deployments with respect to the total deployments.
System Deployment Functional Reliability is given by
N1 N2+N3
=1-
NI + N2 + N3
=1-
N1 +N2+N3
(1-_.)Xo + N3
No + N3
But the convolution of subsystem mechanical reliabilities measures
N1 N3
-1
N1 +N3 N1 +N3
N3
=1
_JVo + N3
Only when there are no unintended deployments (i.e., _, = 1) are these the same. Subsystem
performance or a deployment decision algorithm that allows an arbitrary number of unintended
deployments will always permit meeting a goal of minimal unintended nondeployments.
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If it is assumedthatair bagdeploymentsubsystemsareenr;ineeredto meetperformancestandards
underthemostsevereenvironmentalandcrashseveritycoaditions,thenit is reasonableto assume
statisticalindependencewhenconvolvingsubsystemmechmicalreliability intosystemmechanical
reliability. Supposetherearefour subsystems(e.g.,crashsensor,controlsystem,inflator, andair
bag)withmechanicalperformancereliabilities1-or,;i = 1,. .... ,4. Then, system mechanical reliability
is given by
4
1-I(1- i)
i=1
A subsystem mechanical reliability requirement can be defined in terms of an average subsystem
mechanical reliability, l-a, where
4
i=1
For 1994 N O-- 62 x 103, and there were about 23 x 106 driver-side air bags and 5 x 106 passenger-
side air bags. Assuming the driver/passenger air bag deployment ratio is the same as the driver/
passenger installed air bag ratio the convolution of subsystem mechanical performance reliability
for driver-side air bags is given by
4
The analogous System Deployment Functional Reliabili:y, RFD , the probability of an intended
deployment, is given by
RFD = 1-
/23/28)( 2×10 )+N3
The trade-off between minimizing the number of uninten_Led nondeployments and increasing the
number of unintended deployments is illustrated in the fol owing two tables.
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N 3 = 1 _ ot RMO RFD
0.5 9.8 x 10.6 0.99996 0.49999
0.9 5.5 x 10 -6 0.99998 0.89998
0.99 5.0 x 10.6 0.99998 0.98998
1.0 4.9 x 10.6 0.99998 0.99998
N 3 = 10 _ ot RMD RFD
0.5 9.8 x 104 0.99961 0.49990
0.9 5.45 x 10.5 0.99978 0.89982
0.99 5.0 x 10.5 0.99980 0.98981
1.0 4.9 x 10 s 0.99980 0.99980
If N 3 is specificed as an absolute standard then the growth in air bag installments will lead to
increased subsystem mechanical reliability requirements. If, however, N 3 is specified as a small
fraction of observed deployments then, if deployments are approximately proportional to installments,
the mechanical reliability requirements will be unchanged.
For fixed subsystem mechanical reliabilities it is also possible to consider how changes in the
number of deployments affect the number of unintended nondeployments as a function of the fraction
of unintended deployments. Let r be the fraction of driver side deployments.
4
1 N3 _ H(l_o_i )
_.rNo + N3 i=1
N3 _ i=14
i=!
Future work should assess the relevance of the reliability requirements in terms of current and
future air bag systems. If future systems add capability, they will become more complex, and
subsystem mechanical reliability requirements will increase. The implications of this should be
explored.
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APPENDIX E--HUMAN INJURY RISK CRITERIA
E.1 BACKGROUND
Biomechanical data collected in the past provide the distributions of injury risk to occupants in
vehicle collisions. This information is vital to the development of criteria for evaluating automotive
restraint systems. In 1984, General Motors Corporation published a set of Injury Assessment
Reference Values (IARVs) [ 1] for assessing injury severity associated with the various biomechanical
response measurements of the Hybrid III, 50th-percentile adult male dummy. Qualitatively, IARVs
were to refer "to a human response level, below which a specified significant injury is considered
unlikely to occur for an individual." Development of the risk curves is an evolutionary process with
a foundation in earlier efforts to define risk boundaries, i.e., IARVs. IARVs have been supplemented
by the injury risk curves shown in Figures E-1 through E-9. These curves were developed by Mertz
[14] to express risk of human injury as a function of Hybrid III dummy response.
The Hybrid III 50th-percentile male dummy was developed by General Motors [I,13] to address
the biofidelity and measurement deficiencies of the Hybrid II dummy. This dummy was designed
to approximate the size, shape, and mass of the 50th-percentile adult male. The dummy's skeleton
is composed primarily of metal parts; a vinyl skin and foam covers the structure to give the desired
external human shape. The Hybrid III responses mimic human responses in head acceleration for
forehead and side-of-the-head impacts, neck flexion and extension, and chest force-deflection for
blunt and distributed sternal impacts; Hybrid III knee response can be calibrated with respect to
human knee impact response.
In 1987, Ohio State University(OSU) initiated development ofa muitisized Hybrid III-based dummy
family. Based on the anthropometry of the U.S. adult population, body-segment lengths and weights
were selected for an adult-size large male (Hybrid II! 95th-percentile Male) dummy and an adult-
size small female (Hybrid III 5th-percentile Female) dummy. The various child and infant dummies
were developed by GM, an SAE task force, and OSU to identit) the injury potential associated with
the interaction of the deploying cushion and child and rearward facing infants. Summaries of the
standard instrumentation for the Hybrid III dummies are given by Mertz [ 19].
Human injury is usually characterized according to the Abbreviated Injury Scale shown in Table
E-1 [24]. In the AIS system, injury is classified by severity on a numerical scale from one to six. A
description of severity and probability of fatality are shown in Table E-1. Injury risk curves for
head injury are presented in Figures E-1 and E-2, for thoracic injury in Figures E-3, E-4, E-5, and
E-6, and for neck injury in Figures E-7, E-8, and E-9. All risk curves are based on normally distributed
risk criteria, the justification being grounded in the approximate normality of human sizes and
tissue strengths.
E.2 THORACIC INJURY RISK
The test criteria for assessing thoracic injury risk are chest compression, V'C, and the rate of
thoracic compression [24]. Chest compression (sternal deflection) of the Hybrid III dummies is the
most meaningful parameter for injury assessment for blunt thoracic impact. Peak chest deflection
E-I
is measured in the midsagittal phme and indicates the chan_;e in distance between the sternum and
spinal column. The compression deflection is measured b1 a central rotary potentiometer in the
Hybrid III dummy.
Figure E-3 is a plot of the risk of AIS 3+ thoracic injury due to shoulder belt loading vs. Hybrid III
midsize male sternal deflection. Figure E-4 is a plot of the ri,,k of AIS 3+ andAIS 4+ thoracic injury
due to distributed loading (air bag) vs. normalized sternal deflection. Figure E-5 is a plot of the risk
of AIS 3+ thoracic injury vs. maximum rate of thoracic compression as measured on Hybrid III
3 yr., 6 yr., small female, midsize male, and large male du2nmies. Figure E-6 is a plot of AIS 4+
thoracic injury risk vs. the "viscous criterion," V*C.
Lau and Viano [10] discuss the history of the use of various criteria for predicting thoracic injury:
the acceleration criterion, the force criterion, and the compression criterion. That discussion describes
the capabilities and limitations of various injury criteria in adequately predicting thoracic injury
severity at a level threatening occupant survival, and they provide a foundation for the introduction
of the viscous criterion.
The acceleration criterion is based on a measure of spinal acceleration. Since the human torso is not
a rigid mass, such a measure cannot account for the causal role of body deformation in thorax
injury experience. At best, such a criterion could predict the severity of skeletal injury. However,
the empirical evidence available suggests that a model adequately explaining observation might
look like Figure E- 13. A, B, and C refer to risk curves corresponding to different impact conditions,
so that a single parametric curve cannot adequately explain skeletal injury risk. A given spinal
acceleration produces different risk levels depending on the impact condition or, equivalently, the
same risk corresponds to different levels of spinal accelerati 3n depending on the impact condition.
Spinal acceleration is therefore considered to be an inferio indicator of life-threatening thoracic
injury compared to the criteria given above.
In the following discussion some specific model specification and estimation issues will be addressed
with respect to the thoracic injury risk curves, based on an a :celeration criterion generated in [22].
With regard to model specification, there are three major issues: (1) restriction of the estimated
model to a linear response surface in logit space, (2) the use of age as an explanatory variable, and
(3) the appropriateness of a fixed parameter model. It is not possible to account for interaction
effects without using a higher-order response surface. Even with a single explanatory variable,
such as the use of HIC for head injury risk, the data may sugtr, est a nonlinear response surface, such
as was presented by NHTSA in [22] in their extension of th ,_Prasad-Mertz curves for head injury
risk. In [22] age is introduced as a linear explanatory variable i a Iogit space. However, an examination
of the data base used to estimate the parametric model reveals hat to be an inappropriate specification
and the resulting statistical significance of age as an explar atory variable to be an artifact of the
disparity between the specification and the data used. Fron the specimen data base, for subjects
under the age of 40, AIS -- 0 regardless of the spinal accelerw ion value, and for subjects over 40 the
AIS level is only weakly correlated with age. Evans, in [4], provides evidence that fatality risk from
similar physical insults is correlated with both age and gender. So there might be some expectation
that this would also be true when severe thoracic injury is under consideration. Unfortunately, the
E-2
databaseusedto estimatethe risk curvesin questiondoesnot supportthat expectation.A final
modelspecificationcriticism relatesto the previousobservationthat no single fixed-parameter
injury modelbasedonspinalaccelerationcanexplainrisk level independentof impactconditions.
With regardto modelestimationissues,thetwo major interconnected concerns are as follows: (1)
that the thoracic injury risk curves presented in [22] do not completely account for the possibility
that the injury risk distribution for the population of specimens in the data base may not be the same
as that of the population at risk and (2) that there is a logical flaw in the creation of the risk curves
called "age-independent" curves. Given that the estimated risk curves depend on both spinal
acceleration and age, translating the age distribution from the distribution for specimens to the
distribution of the population at risk was carried out. However, it may still be the case that a bias
remains due to increased injury susceptibility of specimens compared to the population at risk. To
a first-order approximation, the creation of age-independent curves amounts to replacing the
explanatory variable, age, in the logistic curves by the average age of the population at risk. The
frequency distribution of age in frontal impacts from NASS data yields an average age of
approximately 32.7. Thus the age-independent curves approximately correspond to fixing age in
the estimated logistic curves at a level within a range where the specimen data does not support the
hypothesized age effect.
It may well be that injury risk should be dependent on age (and gender), and it is certainly desirable
to adjust for differences in age (and gender) distributions between those of specimens and the
population at risk. But that cannot be accomplished in a quantitatively meaningful way by ignoring
the conflict between hypothesis and evidence.
The AIS 3 + chest injury risk curves developed by NHTSA and presented in [22], Tables II-6 and
II-7, are reproduced in Figures E-14 and E-I 5. The risk curve labeled "Air Bag Restraints" was
developed for unbelted occupants and the risk curve labeled "Belt Restraints" was developed for
belted occupants. Our conclusion, as a result of the considerations described above, is that chest
(spinal) acceleration has limited ability to predict chest injury and that the specific curves embed
several technical flaws. Therefore, we consider that injury risk values derived from these curves for
a given crash event have little credibility.
E.3 NECK INJURY RISK
The neck injury criteria are based on the measurements of flexion bending moment (Nm), extension
bending moment (Nm), axial tension (N), axial compression, and fore/aft shear (N).
Figure E-7 is a plot of the risk of AIS 3+ neck injury vs. normalized neck tension, where normalization
constants are provided for the Hybrid III 3 yr., 6 yr., small female, midsize male, and large male
dummies, as well as the CRABI (Child Restraint Air-Bag Interaction) 6, 12, and 18 dummies.
Figure E-8 is a plot of the risk of AIS 3+ neck injury vs. normalized extension moment. Again,
normalization constants are provided for all the Hybrid III and CRABI dummies mentioned for
Figure E-7. The risk of AIS 3+ neck injury vs. combined normalized neck tension and extension
moment is shown in Figure E-9. Paired normalization constants are provided for all the Hybrid III
and CRABI dummies mentioned for Figure E-8.
E-3
The JPLassessmentutilizes neck injury risk curves.The neckinjury risk curvesdevelopedby
Mertzetal. [14],whichareveryrecent,aretheonlycomprel_ensivesetof neckinjuryrisk curvesof
which we areaware.There exist force-duration envelopes [1,13] constructed for the purpose of
deriving neck protection reference values but those are not il tjury risk curves, the results of analysis
using the neck injury risk curves should be consistent wi:h the specifications derived for neck
protection reference values from those force-duration envelopes.
E.4 HEAD INJURY CRITERION (HIC)
The Head Injury Criterion (HIC) has been used for over 20 years as a predictor of head injury risk
in frontal impacts. References [18, 27 through 30] summarize the evolution of HIC, issues affecting
its performance as a predictor, and the need to limit HIC duration.
Viano [27] describes the historical roots of HIC in tests i avolving direct head impact. In early
application to unrestrained occupant_;, HIC duration was implicitly limited by the unbelted status of
the occupants. As belt use increased, the lack of an explicit duration constraint became important
since the belt use itself increased HIC by increasing duration, but decreased risk by reducing the
chance of head impact. Both Viano [27] and Mertz et al. [18] provide support for limiting HIC
duration to 15 ms in accordance with the implicit limit in the early tests used to justify real-world
relevance for HIC as a measure of head injury risk.
A 15-ms HIC duration limit was also recommended in the NHTSA report [11 ], research supported
by the NHTSA Office of Crashworthiness Research. Quoting from [11], "The best choice for a
head trauma assessment criterion would appear to be the HIC method, but with a limit on the time
interval over which it is calculated. This limit is important because the biomechanical basis for the
HIC method is direct head impact. Thus, we recommend a Value of HIC = 1000, for (t, - t_) _< 15
ms."
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 uses 36-ms HIC values. This results in overstating
head injury risk for restrained occupants. The HIC criterion is defined by
1 ,, ]2 s × ('2-,.)
where a is a resultant head acceleration and t, - t_ < 15 ms fo_ 15-ms HIC. Figure E-1 is a plot of the
risk of AIS 4+ Brain Injury vs. HIC for the adult population. Figure E-2 is a plot of the risk of Skull
Fracture vs. Peak Head Acceleration for the adult populatio I.
Skull fracture risk curves based on HIC have also been developed by Hertz [5]. Those curves are
depicted in Figure E-12 together with the skull fracture risk curve of Mertz from [18]. Mertz et al.
in [ 18] provided a succinct critique of the Hertz curves, illusm ting their lack of real-world credibility.
The following discussion repeats and expands on that.
The objective in developing head injury risk curves based on HIC is to find the threshold distribution
of injury. However, all cadaver specimen data is necessarily censored so that only failure/nonfailure
response to experienced HIC levels is available. The Hertz n Lethod was to assume three alternative
E-4
functional forms--normal, 2-parameter Weibull, and 2-parameter lognormal--and to estimate
distributional parameters using the maximum likelihood method with an embedded algorithm which
attempts to account for the effects of censoring. The ability of any censoring algorithm to correct
for the effects of censoring is dependent on whether assumptions embedded in the algorithm match
the censoring pattern of the data. The existence of a censoring algorithm does not guarantee that it
will produce credible results for a given data set. If estimated curves fail sanity checks, that is
indicative that the algorithm in question is not robust with respect to the censoring pattern of the
data used. The Hertz method does not take into account that the threshold failure distribution of the
specimens is not the same as that of the population at risk. As mentioned previously, the approximate
normality of human sizes and tissue strengths provides a heuristic justification for the expectation
that injury threshold distributions incorporate such knowledge into the specification of distributional
functional form. It is unclear if any justification beyond ease of computation and conservatism for
lower HIC values can be advanced to support the choice of 2-parameter Weibull or lognormal
fOI'ITIS.
The Mertz/Weber estimation method is described compactly in [ 18]. This method has its foundation
in a nonparametric estimation method for uncensored data. It accommodates the fact that all data is
censored. The accuracy of this method (or any alternative) depends on correctly specifying
distributional functional form and obtaining reasonable estimates for the failure threshold of the
weakest and strongest specimens in the sample. In contrast with the Hertz method, the failure
distribution of the specimens does not have to match the failure threshold distribution of the
population at risk.
Referring to Figure E-12, the most direct comparison of the Hertz curves with that of Mertz is for
the normal distribution. That is the only one of Hertz's curves which is not constrained to pass
through zero. If the failure threshold distribution is approximately normal, the probability of values
below HIC = 0 must be negligible. That is so for the estimated normal curve of Mertz, but the
estimated normal curve of Hertz yields the noncredible result that the probability of skull fracture
when HIC = 0 is 10%. That result shows that the estimation method's censoring algorithm does not
produce sensible results for this data set. In particular, it overstates the underlying variance of the
failure threshold distribution. That is obscured by fitting Weibull and lognormal forms with the
curves constrained to pass through zero. However, for the data base in Reference [18] the seven
lowest values of HIC experienced correspond to nonfailures. Mertz's curve yields the likelihood of
such an occurrence as approximately 94%, whereas Hertz's normal and lognormal curves produce
corresponding likelihoods of approximately 24% and 53%, lending support to the suspicion raised
by the normal curve estimate, that the failure threshold probability is overstated for lower values of
HIC in the Hertz curves. A procedure for examining the robustness of the censoring algorithm for
Weibull or lognormal forms characterizing the failure threshold distribution using the specimen
data base would be to estimate 3-parameter forms to see if the estimated location parameters are
significantly different from zero.
Figure E-16 is a plot of the AIS > 4 Head Injury Risk Curve developed by Mertz et al., reproduced
from Figure E- l, the corresponding NHTSA lognormal risk curve, reconstructed from Table II-2 in
[22], and the NHTSA lognormal fatality risk curve given in Table II-2 of [22]. Although the NHTSA
lognormal risk curve for life-threatening head injury as a function of HIC lies below the Mertz
E-5
curve, theassessedrisk in a givencrashtestmaybehiglkerbasedon thelognormalcurvesince
NHTSA uses36-msHIC to assessrisk whileMertz uses15-msHIC.
If HIC is to beusedasanunbiased risk criterion for head i ajury, it is our conclusion that the Mertz
head injury curves are the most appropriate of those available and that 15-ms HIC must be used to
preserve the biomechanicai rationale for the use of HIC.
E.5 APPLICATION Or INJURY RISK CURVES
As the development of injury risk curves evolves and additic;nal experimental evidence is introduced,
the estimation of the absolute level of risk associated with a risk criterion will change. However, in
the use of these curves for the JPL injury assessment process to evaluate the effects of technological
changes from a baseline, our measures will be the relative change in risk levels. Such measures will
not be significantly affected by other than radical changes in the injury risk curves themselves.
Table E-1. Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) and Percent Fatality Associated with AIS Levels
AIS Severity Fatality Range (%)
1 Minor 0.0
2 Moderate 0.1-0.4
3 Serious 0.8-2.1
4 Severe 7.9-10.6
5 Critical 53.1-58.4
6 Maximum Injury >58
(Virtually Unsurvivabk )
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Position 1
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Figure E-10. Out-of-Position (OOP) Placement in Driver's Seat for 5% Female Hybrid III for Static
Air Bag Deployment Tests
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Figure E-11.
' Plane 1--)
Point A
Out-of-Position (OOP) Placement for Six-Year-Old Child Hybrid III Dummy for Static
Air Bag Deployment Tests
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APPENDIX F--INJURY RISK TEST AND SIMULATION DATA
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APPENDIX G---ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
APPENDIX G---ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AAMA
AIAM
AIS
ARC
ATD
CRABI
Caltech
DOB
FARS
FFCS
FFIS
FFRDC
FMVSS
FY
G
GSFC
IAA
IARV
IP
IR
HIC
JPL
JSC
km/h
kPa
LaRC
American Automobile Manufacturers Association
Association of International Automotive Manufacturers
Abbreviated Injury Scale
Ames Research Center
Anthropomorphic Test Device (crash test dummy)
Child Restraint Aig Bag Interaction
California Institute of Technology
Deformable Offset Barrier
Fatal Analysis Reporting System
Forward-Facing Child Seat
Forward-Facing Infant Seat
Federally Funded Research and Development Center
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
Fiscal Year
Acceleration of Gravity
Goddard Space Flight Center
Interagency Agreement
Injury Assessment Reference Value
Inflation-Induced Injury
Instrument Panel
Infrared
Head Injury Criteria
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
kilometers per hour
kiloPascals
Langley Research Center
G-1
LED
LeRC
LOVA
MAIS
mph
MSFC
ms, msec
MVSRAC
NASA
NASS
NHTSA
OEM
OOP
OSRP
PNGV
psi
RFB
RFCS
RFIS
SAE
USCAR
VRTC
WBS
AV
V*C
5%F
50%M
95%M
Light-Emitting Diode
Lewis Research Center
low vulnerability
Maximum Injury for AIS
miles per hour
Marshal Space Flight Center
milliseconds
Motor Vehicle Safety Research Advisory Committee
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Automotive Sampling System
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Original Equipment Manufacturer
Out-Of-Position
Occupant Safety Restrain Partnership (US(,AR)
Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicies
pounds per square inch
Rigid Fixed Barrier
Rear-Facing Child Seat
Rear-Facing Infant Seat
Society for Automotive Engineers
United States Counsil for Automobile Rese arch
Vehicle Research Test Center (NHTSA)
Work Breakdown Structure
delta V
Viscous Coefficient
5'h-Percentile Female (Dummy)
50 'h -Percentile Male (Dummy)
95 'h -Percentile Male (Dummy)
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ADDENDUM
NHTSA COMMENTS TO THE JPL ADVANCED AIR BAG
ASSESSMENT REPORT
ADDENDUM
NHTSA COMMENTS
TO THE JPL ADVANCED AIR BAG ASSESSMENT REPORT
Prior to publication of this report, an agreement was made by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) that NHTSA would provide an insert to the final report that summarizes
NHTSA's response and comments to the report. The attached document contains the agency response.
The document first provides a summary table which contains the agency response to the 15 JPL
recommendations contained in the final report. The document also contains overall comments to
the final report including the characterization of human injury risks.
NHTSA: The Need for a Bette Understanding of
Restraint System Performance
2A
2B
JPL Recommendation NHTSA Response
Continued restraint system
assessment, with emphasis on
restraint protection, and
include consideration of costs
and benefits.
Evaluate and quantify to the
extent possible the benefits of
the application of advanced
technology to improve safety
and protection of restraint
systems with respect to injury
risk of the full spectrum of
occupants in the full range of
crash severities experienced
by the public.
The benefits, costs and risks
of advanced technology
should be investigated and
understood with respecl to
injury to head, neck, chest,
and other body regions across
the full range of occupant
categories and crash
severities.
Assessment of restraint systems has been underway in
NHTSA through _he agency's Special Crash
Investigations, NCSA's semi-annual reports to
Congress on occt pant protection, Crash Injury
Research and Engineering Network case studies, and
research program_ initiated specifically for evaluating
restraint systems (such as safety belts, integrated
seats, advanced air bags). These efforts will continue.
NHTSA agrees tl-at the benefits need to be evaluated.
Safety benefits from the application of advanced
technology are being evaluated through research and
quantified consistent with agency practice through the
agency's Office ef Plans & Policy. Research
programs, which xovide data for the benefits
analysis, are bein; conducted for a number of
occupant sizes an :! a variety of crash severities.
The agency develops measures to gauge a range of
injuries. For the Jarious sized adult and child
dummies utilized in the agency's crash tests of
varying severity, :he head, neck, and chest are three of
the most importaltt body regions generally evaluated,
and will continue to be such, at least in the
foreseeable future. It is the role of the agency to
show feasibility c f advanced technology and to assess
the incremental b, merits of selected advanced
technologies. It i; the role of manufacturers to test
every advanced technology device that may be offered
by them.
NHTSA: The Need for a Better Understanding of
Restraint System Performance (cont'd.)
4
JPL Recommendation NHTSA Response
Expand the assessment of
advanced technology to crashes
other than frontal crashes that
were the focus of this assessment.
Develop a systematic vehicle test
protocol that (a) incorporates
measurements for comprehensive
injury risk evaluation (head, neck,
chest, etc.) for the 5th-percentile
female, 50th-percentile male, and
95th-percentile male drivers as
well as the full spectrum of
passengers, and (b) includes crash
severities representative of the full
range of "real world" collisions.
Evaluate the impact on air bag
performance of deployment time
variability, inflator variability and
system and component reliability
for any advanced technology.
Again, the full range of occupant
size and crash severity that
represent use by the general public
must be considered.
NHTSA agrees that in the future expanded
assessments are warranted within the context of
overall priorities and resources. In addition to
expanding frontal crash conditions to include
evaluation of performance in collinear and
oblique offset impacts, research has been
underway in NHTSA to evaluate system
performance in other crash modes such as side
impacts and in rollovers.
NHTSA agrees that the test protocols should be
expanded. The agency has long recognized this
need and efforts have been initiated to include
dummies representing the population at large,
and toward including test procedures that cover
the wide spectrum of crashes that occur in the
real world. However a complete evaluation of
every scenario requires enormous resources. To
the extent possible, the agency conducts
evaluations of a variety of crash conditions.
NHTSA establishes minimum overall system
performance in its safety standards.
Manufacturers are responsible for vehicle system
reliability. To the extent that it is shown that
there is inherent variability that can not be
limited, this may be taken into account in setting
standards. Assessment of systems on various
occupant sizes in different crash severities is
expected to be part of future evaluations.
NHTSA: The Need for Better Real-World Data
JPL Recommendation NHTSA Response
6
7
Expand the National
Automotive Sampling System
(NASS), and revisit the
question of how it should be
structured and what
procedures should be used to
provide data needed for
safety diagnosis and
engineering analysis.
Study the feasibility of
installing and obtaining crash
data for safety analyses from
crash recorders on vehicles.
NHTSA generally agrees. NHTSA has included in its
Strategic Execution Plan, Goal 4C to improve NHTSA's
timely use and analy:;is of available data; and regularly
reevaluate data needs, how they are being met, and how
future data collection can be improved. In FY 1998,
NHTSA plans to initiate a review of the FARS, NASS
GES and NASS CDS to provide an assessment of these
systems and identify practical improvements to current
and potential crash dtta collection procedures, techniques,
and policies. We are also working toward uniform data
sets for the FARS and NASS programs with comparable
data elements where applicable. The NASS program
converted from papel data collection to electronic data
collection in January 1997 with an Oracle relational
database as the framework and penbased laptops and
digital cameras for documenting data in the field. This is
expected to make mcre detailed, accurate and useful data
available for safety dLagnosis and engineering analysis in
a more timely manner.
NHTSA agrees that this may warrant reconsideration in
the context of the agency's overall priorities. The agency
considered this issue during the mid 1970's and concluded
that it was not feasib e because of cost and privacy issues.
From a technological perspective, the current situation
may allow data from crash recorders coupled with
existing data systems to provide more detailed field data.
NHTSA has formed .t committee to investigate the
possibilities of using crash information collected in the
vehicle in safety rese trch. The committee plans to focus
on understanding the operation of current event data
recorder (EDR) syste ns, their technical limitations, and
what crash informatk,n is currently available. The
committee will consider developing technical
requirements and gui, telines that would establish criteria
for the next generaticn of EDR's.
4
NHTSA: The Need for a Better Understanding of the
Future Potential of Technology
8
8A
8B
8C
JPL Recommendation NHTSA Response
Evaluate specific
technologies that have
promise of significant safety
benefit, such as:
Precrash sensors--both
separately and coupled with
the crash-avoidance sensors
now being investigated--
which could provide
improved crash type and
severity sensing.
Advanced belt systems and
air belts that could improve
protection, but have been
neglected because of the
emphasis on air bags.
Air bag/inflator designs that
could eliminate the keep-out
zone and the information
(sensors) required to support
the functioning of the design.
NHTSA agrees that the enhancement of precrash
sensors is important. The agency has already done
assessment work in this area and we plan to undertake
further work. Equipment suppliers and manufacturers
should play a lead role in development.
NHTSA had introduced air belts in its Chrysler/Calspan
Research Safety Vehicle (RSV) in 1978 and found them
to be effective in our tests. Belt systems are very
effective when used and used properly. We believe that
performance is enhanced when coupled with
pretensioners, integrated systems, etc. Equipment
suppliers and manufacturers should play a lead role in
development. The agency has expended considerable
effort to expand safety belt usage and is assessing
improvements, in part in the context of safer air bag
systems.
NHTSA agrees technologies have been identified.
Technologies need to be developed and refined to
eliminate "false" positives or negatives (shut offs when
systems are actually needed or systems being on when
not needed). Equipment suppliers and manufacturers
should play a lead role in development.
Industry: The Need for Continued
Development
Advanced Technology
9
10
11
JPL Recommendation
Continuediligenteffortto
implementtheadvanced
technologiesthathavebeen
showntoJPL,becausethose
technologieswillmake
restraintsystemsaferand
moreprotective.
Reducethedeploymenttime
andinflatormassflow
variabilities;otherwisethese
variabilitieswillhave
detrimentaleffectson
advancedairbagsystem
effectiveness.
Continuediligenteffortsto
increaserestraintsystem
reliability.
NHTSAResponse
NHTSAagreestha-implementationfadvanced
technologieswillleadto agreatersafetybenefitforthe
rangeofoccupantsizesovertherangeofcrash
severities.However,NHTSArecognizesthatthisis
theresponsibilityofmanufacturerstoimplement
technologies.
NHTSA'sinterestis intheoverallperformanceofthe
system.Vehiclesthemselveshavebeenfoundtobe
variable.Therefore,whileintheoryit is agreedthat
sub-systemvariabilitycanbeanimportantfactor,it
needstobeassesse,tin thecontextof theoverall
system.It shouldPea concernforsub-system
suppliersandautomanufacturers.Improvedairbag
deploymenttimingwillreducethepotentialforairbag
inducedinjuriesto )ut-of-positionccupants.
NHTSAagrees.Etfortstoaddressarangeofcrash
conditionsareongoing.Developingsystemsto meet
therequirementswillleadtoinherentlybetter
reliability.
12
13
14
15
NHTSA/Industry: Cooperative Efforts
JPL Recommendation
Develop quantitative goals
for safer and more protective
restraint systems that address
air-bag-induced injuries and
protection in high-severity
crashes.
Continue to develop and
refine biomechanical injury
criteria for restraint systems
using the best science
available.
Develop protocols and
procedures for testing air bag
systems to ensure air bag
system robustness.
Inform the public of the
specific risks associated with
each vehicle air bag, e.g., by
providing the keep-out zone
dimensions, and recommend
ways to mitigate the risk.
NHTSA Response
NHTSA agrees. NHTSA is addressing a range of crash
conditions, from low speed crashes where air bag
induced injuries more commonly occur to the high
speed crashes where air bags are most effective.
The biomechanical injury criteria NHTSA has
incorporated are based on considerable study and
assessment. The agency's standards are developed
based on the best information at hand and we upgrade
the requirements based upon the most up to date
information.
NHTSA generally agrees. Research programs have
been initiated to develop test procedures for evaluating
vehicle systems including air bag system's robustness
over a range of occupant sizes and crash severities.
We do not believe that it is possible to assess all risks
associated with each vehicle/air bag system given the
broad range of potential crashes and occupant positions.
General ways to reduce risk have been identified. Even
if it were possible to assess all risks, such an assessment
might lead to misinterpretation by the public. Any
keep-out zone information or any other pertinent
information about air bag risks themselves would have
to be accompanied by the air bag/vehicle system's
safety potential under a variety of conditions. This
approach would also provide no information about the
performance of the air bag sensor (i.e., the frequency of
unnecessary deployments in low severity crashes of a
particular vehicle), the crashworthiness of the vehicle,
etc. NHTSA has spent considerable effort informing
the public regarding personal actions that can be taken
to reduce the risk of air bag induced injury, and will
continue to recommend practices available in the future.
OVERALL COMMENTS TO THE ADVANCED AIR BAG ASSESSMENT REPORT.
NHTSA had numerous comments to the JPL Advanced Air Bag Assessment Report. While some
comments were in agreement with JPL's assessment, others were not. There was one major point
of contention between NHTSA and JPL that both parties, at the conclusion of the project, agreed to
disagree upon. This was the report's discussion of human injury risk criteria. The following section
briefly discusses the agency's position on this issue.
Human Injury Risk Criteria
The agency recognizes and agrees with JPL that valid hun_an injury risk criteria are necessary.
However, much of the discussion and many of the conclu-Aons reached by JPL in Appendix E,
Human Injury Risk Criteria, cannot be accepted because ofJPI's use of results obtained by procedures
that have not been accepted or adopted. In particular, JPL vsed the ad-hoc Mertz/Weber analysis
procedure for developing injury risk criteria. The agency feels that the injury relationships applied
by JPL are not the best representations of the available data. NHTSA will develop and rely on
criteria obtained using what it believes to be more rigorous a_alytical procedures. Furthermore, the
injury criteria currently specified by the agency's mandated Federal motor vehicle safety standards
have undergone a lengthy developmental process in which comments submitted in the course of
rulemaking have been given careful consideration before the final determination on the criteria.
One particular example of rulemaking regarding injury criteria is that in which the currently used
36 millisecond time duration for the Head Injury Criterion (I-IIC) was selected. HIC is a complex
calculation involving finding the maximum value of a mtthematical function using the head
acceleration response measured on a dummy during a crash test. The maximum value of this
function has been shown to be highly correlated to the probability of head injury. Prior to this
rulemaking, the calculation procedure involved finding the maximum value over any time duration
of the head acceleration response. The agency undertook th is rulemaking as a result of a petition
from Ford Motor Company to limit the HIC calculation to t 15 millisecond maximum duration.
The basis for the Ford petition was their contention that the r,;search that led to the development of
HIC involved head impact to rigid surfaces and the duration 'or these impacts were approximately
15 milliseconds in duration, and hence the calculation should t,e limited to a maximum time duration
of 15 milliseconds.
In August 1986, the agency rejected the proposed 15 millisecond time interval and instead chose a
36 millisecond duration for calculating HIC. This alternative was selected for a number of reasons.
The agency determined that neck loads and peak head accek rations would increase by 33 percent
if the shorter 15 millisecond duration were selected, thereby :esulting in an increased probability
of head and neck injuries in real world crashes. More importantly, however, the agency determined
that only a small fraction of brain injuries occur in the real world in the 15 millisecond or less
duration. Whereas in many real world crashes that are similar to the tests that the agency conducts,
the agency determined from evaluation of these tests that th ,_head contacts involved longer time
durations, i.e., in the range of the 36 milliseconds. Hence :he 36 millisecond time interval was
selected.
